Problems of Communism

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1971

CHINA'S NEW DIPLOMACY

Allen S. Whiting
G. F. Hudson
Robert A. Scalapino
Roderick MacFarquhar
Robert W. Barnett
C. P. FitzGerald
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Juergen Domes
Morton H. Halperin

Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy

Harry G. Gelber

Systemic Crisis in Soviet-Type Societies

Zygmunt Bauman

Romanian Foreign Policy

Robert L. Farlow

Lumumba University

Alvin Z. Rubinstein

Book Reviews

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

6

NOV-DEC 1971 VOL XX

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20547.

HOW TO SUBSCRIBE:
Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $3.00.

EDITOR: Theodore Frankel
MANAGING EDITOR: Marie Thompson House
ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Clarke H. Kawakami, Wayne Hall, David E. Albright
DESIGNER: Joseph D. Hockersmith

1 China's New Diplomacy: A Symposium (I)
Commentaries by Allen S. Whiting, G. F. Hudson, Robert A. Scalapino, Roderick MacFarquhar, Robert W. Barnett, C. P. FitzGerald, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Juergen Domes, Morton H. Halperin

33 Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy
by Harry G. Gelber

45 Twenty Years After:
The Crisis of Soviet-Type Systems
by Zygmunt Bauman

54 Romanian Foreign Policy:
A Case of Partial Alignment
by Robert L. Farlow

64 Lumumba University: An Assessment
by Alvin Z. Rubinstein

BOOKS

70 Sino-American Relations
by William P. Bundy

72 Keys to Peking's Foreign Policy
by Donald W. Klein

75 Moscow's Approach to Aid
by Roger E. Kanet

77 Building Communism
by William Taubman

NOTES & VIEWS

80 Correspondence

82 Index to Volume XX

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China's New Diplomacy
A Symposium (I)

EDITOR'S NOTE: China's foreign policy has entered a new phase. The leaders of the People's Republic, abandoning the diplomatic isolation which accompanied the Great Proletarian Revolution, have in recent months undertaken a number of important initiatives designed to improve China's relations with other nations. This shift in the Chinese posture, which has already resulted in a number of exploratory responses by a variety of governments, may well affect the shape and course of international relations for years to come.

In order to present an early assessment of China's new foreign policy and its implications, *Problems of Communism* has asked a number of experts, representing a variety of opinions, to answer the questionnaire published in the adjoining column. As is the case with all articles published in our journal, the opinions expressed by the contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government.

A concluding installment of the symposium will be published in the next issue of this journal.

1 What domestic and foreign factors prompted the leadership of the People's Republic of China to initiate its recent foreign policy overtures to the US, to other Western powers, and to Yugoslavia and Romania?

2 What implications do these developments have with respect to Peking's general posture in international affairs, both in state-to-state relations and as regards revolutionary movements?

3 What implications do the Chinese moves have for Chinese policy in Asia? In particular, what will be the probable effect on China's relations with Japan and her other Asian neighbors?

4 What will be the import of Chinese initiatives for Sino-Soviet relations?

5 What sort of relationship does Peking seek with the US and other Western nations? In view of the response from the US and other Western countries, what are the prospects for China's relations with them?

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentaries

Allen S. Whiting

1 The primary factor prompting the PRC's recent initiatives toward the US and other countries was a consideration of foreign, not domestic, policy —notably, Peking's apprehension over the growing Russian military buildup on China's borders. In 1968, the invasion of Czechoslovakia heightened Chinese concern that this buildup might be a prelude to Soviet intervention in the struggles unleashed by the Cultural Revolution or to a Soviet attack on China's installations for nuclear-weapons development. Explicit evidence of Peking's apprehension emerged in the public statements of PRC leaders during September and October 1968; by November the Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally proposed that the newly-elected Nixon administration conclude a treaty of peaceful coexistence with the PRC.

While domestic factors were secondary in the Chinese decision to launch upon a new course, it is certainly clear that Peking's foreign policy initiatives were made possible by developments in the Cultural Revolution. The regime's ability to undertake and persist in a new approach to the US required an end to the extreme xenophobia which had prevailed in China throughout 1967. According to allegations by Jack Chen, son of Eugene Chen (China's Foreign Minister from the late 1920's to 1932) and one of the few mainland Chinese who have recently been allowed to visit abroad, ultra-nationalism had been both nurtured and exploited by the so-called 5/16 or May 16th group, which on that date in 1967 launched a series of attacks ostensibly aimed against moderation in Chinese foreign policy but actually designed to overthrow Chou En-lai and Lin Piao. The attacks began with an assault on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and culminated in the sacking of the British Chancery in August 1967. By Chen's account, the defeat of this group and the subsequent elimination of remaining "ultra-leftist" elements in August 1968 made possible the restoration of law and order by the PLA. The return to normalcy, especially in the conduct of foreign policy, facilitated the regime's new initiatives abroad. Disputes and tensions may have remained, as suggested by Peking's sudden cancellation of the resumed Sino-American ambassadorial talks in February 1969. Basically, however, the turning-point came in 1967–68.

2 These developments mark a new shift in Peking's policy priorities, characterized by the ascendancy of moderation and traditional state-to-state relations over belligerence and support for revolutionary movements. Chinese Communist priorities have been reversed several times in the past two decades, depending upon the interaction of various domestic and foreign factors, and they are likely to be reversed again at some point in the future. For the present, however, Peking seems to have upgraded the importance of improving relations with established governments for whatever political or economic gains it can make, while at the same time soft-pedaling its support for opposition movements to unprovocative levels, in some cases even muting its verbal approval of revolutionary activity. This attitude was reflected in Peking's recent conclusion of a direct trade agreement with the government of Malaysia, despite the absence of official diplomatic ties between the two countries and despite the Chinese Communists' past support of the efforts of Malaysian insurgents. Peking assumed a similar stance vis-a-vis Ceylon by siding with the incumbent regime during the avowedly Maoist insurrection earlier this year.

3 It should be emphasized that the shift in Chinese Communist priorities is not likely to produce any significant change of policy insofar as Indochina is concerned. Peking's relations with Hanoi take priority over the objective of a greater détente with the US (for the moment, it is enough that President Nixon has agreed to visit China).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Were Peking to compromise the interests of its various Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian constituents, not only would the potential payoff of its long support of their struggle against the US be lost, but the Chinese would be giving Moscow a chance to make important political gains in the competition for influence in revolutionary movements throughout the world. The same considerations hold true for Peking's relations with Pyongyang, although the absence of actual military conflict in the Korean peninsula gives the Chinese more maneuverability, should they genuinely wish to defuse tensions through some mediating role. North Korea is the only country, other than the Soviet Union, to which the PRC is formally committed by a mutual defense treaty. Because of this obligation Peking presumably can speak more directly on matters which threaten to involve it in hostilities than it can in the case of Indochina, where it has no such commitment and therefore less leverage.

In Peking's long-run calculus, Sino-Japanese relations rank second in threat-potential only to relations with the Soviet Union. Ever since its inception the PRC has reacted sharply to any evidence of a revival of Japanese militarism, voicing particularly vehement suspicions of collusion between Japan and the United States. This alleged anxiety was given explicit expression in the Sino-Soviet mutual defense pact of 1950; the theme has resounded ever since, reaching an unprecedented volume in recent years. Up to now, none of Peking's tactical approaches—ranging from overt economic pressure and trade manipulations to subtle exploitation of anti-Americanism—has had any effect on Japan's course. But no doubt Peking hopes that its new initiative toward Washington will provide a chance to influence Tokyo's policy by strengthening pro-Chinese sentiment in Japan and by isolating those groups which might favor drastically increased armaments and eventual nuclear weapons.

Certain risks in Chinese policy, however, impede Peking's easy exploitation of the existing situation. While the propaganda barrage against Japan's alleged militarism and threat of aggressive expansionism might arouse suspicion and hostility toward Tokyo elsewhere in Asia, it could also evoke a nationalistic reaction in Japan. This, combined with a possible deterioration in Japanese-American rela-

Contributors to the Symposium

ALLEN S. WHITING—Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan and formerly head of the US State Department's Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific; his published works on China include *China Crosses the Yalu,* New York, Macmillan, 1960.

G. F. HUDSON—Director of the Center for Far Eastern Studies at St. Antony's College, Oxford, and editor of St. Antony's Far Eastern Affairs papers; author of, among other works, *Fifty Years of Communism, 1917-1967,* New York, Basic Books, 1968.

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO—Professor of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley) and editor of the journal *Asian Survey;* he has published *Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements,* 2nd ed., New York, Prentice-Hall, 1969, and numerous other works on Asian Communism.

RODERICK MACFARQUHAR—Senior Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and formerly editor of *The China Quarterly* (London); he is currently working on a three-volume study of the origins of China's Cultural Revolution.

ROBERT W. BARNETT—Vice-President of the Washington Center of the Asia Society and former Deputy-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

C. P. FITZGERALD—Professor Emeritus of Far Eastern History at Australian National University and currently Visiting Professor of Modern Chinese History at the University of Melbourne; among his numerous writings on China are *The Birth of Communist China,* New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI—Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University; his many publications on the Soviet Union and international communism include *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict,* rev. and enl. ed., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967; he is currently working on a study of Japan and its role in the world.

JUERGEN DOMES—Professor of Political Science and Director of the Research Unit on Chinese and East Asian Politics at the Free University of Berlin; he has written a number of books and articles on the history of the Kuomintang and political developments in the People's Republic of China.

MORTON H. HALPERIN—Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; author of, among other works, *China and the Bomb,* New York, Praeger, 1965, and editor of *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control,* Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions due to the changes in Washington's China policy as well as to new economic tensions, could stimulate support for a strong, independent Japanese military capability unrestrained by external ties. Sensitivity to these possibilities may mute some of the more extreme Chinese positions enunciated prior to President Nixon's announcement, in favor of a mixed strategy which attempts to improve state-to-state relations by emphasizing the common interests of Japan and the PRC while maintaining pressure against increased Japanese rearmament. A possible indicator that Peking is pursuing such a course was the sending of Wang Kuo-ch'uan, veteran of the Sino-American ambassadorial talks at Warsaw, to the funeral of the Japanese conservative party leader Kenzo Matsumura this past September. Wang's two-week stay permitted an exploration of Japanese attitudes and potential policies at the highest level of Chinese representation and reporting since 1964.

The effect of these developments on China's relations with Japan cannot be projected solely in terms of unilateral considerations; obviously the relationship depends on the interaction of the postures of Peking, Tokyo, and Washington, and perhaps Taipei and Moscow as well. Unlike Southeast Asia, where conflicts of interest preclude any easy settlement to mutual advantage, potential convergent interests exist in Northeast Asia which could involve all major parties in negotiations, with promise of common benefit. In the area of arms control and security, for instance, Peking understandably is concerned lest Japan become a nuclear power. Conversely, Japan's main concern is to preserve a situation in which its economy can continue to achieve unprecedented growth without the burden of an arms race. Finally, the American interest in Japanese military strength is wholly limited to defense of the Northeast Asian area against aggression. Conceivably these interests could converge to the point of achieving an agreement on a nuclear-free zone, reducing the potential threat to Japan by eliminating all nuclear weapons within a radius of —say—1200-1500 nautical miles. This would reduce the incentive to Tokyo to create a Japanese nuclear defense or deterrent. In turn, China would gain respite from the threat of still another nuclear opponent.

Remote as any such eventuality might seem at present, it illustrates the way in which a wholly changed set of perspectives could open up new possibilities in Sino-Japanese relations as a consequence of the changed Sino-American relationship. Another area of potential convergence of interests is suggested by China's claimed discovery of vast mainland oil reserves, not to mention the potentialities of its offshore continental-shelf holdings. It seems probable that these reserves far exceed the PRC's domestic requirements for the foreseeable future, and their proximity must make them highly attractive to Japan, especially given the uncertainty of Middle East sources. Their exploitation, however, would require heavy investments of capital and technology presently unavailable in China. American assistance in the development of China's oil production, facilitated by Export-Import Bank credits or Asian Development Bank loans, could provide links of interdependency between China and Japan, to their mutual benefit. Not only could this prove to be an economic boon to both nations, but it could also build a bridge of mutual confidence with respect to future policy moves.

4 Chinese initiatives have reawakened the USSR to the competitive threat it faced in the mid-1950's. Under Stalin, Moscow had become accustomed to unchallenged ascendancy in foreign affairs, whether in the area of Eastern Europe or vis-a-vis the United States. After Stalin's death, however, Peking moved forward on its own. Peking's role at the 1955 Bandung conference, its subsequent opening of ambassadorial talks with the United States, and its mediation in East European crises involving Soviet relations with Poland, Hungary, and other countries in 1956–57 demonstrated the desire and ability of the Chinese Communists to play a coequal role in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Soviet power and opportunity, however, made this an unequal competition; Moscow managed to maintain the dominant role in every situation, whether it involved crushing opposition views in East Europe or holding summit meetings in the United States. By 1959–60, Moscow's counteroffensive had beaten back Chinese initiatives on several fronts; concurrently Peking became more and more preoccupied with internal economic and security problems and soon drifted into a new phase of militancy toward conventional state-to-state relations.

Today, however, China has resumed its challenge to Moscow—and it now has the added advantage of appearing to be a state threatened with attack by its much stronger socialist neighbor. The force of Peking's accusations against the Soviets has been

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strengthened by Moscow's behavior—particularly its blatant threat in 1969 to start a war against China on the incredible allegation that the USSR itself might be attacked. China's consistent willingness to support the remote and small state of Albania against Russian pressures has strengthened its attraction for a country like Romania, which has faced Soviet threats similar to those said to confront China and which aspires to a genuinely independent policy. Thus China's position has provided a constraint on Soviet choice in East Europe both by turning Moscow's anti-Chinese moves into an embarrassment for the Soviets and by encouraging tendencies toward independence among the East Europeans.

Insofar as Sino-Soviet tensions are concerned, China's decision to move away from confrontation with the United States provides some offset to Soviet border pressures, at the very least by lifting the threat of a two-front war waged simultaneously from Russia and Taiwan or other US bases in Asia. It also denies the Soviet leadership its long monopoly on negotiation with Washington, a monopoly that has given Moscow leverage in its relations with other socialist states such as North Vietnam.

Thus, Sino-Soviet competition, which over the past decade has operated almost wholly at the level of subversive and revolutionary activity, resumes the dimension of rivalry in state relationships that characterized it in the mid-1950's. Moscow still has the advantage over Peking. Hints suggesting the availability of Soviet security commitments to non-Communist Asian states proliferated in 1969, and such a trend could still come to fruition—as indicated by the recent Soviet-Indian friendship treaty (one notable provision of which formally precludes Russia from assisting China should hostilities arise over the Sino-Indian border, regardless of which side initiates them). Moreover, Soviet economic and military aid can still far outstrip anything available from China. Nonetheless, the PRC's new ability to compete freely in diplomatic and political affairs, especially once it gains entry into the United Nations, will sharply trim past Soviet advantages in many areas.

5 At a minimum, Peking seeks relationships of full and unfettered equality with the United States and other Western nations, whether in the United Nations, in international trade, or in the multitude of transnational interactions which have proliferated in world affairs over recent decades. Any infringement of this equality, implied or expressed, will be resisted.

Beyond this, China's size, location, and historic tradition argue for its being treated as a major power in world councils, most certainly where Asian affairs are concerned. Peking's leadership intends to assert this position, as it has in the past.

Finally, the PRC seeks the removal of the US presence, as well as that of other Western nations, from its immediate environs insofar as their competitive influence is reflected in military bases and mutual security arrangements. For the United States this is of course a matter of major importance because of American ties to Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists, an involvement which Peking insists interferes with internal Chinese affairs. It seems unlikely that the present leadership in Peking will agree on full diplomatic relations with Washington as long as there are American military personnel, equipment, and bases on Taiwan and a mutual defense treaty is operative.

The external responses to these PRC positions will vary. China's minimum demand for equality is gradually being realized, largely through a series of policy initiatives undertaken by President Nixon, beginning with the slight easement of trade restrictions in 1969 and culminating in the abandonment of US opposition to Peking's entry into the UN. Insofar as its role in world councils is concerned, China has already participated in two Geneva conferences in 1954 and 1962, and it has now been assured of participation in any future Indochina conference that may eventuate.

It is at the third level of expectations that frustration and tensions may persist. Twenty years of American involvement on Taiwan will not be reversed overnight. Too many complex issues with far-reaching implications are involved for Washington to accept Peking's position; among the difficult problems to be considered are the fate of the 14 million persons on Taiwan whose socio-economic relations are wholly antithetical to those on mainland China; the disposition of Japanese as well as American assets on Taiwan; and the viability of American commitments elsewhere in Asia, which are of course related to resolution of the Taiwan problem. Internal bureaucratic interests in Washington as well as domestic political factors also impede a simple solution.

More broadly, twenty years of tension, distrust, and actual conflict, both overt and covert—overlaid

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the avowed ideological opposition of each side to the fundamental values and goals of the other—certainly cannot be expected to dissolve in an initial exchange of views. Hard tangible evidence of compromise on both sides will be necessary if a basis of confidence is to emerge sufficient to sustain a genuine *modus vivendi*, without which no real security will exist in the area except that guaranteed by military strength. Moreover, since security is subjectively perceived and mutual needs are rarely identically assessed in international relations, the 20-year heritage of Sino-American confrontation hangs particularly heavy. In addition, there are uncertainties regarding continued leadership on both sides: President Nixon's term officially ends in 1972; Mao Tse-tung, 78, and Chou En-lai, 73, are both aged, overworked men whose stature may be singularly necessary to carry off the changes in Chinese policy required for a rapprochement. In view of these and other factors, it is impossible to make any forecast with confidence insofar as the long-range prospects for US-Chinese relations are concerned. In the short run, however, there is no question that both sides have qualitatively changed their public positions so as to ensure no sudden reversion to the levels of mutual suspicion and antagonism that triggered the repeated Sino-American crises of the past two decades.

G. F. Hudson

When a state engaged in the game of international power politics find itself confronting two powerful adversaries, it is the path of prudence for the statesmen in charge of its strategic and diplomatic policies to try to neutralize one of them. How far this may be possible, which of the adversaries should be regarded as the more dangerous of the two, and what price it would be right to pay for a settlement of disputes with either of them are questions on which there are bound to be differences of opinion in the inner circles of government.

There is a reason to believe that in China such a conflict of opinion arose in 1965 and was part of the complex of conflicts within the Communist Party leadership which led to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the following year. Since 1960 the People's Republic of China had been involved in serious tensions with both the United States and the Soviet Union, but early in 1965 there were indications that the intensification of American intervention in Vietnam might sway Peking to seek a reconciliation with Moscow in order to restore the common front against the United States that had existed during the Korean War. When Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin stopped in Peking on his way back from Hanoi in February 1965, an editorial in the CCP organ *Jen-min Jih-pao* declared that "all those who try to undermine the alliance of China and the Soviet Union will inevitably end up with a bloody nose and meet with utter failure"—an astonishing reversal of the anti-Soviet polemics of the preceding five years.[1] Three months later, in May, the then Army chief of staff, Lo Jui-ch'ing, wrote an article which suggested, in suitably cautious language, a renewal of "socialist unity" to meet the contingency of war with the United States over Vietnam.[2]

This was the period when, as Mao Tse-tung was to complain later, he was treated by Chairman of the Republic Liu Shao-ch'i and CCP Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-p'ing "as if I were their dead parent at a funeral," [3] and it is reasonable to assume that the shift toward reconciliation with Moscow was their policy and not Mao's. In any event, it was certainly reversed when the Cultural Revolution got into its stride, with Sino-Soviet relations returning to a level of tension even higher than before.

The Maoists appeared to be undismayed by the consideration that in the event of an armed clash with the United States their persistence in a policy of hostility toward the Soviet Union must deprive them of the Russian support that had been so valuable in 1950–53. It seems that Mao judged the situation in Vietnam to be different from that which China had faced in Korea in 1950: he evidently did not believe that US forces would come up to the Chinese border or that they would stay the course in Vietnam. In an interview with journalist Edgar Snow in January 1965, he predicted that the Americans would not invade North Vietnam and that after a year or two they would "lose interest." [4] It was a

[1] Quoted in David Mozingo, *China's Foreign Policy and the Cultural Revolution*, International Relations of East Asia Area Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1970.

[2] "Commemorate the Victory Over German Fascism! Carry the Struggle Against US Imperialism Through to the End!", *Peking Review*, No. 20, May 14, 1965, pp. 7-22.

[3] Tokyo dispatches published in *The New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1967 (pp. 1-2), based on Japanese correspondents' reports from Peking.

[4] "Interview with Mao," *The New Republic* (New York), Feb. 27, 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shrewd forecast. With half a million men in Vietnam, the United States gave sanctuary status not only to North Vietnam but also to Laos and Cambodia, and by 1968 American public opinion had turned decisively against the war.

Since Mao did not believe that there was serious danger of war with the United States, he saw no need to make the sort of concessions that would have been required for a reconciliation with Moscow. On the contrary, in spite of Vietnam, he showed more of an inclination toward détente with America. The political development that was eventually to lead to the agreement for President Nixon's visit to Peking did not begin with the red-carpet treatment accorded to the American table-tennis players invited to China early this year; it began with the Chinese offer to resume the suspended Sino-US ambassadorial talks in Warsaw in November 1968. For whatever reason, Mr. Nixon did not feel it opportune at that time to change the course of US policy, and the Chinese canceled their offer at the last minute on the pretext of the United States' grant of political asylum to a Chinese diplomatic defector.

In July 1969, however, the proclamation on Guam of the Nixon Doctrine, with its promise of a "low-profile" US policy in Asia, opened the way for a fresh move toward Sino-US negotiation, and after the temporary flurry over events in Cambodia the Chinese must at last have become convinced that the Americans really were on their way out of Vietnam. There was now an apparent willingness on both sides to negotiate, and the Chinese no doubt came to feel that they could do so from a position of strength insofar as the American bargaining hand had been weakened by the isolationist trend in the United States, the loss of prestige resulting from the Vietnam war, the diplomatic recognition of the PRC by Italy, Canada and others, and the growing number of votes at the United Nations in favor of transferring China's UN seat to the Peking government.

On the other hand, the strength of the US position in relation to China lies in the continuing tension between China and the Soviet Union, and any anticipation of the course of the projected negotiations between Washington and Peking must depend on an estimate of the Chinese leaders' state of mind about the Soviet threat. If they are not seriously concerned about their relations with Russia and feel that they can ignore the unresolved antagonism of their great continental neighbor, then they can afford to be tough and uncompromising in dealing with the United States (particularly on the Taiwan issue), relying upon the strength of pacifist and isolationist political forces in the US, President Nixon's need for a successful outcome to his Peking visit to strengthen his electoral prospects in 1972, and the trend in the UN in favor of seating Communist China to win them a settlement more or less on their own terms. If, on the contrary, behind their facade of self-confidence, they are really apprehensive about the superior power and manifest ill will of the Soviet Union, then they clearly have an urgent need of benevolent neutrals, if not of allies, among the more important nations of the world, and it will be worth their while to accept compromises for the sake of a settlement—possibly even a settlement which would include a diplomatic formula for the continued separation of Taiwan. The Nixon-Kissinger approach to Peking, followed by Washington's public stand for maintaining existing US ties with Taiwan —a stand from which it would manifestly be difficult to withdraw—implies a belief on Washington's part that a compromise is possible, and such a belief can only stem from conviction that the Peking government wants better relations with the United States whether it can get Taiwan or not. This view is probably correct, though the evidence for it can only be circumstantial given the Peking government's remarkable ability to keep its political secrets—at least since the period of the astonishingly revealing Red Guard wall posters came to an end.

One cogent reason for believing that the Chinese leaders *are* genuinely alarmed about possible developments in their relations with the Soviet Union is that they must certainly be aware of the risks involved in their own policies. There can be no doubt that Mao's China aspires to become a third superpower in world affairs and, as a precondition for achieving that purpose, to acquire an effective nuclear capability. As a result of this intention, however, China is now passing through a zone of danger because her progress towards nuclear strength is already sufficient to alarm Russia but not yet enough to provide China with that "assured destruction capability" which is required to create the kind of mutual deterrence that exists between the Soviet Union and the United States. If Peking continues to give top priority to its nuclear program, the time is not very far off when China will have a second-strike capability enabling her to inflict "unacceptable" damage on either the Asian territories of the Soviet Union or the Asian allies of the United States. This would mean a fundamental alteration of current power relations in the world, and one that would

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have much more serious implications for the Soviet Union than for the United States because the latter can disengage from Asia while the Soviet Union cannot.

During the interim period before China can attain such a capability, she therefore has to reckon with the possibility that the Soviet Union may force a showdown. For the present, Moscow holds a winning hand, and the strategic planners in Peking can hardly be unaware of this fact. For China the appropriate response to the situation is to get together on as friendly terms as possible with all countries which might give her diplomatic or economic support or help restrain or divert the Soviet Union in a Sino-Soviet crisis. Hence not only Peking's invitation to President Nixon but also China's apology to Britain for the outrages against British diplomats in China during the Cultural Revolution, the new benevolence she has been showing toward the capitalist countries of Western Europe, and her patronage of Yugoslavia and the USSR's troublesome East European ally, Romania.

All this, of course, implies that Chinese leadership of the forces of world revolution will have to take second place for the time being. In its quarrel with Moscow, the Chinese Communist leadership has exploited the symptoms of Soviet "revisionism" to present itself as the sole heir to the pure revolutionary tradition of Marxism-Leninism, as the uncompromising foe of imperialism and steadfast champion of all national liberation struggles "betrayed" by the Soviet Union in its "collusion" with America. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, when Mao was relying on juvenile mobs to unseat his opponents in party and state, Chinese revolutionary zeal culminated in a wave of xenophobia that enveloped nearly all foreign countries, capitalist or Communist, in a common condemnation. Yet, even in the days of Red Guard rampancy, China actually did very little to support revolutions abroad, her material aid to North Vietnam was outmatched by the Soviet Union, and her backing of the Burmese Communists was far less than it could have been. Preference for good relations with an established government at the expense of helping local revolutionaries can always be excused by invoking the Maoist principle that peoples must make their own revolutions.

Receiving the President of the United States in Peking after a whole generation of young Chinese has been brought up to regard Washington as the source of all evil will no doubt be somewhat embarrassing to the Chinese Communist leadership, but it may be recalled that Mao once negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek. Perhaps a still more difficult ideological *volte-face* is involved in Peking's overtures toward reconciliation with Yugoslavia, formerly denounced by the Chinese Communists as outrageously revisionist and certainly no repentant prodigal today. But Peking has long since cast ideological consistency to the winds in its attitudes toward the affairs of Eastern Europe. Dubcek was even more revisionist than Tito, and Maoists should logically have acclaimed the Soviet intervention against him, but instead China denounced it as an act of "social imperialism." The guiding principle is simply "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

> *For its part, the Soviet Union is locked in an ideological and nationalist-territorial power struggle with China. The signs of a Sino-US thaw have caused some unease in Moscow, which is accordingly anxious to buttress its own position. It has quite expectedly turned to India as among the countries on which it can anchor itself in Asia.*
>
> —Editorial in ***Hindustan Times*** **(New Delhi), Aug. 10, 1971.**

The arrangement for President Nixon's visit has been very helpful to Peking from the standpoint of the latter's relations with Japan. This is not simply because the US approach to the PRC gives Tokyo the green light to take the same road, but also because the manner in which the decision was taken by Washington—without any prior consultation with the Tokyo government—has seriously weakened the political forces in Japan favoring close alignment with US policy and strengthened those who advocate a more independent course. In Japan, a reconciliation with Peking has long been favored not only on the political Left, where sympathy and admiration for Communist China are widespread, but also on the Right, where powerful business interests see hope for a great expansion of Japanese trade with the mainland once diplomatic relations are restored. Former Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama, an opponent of Premier Sato's pro-American foreign policy, advocates that Japan, in order to obtain good relations with Peking, should abrogate its existing treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan—a treaty which China's Premier Chou En-lai has declared to be "null and void"—and it seems likely that Japanese policy will move in this direction, leaving the United

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States with the obligation to defend Taiwan without much in the way of support from Japan.

But while an eventual agreement between Tokyo and Peking would have great advantages for Communist China, both political and economic, it would not—however close the association—strengthen the Chinese strategic position inasmuch as Japan's present military weakness renders her a negligible factor in international power politics. At least in the near future, it cannot be expected that she would be anything but a cautious neutral in the event of a crisis of peace or war on the mainland of Asia.

On the other side of China, the announcement of the Nixon visit, prepared as it was by Mr. Henry Kissinger's secret flight to Peking from Pakistan, has already produced a result adverse to the PRC in the shape of the Soviet-Indian "friendship" treaty negotiated in Delhi by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in early August. This treaty clearly represents the Soviet Union's first countermove to offset the Sino-American rapprochement. There is now talk of a Moscow-Delhi "axis" in Asia, and in this writer's opinion it is no longer tenable to hold that India remains a "nonaligned" power. The treaty admittedly falls short of being a full military alliance, but not far short, and the obligation to "consult" in the event of an attack or threat by a third power is mutual: it could apply not only to an attack or threat against India by either China or Pakistan, but also to an attack or threat against the USSR—and this presumably only by China since the Soviet Union and Pakistan have no common frontier. Moscow would certainly invoke the treaty in the event of another Sino-Soviet armed clash similar to that on the Ussuri River in 1969, in which the Russians claimed that China was the aggressor. On the Indian side, the main thrust of the treaty is clearly against Pakistan, and it is widely believed in India that the pact may at some future time provide cover for Indian intervention on behalf of East Pakistani independence. Faced by this possibility, Peking will have to decide whether to tighten its existing quasi-alliance with Pakistan and thus incur a risk of war with India (and the Soviet Union), or to pull back and leave Pakistan to its fate, thereby increasing the chance that the whole of South Asia might eventually drift into the Soviet orbit.

Most comment in the West on the détente between Peking and Washington has centered on the likely effects of China's new diplomacy in bringing about a general relaxation of tensions in world affairs, drawing China out of an embittered isolation, and mellowing the revolutionary fanaticism that was born in the caves of Yenan. But the indications are that China's new course represents primarily an insurance against the day of wrath which the leaders in Peking fear may come as a consequence of developments in continental Asia. As such, it promises them substantial advantages in certain situations; and certainly no one in the Chinese Communist leadership is better fitted than Chou En-lai to make friends and influence people in China's cause. But China's prospective gain has its limits. Not in North America, nor in Europe, nor in Japan does she have any prospect in the near future of finding a military ally. Certainly the United States, in seeking to reduce its responsibilities abroad and to relax the tensions that have blocked the road to a stable peace over the last two decades, would hardly be ready to incur on behalf of Communist China risks greater than those which have been involved in its international commitments hitherto.

Robert A. Scalapino

1 Two overriding concerns in the international area have preoccupied the People's Republic of China in recent years: the prospect of wide-ranging conflict with the Soviet Union for the indefinite future, and the perceived threat of a dynamic Japan projecting itself once again into East Asia politically and militarily.

Peking's concern over current Soviet attitudes and policies can scarcely be overestimated. The Russians have shown that they are prepared to be both tough and persevering. The threat of nuclear war, used by Moscow in 1969 to bring Peking to the bargaining table, was taken very seriously by the Chinese, as their subsequent defense measures testify. And it left an extraordinarily bitter aftertaste. Moreover, Peking has obviously regarded the 1968 Brezhnev Doctrine as an instrument that could be invoked to justify Soviet interference in the internal affairs of any socialist state—including China. The Chinese no doubt feel that Moscow would not hesitate to become involved in Chinese politics operating through those ousted in the recent Cultural Revolution or others, should a succession crisis or some similar opportunity present itself. Of more immediate concern to Peking, however, is the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mounting evidence that the Soviet Union now seeks to develop a containment policy, countering the China "threat" by encouraging an Asian collective security system involving such nations as India and possibly even Japan. Peking's counterattack is now underway, not merely via its overtures to the United States, its alignment with Pakistan, and its effort to influence such states as North Korea and North Vietnam, but also by Chinese penetrations into that soft underbelly of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe.

Clearly, classical concerns of power and security on both sides are now dictating policies totally inexplicable in orthodox Marxist-Leninist terms. Nevertheless, the fact that both states proclaim themselves to be true Communist societies makes the contest more complex—and possibly more dangerous. It becomes necessary to define one's opponent as a heretic, to challenge his legitimacy in every sense. "Maoism" and "Khrushchevism" thus come under sustained attack from the respective sides as false doctrines leading to cumulative errors, and a strenuous effort is made to separate the people from their leaders. In this fashion, additional dimensions are added to the classic power struggle of two mammoth, neighboring, competitive nation-states.

Is the Chinese concern about Japan equally serious—and equally warranted? There are reasons to argue that, consciously or unconsciously, Peking is greatly exaggerating the threat of Japanese "militarism," ignoring the major psychological and political barriers that currently prevent the re-emergence of Japan as a truly major power. Ironically, in the next five years at least, only a great intensification of Tokyo's perception of threat from China or a total collapse of its faith in American credibility is likely to produce the type of Japan envisaged in Peking's propaganda. Nevertheless, it is understandable that Chinese leaders now into their seventies in age, for whom Japan was the *bête noire* of the 1930's and 1940's, would view with great apprehension the extraordinary economic growth of Japan in recent decades. Their distrust of the Japanese is deep and ineradicable. Moreover, their Marxist orientation tells them that political and military power inevitably follows economic might. Hence, Peking's concern over Japan is no doubt real, warranted or not, and has prompted policies that are aimed at undermining the US-Japanese alliance and blocking Japan from playing any political-military role in East Asia, especially with respect to Korea or Taiwan.

Unquestionably, Peking's anxiety about Japan relates directly to the Taiwan issue. The possibility of a Kuomintang resurgence and a renewed civil war does not seem to worry Peking's leaders in the slightest, but they are deeply concerned over the possible emergence of an independent Taiwan sustained by Japanese/American support. They know that in *de facto* terms, the trend is strongly in this direction; that it has wide support from the people on Taiwan; and that it is a logical development from the standpoint of the interests of Japan and the rest of non-Communist Asia. Indeed, the timing of Peking's current overtures may relate in part to the issue of Taiwan. From the viewpoint of the Chinese leaders, it might well seem better to seek a solution to Taiwan while Chiang Kai-shek is still alive, since he is a firm advocate of "One China," a stalwart opponent of independence for the Taiwanese, and a symbol of a civil war not yet legally concluded. If the Taiwan issue were still unsettled at the time of his death, independence might seem more logical—and more within grasp.

The role of Indochina in Peking's "new policy" is more obscure. In a fascinating interview with a Yugoslav journalist in August 1971, Chou En-lai insisted that the Indochina issue was first on China's agenda for discussion with the US; that China would not serve as a mediator, but rather as a support of the "Indochinese peoples' cause"; and that the United States had to be "forced" to accept the Communist position.[1]

No doubt this hard line was taken, at least in part, because of Peking's deep concern over Hanoi's negative reaction to her new American policies, and also over the quick Soviet effort to exploit signs of unease in North Vietnam and elsewhere. At the very least, the Southeast Asian scene must appear far more complex to the PRC than it did a few years ago. On one hand, the threat of an American-Chinese conflict in Southeast Asia now seems very remote; on the other hand, Soviet advances in the area appear in Chinese eyes to be a part of Moscow's encirclement policies. These factors may produce some shift in China's policy vis-a-vis Indochina. Conceivably, the new Soviet "threat" could lead Peking to seek rapprochement with certain non-Communist regimes in the area, and even to accept a mushy solution to the Indochinese war, especially if it offered prospects for increased dependence of both the Communists and certain "neutrals" upon Peking. Already, overtures have

[1] See Dara Jankeovich's report in *Vjesnit* (Belgrade), Aug. 28, 1971.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been made to leaders formerly excoriated as "fascists," such as Burma's Premier, General Ne Win. It is also possible, however, that the same drive for influence could lead Peking to adopt a very rigid position on the critical issues involving the region. The most likely development is probably some combination of these approaches, calculated to outmaneuver both the US and the USSR.

How do recent policies relate to domestic trends within China? On the surface at least, they would appear to represent a defeat for the "Left," and a continuation of the trends that were set in motion in mid-1967, when strongly ideological, super-revolutionary elements—in the course of reducing PRC foreign policy to a shambles—overreached themselves internally by posing a threat to the army and the civil administration alike. It appears that the swing of the pendulum has now gone sufficiently far to knock off such Maoist stalwarts as Ch'en Po-ta, and even to reduce greatly the role of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching. Yet it is just such oscillations which should teach outside observers the lesson that they must be exceedingly and continuously cautious in analyzing and predicting internal Chinese politics.

2 Since the advent of the Communists to power, Chinese foreign policy has been formulated on the basis of three sets of relations: state-to-state, people-to-people, and comrade-to-comrade. In addition to such formal diplomatic ties as it desired or could obtain, Peking has placed a heavy premium upon "direct contacts" with the people of various countries, implementing its policy through the encouragement of "friendly visits" to and from China and the operation of an elaborate publications and media network. Indeed, "people-to-people diplomacy" has comprised the major portion of the PRC's foreign relations at various points in the past. At the same time, Peking has vied with Moscow for the mantle of leadership of the international revolutionary movement, seeking to portray itself as more conscious of its fraternal revolutionary obligations than its Soviet rival. Hence, it has rendered assistance in a variety of forms to radical movements in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even Western countries.

To operate simultaneously on the three levels outlined above has inevitably involved the Chinese Communists in contradictions difficult to resolve. Obviously Peking cannot find it easy to have "normal" relations with another state while berating it unmercifully via every open channel in an effort to separate the people from the leaders and to induce the former to make the latter tailor their policies more closely to PRC desires. It is even less easy for Peking to have normal state-to-state relations while rendering technical assistance to revolutionary forces that seek to overthrow the government of the state concerned.

Despite the difficulties involved, however, this three-tiered approach to foreign relations has some tactical and strategic advantages. When a government proves recalcitrant (from Peking's vantage point), an appeal can be made over its head to the people. This kind of appeal may prove effective, especially when it is directed at open societies. Moreover, Peking's capacity to increase or decrease aid to internal subversive groups may deter the government in power from pursuing policies considered hostile by the PRC—especially if, by virtue of its geographic propinquity, that government is highly vulnerable to Chinese-abetted subversion.

Nevertheless, Peking must establish its priorities among the three types of relations and periodically review them. Recent events would indicate that the PRC is now prepared to place a higher value on state-to-state relations and on active participation in the existing structure of international organization (albeit on its own terms). If this trend continues, the long-range repercussions may be of great significance.

First, the trend toward traditional diplomacy will greatly complicate the foreign policy decision-making process of the Chinese People's Republic, in the same fashion as Soviet foreign policy decisions have been rendered more complex in the decades since the USSR's growing international involvement. Any state, including a Communist state, so involved is forced to make a multitude of decisions, weighing highly complex factors; it cannot act in a manner pleasing to its natural allies on all occasions. Compromises and concessions are inevitable. Thereby, its "purity" is diluted, in both ideological and policy terms.

Second, the relative advantages of actively supporting a vast array of revolutionaries dedicated to the overthrow of their governments and of overtly challenging existing international institutions is likely to diminish as the Chinese People's Republic seeks to establish its own legitimacy in the international arena and to win approval for those policies that it defines as being in its national interest.

This is not to suggest that Peking will relinquish

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people-to-people or comrade-to-comrade relations. On the contrary, in *certain* settings, one or both of these approaches may play the dominant role. For example, people-to-people diplomacy has been applied rather effectively in Japan for the past decade, when state-to-state relations were almost nonexistent, and by means of such diplomacy Peking has increasingly become a major factor in internal Japanese politics. It has been reliably reported, moreover, that Chinese leaders have privately explained their new policies toward the US to party cadres by asserting that "American imperialism" will continue to be the main enemy, but that the new diplomacy gives them much greater access to the American people as well as to other people of "the American camp."

At the same time, to the extent that the People's Republic of China increases its participation as a recognized state in the world arena, involving itself in a wide range of conferences, negotiations, and international gatherings, it will come to put a higher premium upon state-to-state relations, its foreign relations will become more complex, and the value of its "outlaw" or "revolutionary" role will become more questionable.

3 Future Chinese policies in Asia can only be analyzed after the broader context in which they must operate has been set forth. A major power realignment now appears to be under way in Eastern Asia, one affecting every society in the region. For more than 20 years, American power underwrote the security of most of non-Communist Asia, with joint Soviet-Chinese guarantees playing a similar function for the Communist states. In these terms, a bipolar system prevailed. "Nonalignment" was a rare commodity, and a precarious one—as the negative results of the foreign policy of India's Prime Minister Nehru illustrated.

Now, startling new patterns of security and political alignment are emerging. At a time when American commitments are being reduced, Soviet commitments are increasing, and—directly or indirectly—these latter commitments are aimed at the containment of China. The USSR now has a virtual alliance with India to offset Sino-Pakistan ties. In addition to its long-standing "protection" of Outer Mongolia, it stands ready to vie with China for the affection of other Asian Communist states—notably North Korea and North Vietnam—and at a minimum to prevent their solid alignment with Peking. Moreover, it has made overtures to most of the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia in recent years, even those with the most rigorously anti-Communist regimes. Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and even Cambodia *sans* Sihanouk have been the recipients of Soviet gestures or acts designed to offer an alternative to reliance on the People's Republic of China.

Meanwhile, the United States has signaled its desire to assume a lower posture in Asia and to reduce the heavy burdens it has carried there since World War II. Despite the assurances of the Nixon administration that treaty commitments will be maintained and that there will be no return to isolationism, many American allies are deeply worried. They do not doubt the intentions of the present administration in Washington, but they are less certain concerning the will of the American people and the direction of longer-range political trends.

In this setting, it is natural to ask whether Japan will and ought to assume some part of the post-1945 American role in eastern Asia. No nation has a greater stake in the security and prosperity of the region. None is as well equipped to render economic and, if need be, military assistance. It is always possible, of course, that the small countries of an area like Southeast Asia will ultimately fashion regional organizations that are effective in terms of security as well as economic relations—but the signs are not yet very encouraging in this respect.

Chinese foreign policy in Asia should be seen in this context. It should be emphasized that despite a flood of rhetoric suggesting that China is the local leader of the world's revolutionary forces, Peking at this point intends to place primary stress upon its role in Asia. It desires recognition, in the first instance, as an *Asian* power, and one entitled to a sphere of influence in the region.[2]

What are the PRC's probable minimal and maximal policy objectives in Asia? At a minimum, China wishes to have relative security on her borders, a difficult goal in the face of Sino-Soviet hostility. The Soviet "problem" has probably increased China's willingness to accept truly independent, nonaligned smaller states on her border, rather than to demand

[2] On this point, Chou En-lai had some very interesting comments to make in the interview cited in footnote 1. First, he indicated that while the PRC wished overseas movements well and would give them such moral and material support as possible, "water at a distance cannot extinguish fires." Regarding Asia, however, he asserted that China had a greater right to be heard than others (*i.e.*, the superpowers) and also bore a heavier burden of responsibility for the area.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that all be Peking-style Communist states. In the era when the Sino-Soviet alliance was firm, there was little need to settle for less than a Communist Asia. Now, the situation is considerably more complex, especially given recent Soviet policies (noted earlier) in such regions as Southeast Asia. At a minimum also, China wants a weak Japan, one that does not become politically or militarily committed beyond its own territory, and Chinese policy can be expected to be strongly directed toward such a goal. Further, China would like the United States to sustain as few commitments as possible in the Pacific-Asian region, and to have the most tenuous accord—if any—with the Soviet Union concerning the area. Naturally, Peking can also be expected to strive earnestly to win all Asian Communist parties and states into its camp as an additional safeguard against Soviet expansionism.

What are China's maximal objectives in East Asia? First, the overthrow of "Khrushchevism" and its current disciples, and a fundamental reordering of all Soviet domestic and foreign policies directly or indirectly affecting Asian areas. Second, the ouster of the United States from Asia—including the scrapping of all treaties now in being between the US and its Asian allies. Third, the creation of a "neutral" Japan governed by the Left Socialists or possibly the Buddhist-based Komeito party. And finally, the emergence—either through evolution or revolution—of as many small states as possible modeled after China and prepared to accept Chinese guidance and sponsorship.

For the time being, Peking's Asia policies are more likely to be concentrated on achieving its minimal objectives—obviously because they constitute more realistic goals, given the present political and power configuration of the Pacific-Asian region.

4 Sino-Soviet relations are currently those of two hostile, highly competitive states forced by fate to coexist along a 4,500-mile border, and now at odds on a wide range of issues. Despite the elements of fear and hate involved, however, a climactic war between these two Communist giants is highly unlikely. Soviet nuclear weapons could devastate China, obliterating its sparse nuclear facilities, smashing its industrial centers, and reducing its population by many millions; but such a course on Moscow's part would leave countless more millions of bitterly alienated people in China, comprising a huge population scarcely amenable to Soviet guidance or rule. To occupy China is a truly formidable task, as the Japanese discovered after 1937. And to assume that a subservient clientele can be created through nuclear warfare is a very dubious proposition, especially as it relates to China. Undoubtedly, there are those within the Soviet establishment who have advanced a preventive-war thesis, cognizant of the fact that China may someday have a threatening arsenal of nuclear weapons. But the indications are strong that the Soviet leaders have determined upon another course of action: combining patience and toughness, they intend to wait out the present generation of "misguided" Maoists, hoping that the next generation of Chinese leaders will be "correct Marxist-Leninists" prepared to accept Moscow's basic policies.

> *Needless to say, the final evaluation of the importance of the American-Chinese talks that have taken place and of the agreement reached can be made only after concrete results appear. However, commentators even now are pointing out the difficulties, primarily for the participants in the American-Chinese dialogue themselves. . . .*
>
> **—Yu. Nikolaev, " 'Sensation' and Reality," *Izvestia*, July 29, 1971.**

If total war between the USSR and China seems improbable at present, total peace also seems unlikely. Each country is now reaching for its opponent's jugular vein in the course of some of the most intensive political-psychological warfare witnessed since 1945. Peking's current objectives with respect to the Soviet Union are fivefold: to block Soviet efforts to contain China through alignment or friendship with non-Communist as well as Communist states on the Eurasian continent; to counterattack by penetrating the heart of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, ignoring Peking's own earlier strictures against Yugoslav "revisionism" and reversing its past support for Russian dominance in this region (specifically over Hungary and Poland); to interfere with and, if possible, dilute Soviet-American cooperation—or, as the PRC leaders would put it, "superpower monopolistic diplomacy"; to challenge Soviet leadership within both the Communist and the broader "revolutionary" worlds, offering theoretical and material alternatives; and to achieve a position of military power precluding Soviet blackmail, with the ultimate goal of parity.

Current Soviet objectives are no less ambitious: to contain China by promoting a series of "friend-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ship" and security agreements with states on the periphery of the Chinese empire which face a potential threat from Peking; to make a determined defense of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, combining a firm stand on the limits to which independence can go in this region with a willingness to explore more seriously the possibility of détente with the West, so as to reduce pressures from that quarter; to insist upon the primacy of Soviet-American relations in "solving" critical international problems, and to resist strenuously any substitution of a Sino-American rapprochement; to uphold Soviet leadership within the international Communist movement, while underwriting select revolutionary movements, particularly those related to spheres of Soviet interest such as the Middle East; and finally, to maintain a strong edge over China militarily, particularly in the nuclear field.

Under these conditions, Sino-Soviet relations seem destined to remain troubled, now and for the foreseeable future.

5 Two seemingly opposite interpretations of China's overtures toward the United States and the West are permissible at this time. It can be argued that the People's Republic of China, faced with a grave challenge from the Soviet Union and deeply worried about a resurgent Japan, now desires greater flexibility in its foreign policies and an end to isolation. To attain these objectives, some degree of rapprochement with the West, and especially with the United States, is required—and since the US is a distant superpower, not one on China's borders, such rapprochement may be possible.

Another interpretation, however, would be that China sees this as an opportune time at which to weaken and divide all of her leading opponents. It can be argued that despite her troubles with the Soviet Union, China continues to regard "American imperialism" as a deadly enemy, especially in combination with a rising Japan. By entering more directly onto the world scene and directing appeals to the American people (over the head of their government, if necessary) and to other peoples of the economically "advanced" world, including the Japanese, the PRC can take advantage of the current weariness of Americans, their preoccupation with internal problems and wariness of foreign involvement, the increasing fissures in American-Japanese relations, and the general weakening of American credibility in Asia.

At this point, it is not necessary to choose between these two interpretations, because elements of both are probably present in Chinese Communist thought and policy planning. The Soviet Union certainly represents the most immediate threat to the PRC leaders, since it is the only major power which is currently expanding its commitments and enlarging its role in the world—albeit its "expansionist" moves are frequently a direct response to a perceived Chinese menace. The United States, on the other hand, is contracting its commitments, and Japan is still essentially a nonpower in political and military terms, whatever the uncertainties of the future. Thus, this is an opportune time for Peking to probe the willingness of the United States (and Japan) to make various changes in their policies in line with PRC desires, particularly on issues relating to Taiwan and Korea. Unless Peking wishes to fight simultaneously on all fronts (as seemed to be the case at the height of the Cultural Revolution), a détente—temporary or permanent—must be sought with some of the major powers, and the price for détente with the Soviet Union is currently much too high.

One cannot overlook the fact, however, that Chinese leaders continue to list "American imperialism" and "Japanese militarism" as fundamental enemies, to be defeated at all costs. They have assured such allies as North Korea and North Vietnam that they will remain true to their commitments and their principles (although it is unclear whether these assurances have been fully accepted). And privately, they have indicated that they intend to have maximum contact with the "progressive" elements of the American public and the Western world as a whole, quite apart from state-to-state discussions.[3]

If the above analysis is correct, few concessions can be expected from the People's Republic of China, at least initially, on such issues as Taiwan, Indochina, and Korea. Peking's line on these questions is likely to be tough—and her patience seem-

[3] Once again, the Chou En-lai interview with Dara Jankeovich is instructive. Asserting that American imperialism is now in the greatest danger, he stated that "we must understand this objective reality" and compel the United States to accept the demands of the people.

Yet in the same interview, Chou had just finished rendering an emotional, highly *defensive* portrayal of the potential dangers with which Peking had to deal. Using almost identical words to those voiced by Ch'en Yi when he was Foreign Minister a few years ago, Chou asserted that even if China were attacked from the north by the USSR, from the south by the US, from the east by Japan, and from the Tibetan region by India, she was prepared for all eventualities.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ingly inexhaustible. Whether the United States is prepared psychologically and politically to cope with this situation without becoming disillusioned and angry on the one hand or making premature concessions on the other now becomes one of the truly epochal tests of American diplomacy.

For the Chinese People's Republic, there are also challenges and risks of a crucial nature. As noted earlier, Peking is now entering into a vastly more complex set of relations, and neither China's leaders nor any other government can control the flow of events that will follow from the basic decisions they have recently made. Thus Peking's relations with allies and the "nonaligned" can never again be simple or "pure." People-to-people diplomacy, moreover, is potentially a two-edged sword.

Initial agreements between the United States and the People's Republic of China are most likely to come on technical matters and on problems where the leaders of the two countries see the greatest commonality of national interests. Thus, as in the case of Soviet-American relations, it will not be possible to graph progress in a linear fashion, but only to chart circles of agreement and disagreement, zones of accommodation and of conflict. From all indications, however, we are entering a new era which holds promises equal to its dangers.

Roderick MacFarquhar

1 The ending of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution signaled at the Chinese Communist Party's Ninth Congress in April 1969 permitted the Chinese leadership to give serious thought to foreign affairs for the first time in three years. Two major factors appear to have shaped their thinking: the potential menace of Soviet "social imperialism" and the evident willingness of a number of Western countries to better their relations with China.

With the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia fresh in everybody's mind, Lin Piao indicated to the Ninth Congress that social imperialism was as dangerous as the American variety. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969—coupled with reports that the USSR was sounding out the attitudes of its allies toward a possible preemptive strike against China—drove the lesson home. Soviet-style revisionism, with its attendant threat of a "capitalist restoration," was a long-term worry to be combated by means of cultural revolution; Soviet social imperialism was an immediate threat to be countered by diplomatic action.

One obvious move was to defuse the Sino-Soviet border conflict; hence the Chou-Kosygin meeting of September 1969 and the agreement to initiate border talks. But the Soviet collective leadership was an unpredictable quantity; more lasting safeguards were needed, especially as the border talks dragged on without solution.

Better relations with countries that also reckoned the USSR a threat seemed logical, especially since some of those countries were indicating their interest in détente. China instituted diplomatic relations with Canada and Italy, both members of NATO. Preparations were made for a visit to China by General de Gaulle, and the Chinese apologized and paid for the wrecking of the British embassy in Peking during the Cultural Revolution. Peking also cultivated potential victims of social imperialism in Eastern Europe such as Romania and even Yugoslavia, once roundly denounced by Chinese propagandists for ideological deviations.

But the big breakthrough was, of course, in Sino-US relations. This occurred only after President Nixon had proven, by a progressive scaling down of trade and travel restrictions over a period of 21 months, that improvement of those relations was now a prime objective of American policy. Still the Chinese preferred—when making their own move by inviting the American ping-pong players—to keep the relationship at a people-to-people level. (They were doubtless impressed by the way Hanoi has benefited by conducting people's diplomacy vis-a-vis the US.) President Nixon had to dispatch a personal emissary, Mr. Henry Kissinger—presumably with a guarantee that the US was prepared to see China in the United Nations this year—before there could be a parallel breakthrough at the governmental level in the shape of the invitation to Mr. Nixon to visit China.

Behind the invitation—apart from the considerations already discussed—there probably lay a long-term desire on the part of the Chinese Communist leadership to play a role in world affairs as great as that of the United States or the USSR. The attainment of this goal always meant the PRC's entry into the UN and into extensive diplomatic relations with the United States, and now that these things appear to be in the cards, Peking is acting to bring them about.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2 China has always tended to be very correct in her state-to-state relations so long as Peking feels that there is reciprocity, and this attitude will no doubt persist. If the People's Republic does enter the UN this year, it will see itself as the champion of the third world and small-power underdogs—a category that is flexible enough to include virtually all countries except the two superpowers—in the struggle to break what Peking considers to be tacit American-Soviet collusion to enforce the status quo.

Peking will continue to support revolutionary movements in principle and, in carefully selected instances, in practice. But for the moment state-to-state relations will probably take priority, as China's attitude towards the left-wing insurrections in Pakistan and Ceylon indicates. China has always tried to deal fairly with countries that have helped her. This certainly applies to Ceylon, which sold China rubber during the Korean war, and Pakistan, which modified its pro-American alignment to enter a marriage of convenience with China. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia has been maintained in style in Peking although his value to the Chinese as a diplomatic counter must be uncertain.

3 The real question to be asked first is: What implications does the change in American policy towards China have for US-Japanese relations? The Japanese government has, to put it mildly, been placed in a highly uncomfortable position by a policy shift that takes an American president to Peking before one has visited Tokyo. Will this mean that Japanese faith in the American nuclear umbrella will diminish? If so, will the Japanese go on to build nuclear weapons?

Morton Abramowitz and Richard Moorsteen, in their recent book on US China policy (*Remaking China Policy: US-China Relations and Governmental Decision Making*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971), point out that the US and China have a common interest in preventing Japan from getting nuclear weapons. American correspondents who recently visited Peking have confirmed the message of Chinese editorials and broadcasts: China is deeply concerned and worried about the growth of Japanese power.

China's problem is: Does the danger of Japan going nuclear make it advantageous for China to tolerate the continuation of the present US-Japanese joint defense arrangement? My own belief is that China's overriding priority is to see the American military presence withdrawn from all of Asia, including Japan, and that even if such withdrawal might prompt Japan to develop her own nuclear arsenal, Peking would be prepared to accept that risk.

In this situation, China's natural policy line must be to suggest to the Japanese that the United States will eventually leave Japan to fend for herself and that Japan's best answer to this is not to revert to the militaristic policies of the 1930's but rather to seek friendship with China as the best and cheapest method of self-defense. I would therefore expect China to make some concrete efforts in the coming months to exploit the political ferment caused in Japan by President Nixon's approaching date with Chou En-lai and by Washington's recent economic measures.

China has evidently attempted to reassure her friends in Pyongyang and Indochina that her new relationship with the US does not augur any change in her support of their demands. The North Vietnamese, however, recalling that they were persuaded by the Soviet Union and China at the 1954 Geneva Conference to accept half a loaf then and the rest later, are clearly worried that Peking may desert them, and the Chinese will probably have difficulty convincing Hanoi of their sincerity as long as American military forces have not actually withdrawn from Vietnam. The North Koreans, on the other hand, have indicated their acceptance of China's new posture. Kim Il-song may well calculate that decreased hostility between the US and China will make American taxpayers increasingly reluctant to keep US forces in South Korea. Besides, North Korean bellicosity over the past two years—while it may have scored some spectacular successes (such as the capture of the US communications-intelligence ship Pueblo, the near-successful North Korean commando raid on the presidential palace in Seoul, and the shooting-down in 1969 of a US Navy EC–121 reconnaissance aircraft)—has accomplished nothing toward getting the US out of South Korea or bringing reunification nearer. So long as Pyongyang feels that a general Far Eastern détente could benefit North Korea, I would expect Peking-Pyongyang relations to remain good. In any case, the North Koreans appear prepared to give the conciliation policy a try, as their recent approach to South Korea through the Red Cross has clearly indicated.

The impact of Peking's shift on India is already clear: it has driven her closer to the Soviet Union,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though there were certainly other factors behind the recent Indo-Soviet treaty. On the other hand, Pakistan will doubtless be glad if the Sino-American détente enables her to handle more easily the thorny problem of maintaining good relations with both Peking and Washington.

4 One immediate effect of the improvement of Sino-US relations on the Soviet Union has already been indicated—the Indo-Soviet treaty. Faced with the Nixon-Chou diplomatic blockbuster, Moscow has felt compelled to pull something out of the bag to strengthen its own position in Asia. However, this is only a partial answer. The USSR, having had hostile powers on its eastern and western flanks for some years, now finds that these powers are improving their relations with each other. It is not yet the kind of situation that Stalin faced after the Nazi-Japanese anti-Comintern pact of 1936. Stalin's answer then was to try to head off the more dangerous enemy, Germany, by negotiating the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939. That policy was not good enough, and this time Soviet strategists will probably want to neutralize the hostile powers on both flanks. This must have been one important reason why the four-power talks on Berlin made sudden progress recently, and I would also expect to see faster progress in the Soviet-US strategic arms limitation talks and renewed attempts to get an all-European security conference off the ground. In addition, it is likely to give added impetus to Soviet attempts to improve bilateral relations with the main European non-Communist powers—West Germany, France, Britain and Italy.

At the same time, the Russians must realize—however reluctantly—that if China is going to develop a friendly relationship with the US, then it would be wise for the Soviet Union also to improve its relations with China. If the old bipolar US-USSR relationship is to become triangular, then the Russians, too, must be able to play the other two protagonists off against each other. The alternative would be to accept a weakened diplomatic posture. However, I would also expect Moscow to reinsure its position by cultivating Japan even more assiduously as a possible ally against China. This would be an ironic historic reversal: in the early 1920's, the Soviet Communists attempted to build up a non-Communist China as a bulwark against Japan; in the 1970's, they may see a non-Communist Japan as a bulwark against a Communist China.

5 Basically, what Peking wants is equality. After over a century of imperialist encroachments and anti-Communist boycott, China demands her rightful place at the center of the world stage. If Peking takes over the Chinese seat in the Security Council and General Assembly and Taiwan is simply dropped from the UN, the Chinese will regard this as a big step forward. If, on the other hand, the United States bends every effort to keep Taiwan in—and especially if such an effort succeeds—then there will be a major setback to the developing detente.

China probably does not expect Washington simply to sell Taiwan down the river. What she wants to rule out is any possibility of a "two Chinas" or "one China/one Taiwan" solution. If the US and other Western countries, instead of tying themselves to such a policy, either leave their options open (as Canada has done) or adopt a policy of "one China, but not now" (as Abramowitz and Moorsteen have suggested), then the prospect for better relations with Peking are good. Obviously, it would be politically difficult for the US unilaterally to end its defense treaty with the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan, but there would probably be no need for this. Peking might well be content with a tacit guarantee that the United States will do nothing to hinder a genuine rapprochement between China and Taiwan—and it might see such a guarantee in eventual US action to phase out the remaining American military presence on the island.

Robert W. Barnett

1 The question of whether the current explorations of possibilities for negotiation and accommodation now going on between the People's Republic of China and various foreign countries, including the United States, were initiated by Peking itself or by others can be safely left for future historians to decide. For the present, answering this question appears less important than perceiving that a certain common logic seems to be at work everywhere. The current overtures are occurring in a setting whose principal features are identifiable—and their significance probably viewed similarly—by all the governments concerned.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One facet of this setting is that within China the demonic element in the catharsis of the Cultural Revolution has been brought under control. The cities and countryside are quieter. The pace of China's national development and local economic growth indicators for places like Shanghai, Kirin, Shantung, and Kweichow, backed by the recent first-hand observations of skilled foreign reporters like Tillman Durdin, Seymour Topping, and Robert Keatley, produce an impression of Chinese self-assurance and of confidence in their plans and techniques for national organization and growth. The past year has seen an upsurge of 10–15 percent in China's gross national product. Foreign trade is on the increase; schools are again functioning; Chinese and foreigners engage in well-mannered technical consultations; and in conspicuous separateness from the rest of their society, China's community of scientists and engineers sustains progress toward mastery of the nuclear art. Politic remains in the saddle, and power may still proceed from the mouth of the gun; but mundane goals of improved production and productivity have been edged toward the center of China's national concern. And if this is so, it is because the more pragmatically-minded elements in the Chinese leadership —conscious of how China's growing population presses on her thin margins of human survival— have done it.

These leaders, it appears, have felt emboldened to reassess both the immediate and more distant strategic aspects of China's international environment with a degree of discrimination and realism that would have been imprudent in the heat of Cultural Revolution witch-hunting. And in the apparent changes of domestic temper or foreign orientation in the USSR, Japan, the United States, and other countries, as well as in the subtle alteration of the tenor and vocabulary of Western discussion about communism itself, the current Chinese leadership has apparently discerned opportunities for fresh international maneuver.

Peking has watched a "bourgeois" USSR coming to terms with the United States in the strategic arms limitation talks, negotiating over Berlin, trying to overcome stirring local resistance to the increasingly tight Soviet hold on Eastern Europe, and sending trade missions, diplomats and naval vessels to South and Southeast Asian countries, while at the same time deploying three-quarters of a million troops or more along China's borders and persisting in criticism of Peking's misdeeds. The Sino-Soviet border confrontation of 1969 had escalated to the point of threatened nuclear exchange, and China then had been alone in its stand against Moscow. It may now perceive both the wisdom and the possibility of finding some community of interest with Yugoslavia, Romania, South Asia, and even the United States in future confrontation.

The Chinese also discerned potential danger from another quarter. The Nixon-Sato communique of November 1969, in which Japan for the first time expressed an explicit interest in the security of South Korea and Taiwan, produced a chill in Peking. US agreement to restore Okinawa to Japanese administration heightened the prospect of Japan's eventual military involvement outside her home islands. In combination with these developments, Japan's dynamic economic growth also assumed a potentially malignant significance in the eyes of the Chinese, who could now question past Japanese insistence upon "separating politics from economics."* "Economic expansion," Premier Chou En-lai told visiting *New York Times* correspondent James Reston, "is bound to bring military expansion." Accordingly, the prospect of American retreat from Northeast Asia, leaving an "independent," rearmed, and economically expansive Japan free to cast a protective arm over Taiwan and possibly to engage in adventures elsewhere in Asia, confronts Peking with a troubling, not to say nightmarish, variable in its strategic recalculations.

The Nixon Doctrine presents many faces to Peking. Debate in the United States Congress and the tenor of press and public opinion polls must surely lend credibility to at least one of the most immediate and important implications of the doctrine—namely, that the United States *will* withdraw from Vietnam. Having long called for an end to the hostile encirclement of the People's Republic and now facing not only the

* The Japanese have used this formula to justify engaging in trade with the China mainland while refusing to grant political recognition to the PRC.—Ed.

The Japanese reactionaries have for many years practiced cunning neo-colonialism with all their efforts. . . . Japanese monopoly capital is sure to protect its colonial interests by armed force and scramble for spheres of influence. An "economic power" is bound to become a "military power," and economic expansion definitely leads to military expansion. This is an inexorable law of development of Japanese militarism.

—Editorial in *Jen-mih Jih-pao* (Peking), Sept. 18, 1971.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prospective withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam but also a far-reaching change in the character of future American involvement in an area much larger than just Vietnam, Peking may well be giving serious practical consideration to the relative capabilities of China, the Soviet Union, and Japan to exploit opportunities to exercise power and influence in the area. The Chinese leaders may indeed be having second thoughts about indulging in their past practice of construing all American intentions and any US involvement in the surrounding area as bad, and total US absence as good. The degree and quality of contact and joint involvement can, after all, make a critical difference, and Peking may now have begun to recognize this.

Related to all of this but not susceptible of quantitative measurement in terms of arms, economic indices, or the decibel count of public pronouncements has been the change in the vocabulary of international discourse about communism. This has been brought about, on the one hand, by fragmentation and polycentrism within the Communist world and, on the other, by the erosion of the United States' determinative influence on the conduct of others within the non-Communist international community. Automatic political reactions to Communist conduct and declarations of purpose have largely ended in the West. A conspicuous illustration has been President Nixon's own stubborn determination, since the first days of his presidency, to move toward new China policy options without excessive regard for the paralyzing consistency of the China policy of the three preceding Washington administrations—a consistency built upon and sustained by the magic potency of being merely anti-Communist. Applicants for foreign aid likewise observe that anti-communism *per se* has lost much of its potency to move the US Congress and people to automatic, unreflective response. Thus, Washington discussion of strategic variables in the Pacific area and elsewhere has come to show qualities of novelty and elasticity.

This change has had far-reaching consequences. For one thing, it has injected a wholesome uncertainty into Peking's calculations of US intentions and capabilities, and it offers the Chinese leaders the opportunity to talk differently about unresolved problems between the two countries. For over twenty years, for example, Taiwan has been a bone in the throats of Chinese and American negotiators, obstructing consideration of problems the two powers might otherwise have wished to discuss. Now, however, Peking sees that the United States has ceased proprietary talk about Taiwan and, while remaining faithful to its obligations under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, seems ready to be guided by the decisions of many other countries in moving toward a redefinition of the respective roles of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the international community. Hence Peking, too, must take into account the attitudes of many other countries besides the United States in working out, as a practical matter, its future relations with Taiwan.

2 The past year has seen a gathering momentum in the procession of states seeking and entering into diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, while Peking's admission to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council seems virtually certain. Heavy and unaccustomed burdens will thus be imposed on the PRC's diplomatic establishment. In the multilateral UN bodies to which Peking will soon belong, its representatives will be obliged to take positions and cast votes on issues which they have hitherto ignored. In other words, the Chinese will be operating in a much broader and more complex international environment. Moreover, by joining the UN bodies, Peking will expose itself to public comment on its conduct everywhere and will be obliged to answer when that conduct is criticized as improper. It must decide when to comply with the rules of traditional diplomatic practice and of the UN, when to exercise its veto and otherwise obstruct international cooperation, and when to advocate defiance of the status quo and the necessity of revolution.

Time alone will show whether China, in its new international role, will choose to project itself as a third superpower or as the leader and greatest of the developing nations. Not very long ago the PRC presented the spectacle of a system out of control. Its more recent behavior, however, suggests a capacity to combine devotion to Mao's messianic goals, stubborn defense of national interest, and pragmatic accommodation to most negotiating situations, in self-assured style. Capitals like Bangkok, Djakarta, and Kuala Lumpur will insist that Peking end its support or encouragement of subversion or insurgency in their countries before any exchange of diplomatic missions, and the Chinese may be evasive on this issue. However, Peking is likely, I believe, to want to establish and maintain correct state-to-state relations, as it already seems to have done,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with a good record of aid and friendliness, in several non-Communist countries of Black Africa and South Asia.

3 Anomalously, the recent elasticities in Peking's foreign policy have been more conspicuous as they have involved distant countries than those nearby. Except in receiving Dr. Kissinger for an encounter with Premier Chou En-lai, Peking has done little lately to startle Pyongyang, Hanoi, or Tokyo. It has shown no hurry to respond to hesitant trade, cultural, or diplomatic overtures made by Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, or Indonesia. Rangoon seems to feel reassured that Peking will not intervene in its local insurgencies, and nothing else Peking does seems to cause Rangoon to fear its intentions after US withdrawal from Vietnam.

However, Dr. Kissinger's visit—an American overture—produced throughout the area an upheaval in previous conceptions of the balance of power and the purposes for which power had seemed to be exercised. That visit accorded Peking "recognition." All countries that had withheld recognition and/or adopted attitudes of disapproval or hostility to Peking had done so, over two decades, in the shadow of American leadership. United States "recognition" caused a profound shock in Chiang's Taipei because the ultimate *raison d'être* for his government on Taiwan, was thereby negated, and in Tokyo because, without US association in the same mythology, Japan's policy of separating politics from economics and her continued recognition of the legitimacy of Chiang's claims to sovereign authority on the mainland became embarrassing and even ominous political liabilities.

Leaders in all Asian capitals want to see how Washington prepares for President Nixon's upcoming journey, and what resolutions can be found for the issues in dispute. They can discount Peking's capacity for nuclear blackmail, or the reach beyond China's own frontiers of conventional weaponry, yet still be conscious that a land mass soon likely to accommodate a billion restless and talented people and already having a gross national product larger than that of all Southeast Asia can now no longer be isolated or contained. Smaller Asian countries have been preparing for encounter and accommodation with Peking for a good many years. Some, hoping to diminish the risk that Peking might attempt to intimidate them one by one, have explored possibilities for creating a collective front. Those preparations, individual and collective, will now accelerate. Meanwhile, business interests in all Asian societies, mesmerized by the prospects of profits from normal economic ties with the China colossus, will try both to play separate hands and to influence governments to improve their position in the China market.

4 For Moscow, which has been a beneficiary of the unbending Sino-American hostility and confrontation of the past two decades, the present spectacle of a China assuming a flexible role on the international stage alters the entire action. The fact that Peking and Washington are now on talking terms transforms, for Moscow, the possible import of conversations Peking is also having with Belgrade, Bucharest, and other national capitals.

Soviet visitors courting countries in Southeast Asia will begin to encounter different reactions and face different problems and opportunities if and when those countries are also receiving regular visitors from Peking. Now uncertain about the future economic, political and military role of the United States in Asia and increasingly apprehensive over the mounting economic impact of Japan, Southeast Asian countries, on their part, may indeed welcome both Russian and Chinese visitors in the hope that they will keep each other under surveillance and that their joint presence will at the same time serve as a counterweight against the "capitalist" powers.

In short, Peking's advance toward acceptability in the international community might embarrass and complicate Soviet strategy, although in itself it may not alarm Moscow. The USSR will certainly support the Albanian resolution providing for the PRC's admission to the UN in place of the Chinese Nationalist government. However, if Peking were to move toward understandings and arrangements of a military nature with Washington and/or Tokyo, these—almost regardless of actual detail—could sharply increase Sino-Soviet tension and even pose the risk of preventive war.

5 It is quite possible that even Peking does not yet know exactly what sort of relationships it may desire to have ultimately with the United States and other Western nations. The Chinese will hope, of course, that relations between Peking and Washington will deter the United States from colluding with

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Union for anti-Chinese purposes and help to forestall Japan's remilitarization. Barbara Tuchman recalls that President Roosevelt's "China policy" was the best-kept secret in Washington—to the point that even after the Cairo conference of 1943, General George Catlett Marshall was able to state with assurance only that the President was determined to accord China great-power status. Recognition of such status for the PRC and the promise that China's borders will be restored may be what Mao wants most from President Nixon.

Peking of 1971 is not, of course, Chungking of 1943, and the contrast between the two situations needs no review. Though still weak and vulnerable compared to the superpowers, Mao's China today—unlike Chiang's in the 1930's and 1940's—is a national entity of sobering, even massive capabilities both at home and in its relations with other countries. But how its foreign relations will develop depends upon whether Peking, in the coming years, will be guided by the 1955 spirit of Bandung, by a revival in some form of Lin Piao's 1965 strategy for worldwide Communist victory, or even—though it does not now seem likely—by a reversion to Liu Shao-chi's pro-Soviet orientation. (It is not inconceivable that the emergence of a nuclear-armed Japan might thrust Peking into staff talks with Moscow.)

Recent Chinese behavior in Africa and Asia suggests a renewed commitment to the spirit of Bandung. We may know better to what extent this will be the case when we see how Peking decides to treat the hardest of its current foreign policy problems—Taiwan. We still do not know—at the time of writing—how the rival interests of Peking and Taipei will be accommodated in the United Nations and other international institutions. However, if Peking is satisfied that it has achieved recognition of the principle of "One China," it will then have a choice between pressing for early absorption of Taiwan by force—through infiltration, subversion, insurgency, and intimidation—or waiting and letting the slower processes of history—economic, social, psychological, and cultural—determine the time and mode of eventual accommodation of Taiwan in the Chinese system. Peking's tactics may be ambiguous and even contradictory, with some used for effect in Taipei, others for effect in Tokyo or Washington, and still others for effect in Southeast Asia with its significant Chinese minority.

Whatever may have been the past justification for China's isolation, the United States and other Western countries now recognize the continuation of that isolation to be unwise and impractical. Most of China's neighbors share this view. Only a guess can be made, however, as to how Peking will choose to participate in the wider international community it now proposes to enter, and how it will deal with the Taiwan issue. My own guess is that it will not insist upon thrusting Taiwan into total outer darkness and then intervene with force. The PRC's actual leverage is limited, and its leaders must surely realize that threats to absorb Taiwan by force, even if not actually attempted, could bring about the one result they most want to avoid—that is, a Taiwan with a claim on the sympathy of very nearly the whole world community, possessed of most of the requirements for independent action, and securely protected by the military might of the United States and possibly of Japan as well. Peking itself would then have created "One China/One Taiwan."

So, the PRC's real self-interest would seem to dictate pursuit of the national goal of One China by other means. Its style in doing so may well have a decisive influence on the mix of anxiety and gratification with which other countries greet the historic and unsettling fact of the world's largest and most ancient society again becoming a recognized participant in the world's faltering efforts to organize a system for common survival.

C. P. FitzGerald

1 The form of this question rather presupposes that the initiatives for renewed Chinese relations with the United States and other powers came only from the Chinese side, but it is surely arguable that the several successive relaxations of trade and travel restrictions by the US government—which at first did not seem to meet with any response—also constituted an initiative which China has since decided to take up. (How far Canada and other powers were also moving of their own accord towards better relations with Peking has not yet been made clear.)

In any event, I would suggest that one of the main reasons why the Chinese are now responsive to such overtures, and why they are now making similar moves themselves whereas they did not do so before, is that they have acquired a new sense of self-confidence as a result of the Cultural Revolution. It

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seems clear that the Chinese themselves believe—even though outside observers may not share such belief—that the outcome of the Cultural Revolution was to strengthen the state, release the energies and enthusiasm of the people, and thus give the Chinese leadership the assurance that it could negotiate with foreign powers, if not from superior strength, at least on a basis of equality. Several experiences in the past history of the People's Republic, notably the Geneva Conference of 1954, had given the Peking regime reason to feel that it was not admitted to international society on equal terms with others, and that this was but a continuation of the long-resented situation of earlier Chinese regimes dating back to the Manchu dynasty in the 19th century. The Communist leaders were determined to surmount this obstacle and to prove that they could achieve a status which their predecessors had not been able to attain.

In respect of China's relations with foreign powers, the new overtures may seek to avoid the danger that after the Cultural Revolution world opinion might be led to accept the view of China put out by Soviet propaganda—*i.e.*, that China is prey to "petty-bourgeois anarchy" and a maverick power which cannot be trusted nor treated with on any basis but alert suspicion. It is much more difficult to sustain these criticisms if China is seen to be entering into negotiations with the United States and other Western nations which have hitherto avoided diplomatic relations with her. If the negotiations should lead to Peking's recognition by a number of nations and the establishment of normal diplomatic relations, these nations would be less inclined to put much weight upon Soviet criticisms of the Chinese Communist regime, thus enhancing the PRC's standing in international society generally and its position vis-a-vis the USSR in particular.

2 In state-to-state relations, it may be expected that the PRC will ease restrictions on travel and on press representation in China for countries with which relations have been normalized, but also that, in matters of trade, it will differentiate between countries which have accepted Chinese overtures (or made overtures to China) and those which remain aloof. It is also possible that the Chinese will permit their own citizens to attend some international gatherings of an academic or professional nature, if only to deprive the Russians of the advantage of being the sole representatives of a major

> *We give resolute support to the three Indochinese peoples' resistance against US aggression and for national salvation, to the just struggle of the Korean people for the unification of their fatherland, . . . and to the national liberation struggles of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.*
>
> **—Speech by PRC Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien in Hanoi, as reported by VNA International Service (in English), Sept. 25, 1971.**

Communist power at such meetings. Much could depend upon whether the staffs of future Chinese embassies established in newly-recognizing countries are instructed to enter more fully into the social life of the local community than was generally true of Chinese diplomatic missions before the Cultural Revolution. This, it may be noted, is also a question of confidence—of how far the Chinese leaders feel that they will be able to select diplomatic personnel who can be trusted to enter into such contacts abroad without themselves becoming "tainted" with bourgeois ways of life and thinking.

In respect of revolutionary movements, Peking's new diplomatic policy would appear to entail some risk of encountering a contradiction. For internal political reasons, it may not be easy to abate the violence of the language used in propaganda, which is primarily meant for the home audience; hence, words may not match deeds, and policy may seem to be inconsistent with propaganda. But there could well be here a real conflict rather than a mere inconsistency of word and deed, for the extent to which moderate views have prevailed over more ideological outlooks is uncertain and could be related to the rise or decline in the influence of different highly-placed people. Moreover, the ideological position that revolutionary wars should be supported by all Communist powers and should not be abandoned or ignored for motives of national convenience has been one of the key issues in dispute with the Soviet Union, and it will therefore be difficult, if not impossible, for Peking to admit any deviation from this position without damaging its posture vis-a-vis Moscow. While it is indeed true that Communist China, in its own past practice, has avoided carrying this position to dangerous lengths, this is hardly an argument that Peking could publicly use to justify a new non-revolutionary policy.

Yet, the Chinese leaders are under strong compulsion to find some way of reconciling their ideological advocacy of the revolutionary cause with the exigen-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cies of their new diplomacy. Peking, it may be noted, has consistently professed to abjure any claim to "great power" status on the ground that this is a "feudal" and reactionary concept; it has taken the position that all foreign nations—even small ones—must be accorded respect and treated with a decent equality. To solve its dilemma, the Peking leadership might well develop this policy to stress (1) the right of any nation to make its own revolution if circumstances render such a course probable and popular; and (2) its own opposition to the actions of any power seeking to uphold unpopular regimes or—as the Chinese would put it—"to frustrate the national aspirations of the people."

3 One purpose of Peking's new diplomacy could be to break up the opposition to relations with China which has existed among many of the nations of Southeast Asia. The Chinese have not made these countries the first targets of their overtures but have preferred to approach those Western nations which have hitherto been the protectors or friends of Southeast Asian countries hostile to China. The Chinese may be seeking to undermine the stance of the hostile nations by winning friends among those outside powers which have the most influence over them. The fact that several of these countries have begun to accept some relations with China, in the form of trade missions, indicates that this policy may prove fruitful.

Japan is now the most important near neighbor to China. Chinese propaganda has hitherto been and at present still is hostile toward the Tokyo government, accusing it of renascent militarism and subservience to the United States. But if Peking's relations with Washington become easier and more normal, even though still short of diplomatic recognition, it may be to China's interest to modify this stand and—tacitly at least—to encourage Japan to remain close to the US for fear that she might otherwise come nearer to agreement with the Soviet Union. The Chinese must see Japan, potentially, as the third party which could give either the Soviet or the American side preponderance in the Pacific world, and while they certainly hope they can avert a preponderance of either side, it is clear that they consider the Soviets the greater danger. It also seems that Peking now believes that it may be easier to arrive at a limited but valuable détente with the US than to resolve its differences with the USSR—possibly on the theory that it is easier to deal with infidels than with heretics.

To get back to Japan, the Chinese have no reason to be disturbed by the current disaccord between the Japanese and US governments. If this were to result in the fall of Prime Minister Sato, they would no doubt be well pleased, but they would not, one may suppose, be glad to see such a rift develop so far as to push Japan towards the Soviet Union. On the other hand, if Japan should find it wiser to conform with the new US policy towards China as it did with the old, the Chinese will doubtless see this as a major gain from their approaches to the United States: Japan will have been shown that China can play her own game and is therefore a force to be reckoned with.

4 It is already evident that the Soviet reaction to the Chinese initiatives and the responses thereto by other states has been one of alarm and anxiety. Soviet troop concentrations on the northern frontier of China are said to have been increased considerably. On the other hand, official relations between Peking and Moscow do not appear to have registered a new breech, nor have polemical exchanges taken on a significantly sharper tone. Chinese moves in the Balkans must be particularly unwelcome to the USSR, but they cannot be characterized as positively provocative and surely do not appear to constitute a cause for war. The Soviet leaders must clearly see that Peking's moves in Central Europe and its overtures to Western nations are intended to discourage any Soviet use of force against China. Preemptive Soviet military action would obviously be hard to justify at a time when China is not only adopting a relatively conciliatory attitude toward non-Communist states but also showing friendship toward Communist states such as Romania and Yugoslavia. Any clear indications that Peking's overtures were proving successful in persuading major Western powers, as well as some of the less pro-Soviet European Communist states, that China is a nation with whom it is possible and desirable to establish normal relations would serve as a major deterrent to any Soviet act of force against China since the consequences of such action would be too incalculable.

China is thus striving to build diplomatic positions that will minimize her external risks—an entirely normal policy followed by all states—and it would seem improbable that Peking intends to exacerbate the conflict with the Soviet Union in any decisive way. The indications are that China sees her relations with the USSR as a source of danger not easily dis-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pelled, and that she now regards participation in the international diplomatic system as a wise and necessary safeguard. The fact that China no longer takes a hostile line towards the European Economic Community and the probability of British membership reinforces this view and suggests that China seeks to build a consensus in favor of no longer excluding her from the consideration accorded to other countries. The Soviet Union may accept this development. If so, it is possible that the Sino-Soviet dispute may become less acute, although unlikely that it will be resolved so long as the present Soviet leadership is in power. Changes in the Soviet political structure and social attitudes that would be likely to please the Chinese seem improbable, while a return on China's part to the manners of the pre-Cultural Revolution period also appears very unlikely. It may be thought that the Communist world is now irreconcilably divided between rival interpretations of Marxism. If so, this division—like that between Orthodox and Catholic Christians—may be expected to continue indefinitely, but it need not result in an ideological war from which neither side could reap a conclusive victory.

5 Although ideologically uncompromising in words, the Chinese show caution and calculation in deeds, and they have apparently recognized that relations with the United States and other Western capitalist powers will offer them the possibility of limited but useful advantages. It is obviously most improbable that the US or any other Western nation will embrace the thought of Mao Tse-tung; moreover, even if the Chinese should think that this ideology will in time exercise a growing influence on Western society, they will for the foreseeable future expect to deal with governments which do not share it. On the other hand, it is likely that the Chinese have observed the growth of Western disillusionment with armed intervention against revolution in Asia and elsewhere, and their objective may be to foster this tendency by presenting a more amicable face to the non-Communist world, while at the same time maintaining the position that China, among the Communist countries, is the true exemplar of Marxism for the world's revolutionaries. The Chinese leaders are well aware that acute internal problems of development, industrial growth, population increase, and food supply will continue to confront them for many years. Under these conditions, trade, diplomatic relations, representation in the United Nations, and perhaps—as a further-off goal—foreign recognition that China, too, has a right to a sphere of preponderant influence in the region close to her homeland, that is, in Southeast Asia, are probable incentives to Peking to seek better relations with the West.

Whether these objectives are attainable or compatible with Western policies, would seem to depend to a great degree on mutual confidence. If the Chinese interpret the recent overtures and responses as partial recognition of the PRC as a peace-loving state, their incentive to maintain a friendly or at least not overtly hostile attitude toward the West will be increased. Similarly, if Peking sees the responses of the Western nations as some degree of assurance that the latter no longer seek the overthrow of the Chinese Communist regime and believe that policies which had that objective are no longer sensible nor practical, there would seem to be good hope that the Chinese will welcome a gradual normalization of relations. Although there may be some tendency on the part of the Chinese to view Western concessions as a weakening of the "imperialist front," how they react to it will probably depend on their estimate of the determination of the Western nations to uphold their own system in their homelands, even though conceding that it may not be exportable elsewhere.

On the side of the Western nations, confidence will depend to a considerable extent on whether or not they believe that China will strictly interpret her professed doctrine that revolution also is not exportable and can only grow in home soil. There is an obvious problem here. Does the Chinese interpretation rule out revolutionary propaganda, or does it mean only that China will refrain from open armed support of a revolutionary movement? The Chinese are likely to take their stand on the second interpretation, refraining from armed support but upholding their right to make revolutionary propaganda. A settlement of the Vietnam war which removed the risk of Chinese armed intervention could give the Western powers confidence that propaganda by itself would not create an acute conflict.

It is clear today that the contest between capitalist states and Communist revolutionaries is not the only cause of international tension. Nationalism is a strong force in Southeast Asia and would not necessarily be allied to Communist revolution if foreign intervention were absent. While it is ideally possible that both sides might be prepared to make recognition of this the basis for a mutual reorientation of policies, it seems more probable, for the immediate future, that both sides will move with caution, hold-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing to their professed ideologies but not permitting this adherence to frustrate useful contact and closer trading relations. For both sides, the experimental nature of the present developing relations precludes positive decisions with respect to long-term future policy. The Chinese have a proverb: "Let the water flow, and the stones will appear." There is much water left to flow before all the stones can be seen.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

1 The conclusion of the more acute phases of the Chinese Communists' Cultural Revolution made it possible for Peking to turn its attention to foreign affairs. In other words, the termination of domestic turmoil created the precondition for a more active foreign policy. The pursuit of such a policy, however, was stimulated by considerations pertaining to China's international position and not by factors of a domestic character.

As the Chinese leaders looked more closely at the world which they had virtually ignored for almost a decade, they found—somewhat to their dismay—that during the intervening years Japan had made major strides toward a truly significant world status; that Taiwan had made major progress in its social-economic development, raising the possibility that it had acquired the capacity for self-sustained growth and even for political stability of long duration; and that Soviet military development had acquired an increasingly threatening character, posing the specter of effective Soviet military intervention.

It can be surmised that in this situation, the leadership in Peking came to the conclusion that China not only must activate its foreign policy but must do so in such a manner as to complicate Soviet strategic-political planning, stimulate uncertainty in Taiwan, and offset the increasing influence of Japan.

2 In the writer's judgment, the foregoing is consistent with the Chinese Communists' commitment to a long-range revolutionary process. One of the principal tenets of Maoism insists that the revolutionary process has to be indigenous and truly spontaneous in any country. Hence, China's general support of and assistance to revolutionary activity does not stand in the way of its negotiating transitional and more expedient arrangements with individual states, especially if such arrangements are clearly in China's national and political interest.

3 It seems certain that China will gain enormous additional status from President Nixon's visit to Peking. Whatever the benefits of this move to the United States—and there are undoubtedly many—from the Asian point of view the visit of the American president to Peking has great symbolic meaning (particularly since it is President Nixon who is traveling to Peking, and not Chairman Mao to Washington). The visit will thus serve to increase China's international prestige, particularly among its Asian neighbors.

Insofar as Japan is concerned, the anxiety already generated in that country is likely to express itself in more active Japanese efforts to match the American-Chinese rapprochement, both politically and economically. China will thus be in a position to improve its relations with Japan even while continuing to rebuff "Japanese militarism" and trying to humiliate the Sato government. Undoubtedly the Chinese are genuinely concerned over Japan's economic and political recovery, and in the writer's view, Peking's policy towards Tokyo can be expected to combine efforts to benefit from closer economic relations with the simultaneous attempts to weaken Japan's internal political cohesion as well as its ties with the United States.

4 It seems likely that the Chinese initiative will deepen Moscow's already profound anxieties about the future of the Sino-Soviet relationship. In the short run, nothing much will change on the surface, but in the longer run, Soviet hostility to the Chinese probably will have been deepened and Soviet anxieties heightened. Both will intensify in direct proportion to the further growth of China's nuclear and strategic power.

5 In reference to the question posed, it does not seem possible to consider Peking's relations with the United States and its relations with other Western nations in the same breath. Chinese-American relations are a special problem for Mao's regime, as well as a special challenge. The very process of dealing with the United States enhances

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China's status, even while it maximizes insecurity in Taiwan and sows confusion in Japan. The prospect of a US-PRC "summit" also strengthens the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Over time, Chinese relations with other countries are likely to reveal more material but less complex motivations: in addition to weakening the relative position of Taiwan, economic benefits for Peking are potentially involved.

Accordingly, it can be expected that Chinese relations with other Western states will become more extensive and increasingly normal. Relations with the United States will remain very complex, given conflicting Chinese and American interests as well as the intractable legacy of the past, particularly Taiwan. Since both China and America see an interest in a better, or at least less hostile relationship, there will be progress, but it would be most unwise to expect that progress will result in a rapid and full normalization of relations.

Juergen Domes

Ever since the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the People's Republic of China has intensified its efforts to reopen avenues to the outside world which had been closed off during the domestic crisis, as well as to open up new roads toward China's objective of achieving great-power status on a world scale.

China's return to the diplomatic scene unfolded in three distinct stages after the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1969 formally confirmed the post-GPCR leadership group. The first stage, from April 1969 to the autumn of 1970, saw the *restoration* of the diplomatic ties that China had already developed before the Cultural Revolution, with Peking resuming relations with the Communist, Afro-Asian, and various Western countries on the ambassadorial level. The second stage, inaugurated by Canada's recognition of the PRC on October 10, 1970, was one in which China sought an *expansion* of its diplomatic contacts, concentrating mainly on members of the NATO alliance and the African and Latin American countries. Now, the apparent thaw in Sino-American relations since last spring appears to have ushered in a third stage of at least tactical, if not strategic *reorientation.* It is still much too early to attempt a definitive analysis of this reorientation; nevertheless, some initial, tentative ideas may be put forward in reply to the five questions posed by the editors of *Problems of Communism.*

1 China's recent foreign policy overtures to the United States and—less spectacular but equally significant—to some East European countries, especially Yugoslavia and Romania, as well as certain West European governments, must be seen against the background of certain domestic and foreign political developments that combined to create the atmosphere in which such overtures became possible. In the domestic sphere, the most important development was the takeover of political control by a stabilizing coalition composed of essentially two elements: the central and regional military leadership and the remnants of the state administrative apparatus. Already in 1968–69, this coalition had launched a drive to constrict the operating room available to the hard-core Cultural Revolution activists, and as domestic reconsolidation proceeded, the influence of the Maoist organizations and their leaders was diminished and finally overcome—an outcome symbolized by the eclipse since early this year of Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's onetime confidant and head of the once-powerful Cultural Revolution Group attached to the CCP Central Committee. The new coalition of forces has tended to take a rather pragmatic approach to policy questions and has sought to facilitate the task of domestic reconsolidation by alleviating as far as possible the constraints imposed on political decision-making by external crisis situations.

In the foreign sphere, the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia and promulgation of the Brezhnev doctrine, followed in the spring of 1969 by the armed clashes on the Ussuri River and Sinkiang borders between the USSR and China, appear to have convinced the Peking leadership that China could not afford to risk a simultaneous conflict with both superpowers and that the threat from the Soviet Union was graver and more dangerous than that from the United States. The growing American tendency toward disengagement from the Asian continent seems to have further heightened China's misgivings about a possible augmentation of the Soviet presence in Asia, as well as about Japan's possible re-emergence as a formidable regional power. In this context, whether or not Peking's fears are justified is less important than the fact that the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese leaders have apparently become convinced that their country is more seriously threatened by the Soviet Union and Japan than by the United States.

Under such circumstances, the Chinese leaders had a natural interest in strengthening the position of any power in actual or potential conflict with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and in exploring the possibilities of opening up new options in their relations with the two superpowers. It is against this background that Peking has cautiously shown its willingness to get at least onto high-level talking terms with Washington. The Chinese invitation to President Nixon thus appears to be mainly a warning directed at the Soviet Union and Japan, though it probably also has the subsidiary purposes of advancing Peking's ambitions to gain control of Taiwan and take over China's seat in the United Nations, as well as of bolstering the domestic prestige of the ruling group.

2 Chinese Communist foreign policy has always been shaped by internationalist-revolutionary aims as well as by considerations of state-to-state diplomacy. In the early years following the Communist takeover, revolutionary propaganda took precedence over diplomacy, and the same was true in the periods of the "Great Leap Forward" and the Cultural Revolution. But there have also been distinct periods in which traditional diplomacy overshadowed revolutionism, most notably during the 1954–55 period of the Geneva and Bandung conferences.

The ascendancy of diplomacy over propaganda has in the past been rightfully associated with the person of Chou En-lai, but China's apparent entry into a new phase of priority emphasis on diplomatic tactics and the interests of national security does not necessarily indicate that the Prime Minister now has effective control of the central leadership. His domestic power base is too small for that; hence it is reasonable to assume that Chou's renewed activities are supported by the military leaders and perhaps at least tacitly approved by Mao Tse-tung.

In any event, given Communist China's apparent new interest in expanding her diplomatic contacts with the outer world, we are probably entering a period in which Peking, rather than calling for or actively supporting revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, will restrict itself to rallying diplomatic support for a movement of the third-world countries, irrespective of political and social orientation, to gain greater independence from the two superpowers. At least for the near future, therefore, the revolutionary movements probably will be unable to rely on much more than the verbal sympathy of Communist China.

The West should, however, remain aware that the Peking leadership has not renounced its ideological commitment to the ultimate goal of world revolution and doubtless intends the new phase of diplomatic activity to open up long-range possibilities for influencing public opinion in the West and in the developing areas and thus preparing the way for a future new "high tide of revolution." After an interim period of respite, the PRC will most probably revert again to a policy of encouraging the overthrow of existing regimes whenever a power vacuum in China's area of immediate interest creates an opportunity to do so. During most of the 1930's, it may be recalled, the Soviet Union pursued a policy of extreme caution in its foreign relations. This led to the mistaken notion abroad that the USSR had become a status-quo power—an illusion which was proven false in the wake of the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. It would be dangerous, if not disastrous, if Japan and the Western powers were to forget this lesson of history.

3 Given this general context, Chinese policy in Asia may be expected to continue to deemphasize ideological affiliations at least for the interim period referred to above. Peking, however, is likely to utilize this period to establish or expand Chinese Communist control over the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and to brace itself for another eventual confrontation with Japan. While China might possibly respond favorably to Japanese overtures during the next few months, she probably will not relax her awareness of the long-range conflict of Chinese and Japanese interests in East and Southeast Asia and will do her utmost both to broaden the rift between Tokyo and Washington and to forestall closer cooperation between Tokyo and Moscow. As soon as more Asian countries establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, Peking can be expected to use its agencies in these countries not merely for the purpose of promoting closer political and economic cooperation but also, to an increasing extent, for carrying on intelligence work and revolutionary propaganda.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

4 If Peking's new diplomatic moves result in improved relations with the United States and at least tacit moral and political support to and from Yugoslavia and Romania, the Chinese leaders' fear of possible Soviet intervention in China should be reduced. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the chances for a settlement of the Sino-Soviet conflict will improve; on the contrary, the Soviet Union, apprehensive of an increased Chinese threat, will most probably enhance its vigilance along the Sino-Soviet borders and try to strengthen its position in Southeast Asia. As a logical consequence of the Soviet-Indian treaty, Moscow can be expected to expand economic relations with the Southeast Asian countries and may even be prepared to enter into loose security commitments in Asia after the anticipated reduction of the US military presence in the area. It seems unlikely, however, that such moves by Moscow would include Nationalist China on Taiwan —at least not as long as the Soviet leaders, contrary to the warnings of their China specialists, see some hope of reaching a fair settlement with a future Chinese Communist leadership group after the death of Mao. But if this hope should be abandoned, a Soviet-Indian-Japanese security arrangement with Southeast Asian countries, including Taiwan, would appear to be a realistic long-range possibility.

5 In her contacts with Western Europe, China seems primarily to look for economic ties which would give her an option between Japan and the Common Market as a source of vital investment goods. Furthermore, Peking might try to exert whatever influence it can on an eventual all-European security conference with a view to impeding arrangements that would reduce Moscow's concern for the safety of its western borders and thus strengthen the Soviet position vis-a-vis China. While it appears highly doubtful that such an effort could succeed, the leaders of Communist China might still consider it worthwhile to try.

As far as her prospective relations with the United States are concerned, China might even go so far as to entertain hope of eventually obtaining some form of tacit American nuclear guarantee against the Soviet Union. For the immediate future, however, Peking's major objectives probably comprise abandonment by the US of its security commitments to Taiwan and the promotion of conflicts between Washington and Tokyo. In addition, the Chinese leadership probably calculates that its new conciliatory posture will help to reverse public opinion in the United States in Peking's favor and encourage the current tendency among many American scholars to take a highly sympathetic and noncritical view of Communist China's policies and goals. Indeed, the Chinese success in this area has already been remarkable.

To sum up, the leaders in Peking probably see China's emerging ties with the United States and other Western powers as serving a dual purpose: in the short run, to give China more options and provide her with more leverage on the international scene; and, in the long run, to open the way for renewed efforts to promote revolutionary changes in the political systems of the West. There is little if any evidence that the Chinese Communists have abandoned this long-range goal, and any sober analysis must continue to take it into account in spite of the remarkable change in Peking's foreign policy posture. While responding to any indication that Peking is now willing to enter into meaningful diplomatic contacts, American and other Western leaders would thus be well advised not to harbor any illusions and to combine readiness to talk with China with prudence and firmness. The development of Soviet-American relations since the death of Stalin has led to patterns of negotiation which could well be applied in relation to the People's Republic of China.

Morton H. Halperin

1 The striking shift that has brought about China's reemergence on the world scene, following the period of inward concentration that accompanied the Cultural Revolution, may well indicate a struggle within the Chinese leadership regarding appropriate foreign policy objectives. There are no doubt differences of view among the leading representatives of the party, the military, and the ministry of foreign affairs concerning both the strategy and the tactics of Chinese foreign policy. Unfortunately, we do not have the necessary data to delineate the conflict among these groups and are forced to try to deduce Chinese interests from Chinese actions, on the assumption that,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

despite differences, the leaders manage to compromise on a relatively unified approach to foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that Peking's public stance probably veils considerable behind-the-scenes debate. Statements which look like attempts to communicate with the outside world may in fact be reflections of internal tactical maneuvering to affect power relationships and to influence domestic as well as foreign policy.

With this caveat in mind, we can turn to consideration of the specific domestic and international factors which have led to a new Chinese foreign policy—or rather to the re-emergence of certain strands of policy which have appeared episodically since 1949.

The end of the Cultural Revolution was certainly a precondition for a new and more active Chinese role in the world. This is true if for no other reason than the factor of demands on the time and attention of the senior leaders. With China in convulsions, with the power of Peking over the provinces in doubt, and with large-scale clashes taking place, the leaders would not have had the time and energy to devote to foreign policy questions. Moreover, the emphasis of the Cultural Revolution on ideological purification would have tended to work against efforts to deal on a pragmatic basis with foreign governments. At a time when cadres were vying with each other to prove their revolutionary zeal, few would have been willing to advocate exploring the possibility of improved relations with the Soviet Union or with bourgeois governments in the non-Communist world.

With the decline of the Cultural Revolution these tendencies toward isolation abated. Today the foreign ministry appears to have been returned to the control of professional Chinese diplomats whose interests and inclinations would lead them to seek to deal with other nations on a state-to-state basis and to seek improved relations where possible.

The complex and somewhat enigmatic relationship between Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung is undoubtedly an important part of the explanation for the new turn in Chinese foreign policy. Chou and his associates in the foreign ministry had a relatively free hand in the pursuit of a moderate foreign policy in the early 1960's. During this period, China devoted considerable energy and some economic resources to efforts to establish good relations not only with the developing nations but with the so-called "second intermediate zone" of developed nations which were willing to oppose both US and Soviet attempts to establish hegemony in different areas of the globe. Peking's efforts appear to have accomplished very little and to have climaxed in its failure to have the Soviet Union excluded from the proposed second Afro-Asian conference at Bandung (which never took place). Mao's disillusionment with these policies became part of his general concern about the tendency toward bureaucratization in Chinese policymaking.

Confronted with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, Chou most likely devoted his energies to preserving his own position, protecting the domestic policies which he believed were important, and protecting individuals who were identified with him. This would have left him with little time and probably little inclination to fight about foreign policy matters. However, with the ebbing of the Cultural Revolution and Chou's re-establishment as the principal figure in the management of the government and the economy, he may have felt freer to propose a new effort to improve China's relations with the outside world. Mao appears once again to have moved to the background and to have given Chou a relatively free hand in directing foreign as well as domestic policy.

These changes in the Chinese domestic situation might have been insufficient to cause a shift in Peking's foreign policy had it not been for several major developments in the international sphere. The key factors which seem to have influenced Chinese policy were: (1) the Soviet military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border; (2) economic and political developments in Japan, as viewed by Peking; and (3) the beginning of the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam and the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine. Each of these will be considered in turn.

The Soviet Union has engaged in a very extensive buildup of military forces on the Sino-Soviet border over the last several years. This action has cost the Soviet Union a good deal of money in a period marked by increasing pressure on the Soviet economy in general and on the defense budget in particular. Since the Soviet military apparatus is essentially oriented toward Europe, except for certain segments (which have never seemed strong) directly concerned with the Far East, it seems likely that the pressure for the buildup on the border initiated with the political leadership, which must have calculated that such forces at a minimum would provide political leverage in the ongoing Sino-Soviet struggle, and might in fact be needed for military combat.

It was to be expected that the Chinese leaders,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who have seen their country subjected to foreign invasion and military threat throughout most of their lives, would take Moscow's actions very seriously. They knew that the buildup on the border was costly and was not undertaken lightly. What is more, the Soviet moves were accompanied by clear hints that military action might follow.

Peking responded to these moves by launching a massive effort to move key defense facilities underground and by indicating a new "willingness" to engage in diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union on state-to-state matters. Without doubt, fears of a Soviet attack also played a major role in precipitating China's new foreign policy vis-a-vis the non-Communist world. Peking's leaders may well have calculated that perpetuation of the image which China had presented during the Cultural Revolution would increase the probability of a Soviet attack, since the Soviets might claim that Mao's regime was losing control of China and there was need to remove the threat of an irresponsible use of nuclear weapons. They must have realized, too, that China's isolation from the outside world would make it more difficult to bring the pressure of international opinion to bear to deter Soviet aggression.

American statements, particularly the comments by Secretary of State William Rogers that the United States would view with concern any outbreak of hostilities on the Sino-Soviet border, may have led the Chinese to believe that they could inhibit Moscow by establishing contact with the US. More broadly, if China could get into the UN, she could expect to reduce the Soviets' room for maneuver.

The concerns of the Chinese political leadership were undoubtedly shared by the military and may have defused objections on their part to seeking rapprochement with the nation that had previously been viewed as China's primary military opponent. With a very real Soviet enemy facing them across the border, neither the generals nor the ideologues needed to conjure up the specter of the United States as a military threat.

> *What Japan should take is another road—the road of independence, democracy, peace and neutrality. That is to say, Japan must free herself from US imperialist control, have US military bases dismantled, and achieve genuine national independence; . . . she must stop tailing after US imperialism's policies of aggression and war, cease to be a US tool for aggression, and live on an equal footing and in peace with all countries. . . .*
>
> **—Editorial in *Jen-mih Jih-pao* (Peking), Sept. 18, 1971.**

A second factor that surely played a role in both the timing and the nature of Peking's new foreign policy was its apprehension over developments in Japan. Chinese leaders have been making it clear in recent conversations, including the James Reston interview with Chou En-lai, that they are particularly concerned over the possible revival of Japanese militarism. While the writer will not attempt to assess the real chances or dangers of such a revival, there is no doubt that the Chinese take them very seriously. Of course, all of the Chinese leaders grew up in a period when Japan was attacking China, and the possibility of a second invasion would seem more real to them than to anyone else. The growth of Japanese economic power and the re-emergence of Japan on the world political scene also affects Chinese claims to leadership in Asia and threatens a revival of Japanese economic and political influence, which the Chinese must fear would be directed toward their containment.

Optimally, Peking would like to stimulate the conditions for an upheaval in Japan which would replace the current government with groups more sympathetic to the PRC. At a minimum, the Chinese hope to generate pressures which would force the leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party to recognize Peking and break relations with the Taiwan regime. Otherwise, the Chinese fear that ties between Taiwan and Japan will grow and that the Japanese might seek to encourage a Taiwan independence movement. The Chinese view such a possibility with great alarm, and one of their highest priorities now is to create the conditions in Japan—and in Asia in general—that would prevent such a move. This means seeking to solve the problem of Taiwan with the United States before Japan resumes a dominant role in Asia, and also seeking to create an international climate which could alter Japanese policy.

Finally, changes in American policy have undoubtedly been an important factor leading to the new Chinese posture. As long as the United States was escalating the war in Vietnam and seemed prepared to stay indefinitely, Peking could not seek improved relations with Washington without endangering its influence in Hanoi. Now, however, Peking appears to have become persuaded that the United States is engaged in a military withdrawal from Indochina. A series of other signals from the United

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States have suggested its growing willingness to consider improved relations with Peking, ranging from the abandonment in 1969 of trade and travel embargos in effect since the establishment of the PRC, to the recent diplomatic maneuvers that climaxed in President Nixon's announcement of an impending visit to Peking.

2 China's general posture in international affairs has already changed substantially. For example, Peking is now actively seeking membership in the United Nations and is no longer demanding, as in the past, that that body purge itself of anti-Chinese resolutions prior to the PRC's entry. Peking is also seeking diplomatic relations with many countries, and in pursuit of this objective it has substantially softened its stance on Taiwan. While it continues to insist that the United States and Japan recognize the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan, it has dropped the demand for such explicit recognition in establishing formal ties with several other nations, holding only that the PRC must be recognized as the sole legitimate government of China. In another new shift, the Chinese are now seeking to use the lure of trade to move other countries toward better relations with Peking. Toward this end, pressure has been brought to bear on the Australian authorities in connection with wheat purchases and on Japanese firms whose main markets heretofore have been in the United States or South Korea.

With respect to Chinese support for wars of national liberation, the situation is more complicated. Peking will undoubtedly continue to affirm its support for revolutionary movements throughout the world and to provide training and minimum levels of support for such operations. However, the Chinese leadership has learned that revolutionary groups, even those which proclaim themselves to be Marxist-Leninist, are not necessarily in ideological sympathy with Peking or willing to subordinate themselves to a worldwide Communist movement under China's control. Thus, Peking recently found itself in strange alignment with the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and India when it backed efforts to suppress a self-styled Marxist movement in Ceylon.

Despite Peking's continued ideological commitment to revolutionary movements, support for such activities is likely to play a minimum role in Chinese policy and will not be permitted to interfere with the improvement of state-to-state relations, particularly in the Arab world and in Africa and Latin America. On the Chinese border, Peking's choices will be more difficult. Whether the Chinese will be prepared to abandon support for dissident movements in India, Burma and Thailand in return for improved relations with the governments of those countries probably has yet to be determined in Peking and may in part depend on the attitude and conditions voiced by those governments. In Indochina, Peking will no doubt continue to support the various revolutionary movements engaged in the struggle there, although its posture in a period after an American withdrawal would depend on Hanoi's attitude in combination with the scope and nature of the arrangements to emerge following the American disengagement.

3 As has already been suggested, Peking's concern about developments in Japan is likely to be at the heart of its Asian policy and indeed much of its worldwide diplomacy in the coming years. The Chinese appear to be trying to isolate Tokyo. Thus, they have resisted efforts on the part of the Sato regime to move toward increased contacts and discussions with Peking.

If the Chinese do succeed in entering the United Nations, there will be enormous domestic pressure on the Japanese government to seek to establish diplomatic relations. Peking will then have to define the terms under which it is prepared to move toward rapprochement. The Chinese are likely to make such terms rather severe, demanding, for example, a renunciation of the existing treaty between the Chinese Nationalists and Japan and the renegotiation of a peace treaty between Peking and Tokyo, including perhaps token reparations. They are also likely to demand the cessation of Japan's diplomatic and perhaps even trade relations with Taiwan. Peking's posture will no doubt be influenced by its desire to promote the ouster of the current Japanese government and its replacement, at the least, by a Liberal Democratic regime more friendly toward China, or preferably, by a coalition including pro-Peking elements of the opposition. Until and unless it succeeds in dislodging the Sato regime, which it views as anti-Chinese, Peking is likely to persist in its tough stand towards Japan. Meantime, in its dealings with other Asian countries, Peking is likely to play on fears of growing Japanese economic and political influence in an effort to create an anti-Japanese bloc.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

China is a country which was blockaded by the United States for more than 20 years. Now, since there is a desire to come and look at China, it's all right. And since there is a desire to talk, we are also ready to talk. Of course, it goes without saying that the positions of our two sides are different. . . . To achieve relaxation, there must be a common desire for it, so various questions may be placed on the table for discussion. We do not expect a settlement of all questions at one stroke. . . .

—Chou En-lai in an interview with James Reston, *The New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1971.

Peking will be particularly concerned about Tokyo's relations with Seoul and Taipei. While the Chinese have recently shown somewhat greater flexibility on the issue of Taiwan (as noted above), they are totally opposed to growing ties between Taiwan and Japan and thus to any scheme for an independent Taiwan with strong economic links to Tokyo. In the future they will probably seek support from other Asian countries for the return of Taiwan to China, and they may even seek to open negotiations with the Chinese rulers on Taiwan, appealing to their nationalism to get their commitment to such an arrangement.

Peking's concern about Korea has similar bases. It fears that Tokyo will establish close relations with Seoul and gradually replace the United States as the protector of the anti-Communist regime in South Korea. To counter such a possibility, the Chinese may go so far as to encourage Pyongyang to move toward rapprochement with Seoul.

Peking's concern about Japan will create dilemmas in terms of its effort to reduce the United States' influence and presence in Asia. Chinese leaders must recognize that a complete US withdrawal would substantially increase the probability of a Japanese move toward assertive nationalism and rearmament, including the possession of nuclear weapons. Thus, Peking may learn to accommodate to a certain amount of American presence in Asia as an alternative to a growing role for Tokyo.

4 It is doubtful that China's new posture will lead to any substantial improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Some moderation in polemics may be expected, along with some improvement in diplomatic give-and-take, including trade relations. Most important, from Peking's point of view, the prospects of a Soviet military move against China have probably been reduced.

5 Except in the case of the United States and Japan, the prospects for Peking's establishment of diplomatic relations and resumption of normal contacts with Western nations appear quite good.

Insofar as the US is concerned, China's goals revolve primarily around the issues of security and territorial integrity. The leaders in Peking no doubt hope to negotiate an American military withdrawal from Tawian which would permit negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists for a reincorporation of the island under Chinese control. In addition, they seek diplomatic recognition from the US and assurances that it is no longer committed to the overthrow of their regime. More broadly, they hope to establish the PRC as a major world power which is consulted on international issues, particularly those touching on Asian affairs.

The state of relations between Peking and Washington will hinge on how far the latter is prepared to go in loosening its ties to Taiwan and how rigid the former is in demanding formal renunciation of the American security treaty with Taiwan. The United States is unlikely to be willing to renounce its commitment to defend Taiwan but might be prepared to end its very limited military presence there. Even if this move were made, the prospect for a resumption of diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC in the short run appears to be remote. More likely, President Nixon's trip to Peking will lead to the establishment of a multitude of contacts, both formal and informal, between the Chinese and the Americans, leading gradually to a normalization of relations.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy

By Harry G. Gelber

The strategic calculations of the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the last 20 years have taken place under unique constraints. The industrial and force structures required to underpin China's international claims have had to be constructed in the midst of major domestic difficulties and foreign dangers, including threats from both superpowers. Yet China achieved her first nuclear explosion in the mid-1960's, only a few years after the break with Moscow. At the beginning of the 1970's, she has a small medium-range potential which is being enlarged. This article examines the evolution of Peking's attitudes toward nuclear weapons; the present status of Chinese nuclear capabilities and the ways in which they may be developed and expanded; and the effect which the creation of these forces may have on the conduct of China's foreign relations.

Early Views

Reconciliation of Maoist principles of revolutionary warfare with the new facts of nuclear weaponry has been an important problem for Chinese military thought since 1945. The initial synthesis had come to be broadly accepted by the early 1950's. It included assumptions about the continuing validity of at least three principles: the primacy of politics; the refusal to admit sharp distinctions between the use of force and other means of achieving political aims; and the idea that a properly designed strategy can make possible the achievement of political gains from a position of technical military inferiority. Nuclear weapons were "paper tigers"—not in the sense that they were not highly destructive, but in the sense that their development did not alter the basic laws of social change. Weapons would always be less important than the men who controlled them, and political action and revolutionary spirit would continue to prevail over merely material factors.[1] At the same time, revolutionaries had an obligation to observe other principles of action, including caution. The use of force was one essential dimension of the struggle for political victory; however, this fact did not contradict but rather emphasized the need to avoid adventurism.

In Peking's view, experience seemed to point toward similar conclusions: atomic weapons were apparently not relevant to many kinds of conflict situations, and low-level conflicts did not need to escalate. The US possessed such weapons, but they had not been used to prevent the Chinese Communist Party's victory within China, to overcome a stalemate in Korea, or to prevent or limit other nationalist revolutions in Asia. Hence, political gains might still be made in cautious—even if sometimes violent—ways which would not invoke the use of

Mr. Gelber, Reader in Politics at Monash University (Australia), has written extensively on defense matters; his list of publications includes The Australian-American Alliance, *New York, Penguin, 1968, and articles in a number of journals. He also edited* Problems of Australian Defense, *Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970.*

[1] For a more recent assertion of the supremacy of people over things, see the joint editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag), and *Chieh-fang-chun Pao* (Liberation Army Daily) on Aug. 1, 1970, commemorating the 43rd anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), in *Peking Review*, Aug. 7, 1970, pp. 6-7, 23.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

atomic weapons. And once the Soviet Union had begun to acquire similar weapons, the Chinese leaders evidently felt that Soviet power on balance increased China's own security against the United States.

These first conclusions came under review during the years 1953–54. The strategic plans of the new Eisenhower administration contained, from China's point of view, some alarming features. Washington threatened atomic action if there were no armistice in Korea. The "new look" US strategy of off-shore naval presence and reliance on nuclear weapons clearly emphasized technical warfare and long-distance strikes, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' declarations about massive retaliation may have seemed, to Peking, to be aimed at China as much as at the Soviet Union—or at least to indicate a policy of selective nuclear response to Chinese moves. Events leading up to the 1954 Vietnam settlement, especially the public discussion of a possible American atomic strike to help the French, further alarmed Peking.[2] So did Mr. Dulles' Asian containment policy, culminating in the SEATO treaty.

At the same time, there were new doubts in Peking, partly resulting from the development of thermonuclear weapons, about the adequacy of Soviet deterrence of any American threat to other Communist states, including China. The Soviet Union's own thermonuclear tests were welcome in that they increased America's risks in a confrontation with Peking. But how far would the Soviet Union actually go on China's behalf at the risk of an American thermonuclear response against Soviet territory? And what degree of control over Chinese actions would Moscow require as a condition for granting its protection?

Sino-Soviet Cooperation

Whether these developments led to China's decision to build her own nuclear force or merely strengthened a decision already taken is not clear. At any rate, they showed Peking that, while political factors might remain supreme, China's foreign policies would operate under major constraints so long as she lacked adequate means of her own for deterring nuclear threats. Peking therefore reinforced its effort to create the scientific and industrial base needed for any Chinese nuclear effort, including weapons production. But this led to a further dilemma which underlay the strategic debates in China during 1955–56. To what extent should China try to acquire the new weapons technologies by her own effort, and to what extent should she rely on Soviet help in order to achieve eventual independence?[3] Professional soldiers argued that the swift creation of modern forces, especially air forces and air defense, should have priority over the slow development of the country's economic potential favored by some party leaders. Yet a "quick fix" would prolong China's dependence upon Moscow by further delaying the industrial development on which a fully independent Chinese capability would eventually have to be based. The decision went against the professionals: economic development would be pursued at the cost of immediate military capabilities.

But this approach, too, left some PRC interests exposed. In 1956, Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev began to argue that atom bombs were no respecters of class laws, that conflicts were liable to escalate, and that violent revolution should not be insisted upon to the point of courting nuclear devastation. Such a line contradicted the Maoist belief that atomic weapons were paper tigers. If accepted by Peking, it would mean the abandonment or downgrading of Chinese policies of support for the "national liberation struggles" in the underdeveloped world, with an adverse effect on an important element of Mao's global strategy. Propositions of this kind, moreover, were leading Khrushchev to search for arms-control arrangements with the West, and these might well prove to be incompatible with Soviet nuclear aid to China or support for the development of Chinese nuclear capabilities.

In the meantime, however, the Russians were giving substantial help to the Chinese nuclear program. The two governments had agreed in 1950 on a joint exploitation of uranium resources in Sinkiang, and in 1955 the Russians consented to transfer their share of the joint enterprise to China, thus providing Peking with sole control of the extraction and separation facilities. The same year, Moscow and

[2] This is not to say, of course, that Chinese policies on Vietnam in 1954 were concerned solely with protecting the PRC against a US attack. For a general discussion of China's views and aims, see Melvin Gurtov, *The First Vietnam Crisis: Chinese Communist Strategy and United States Involvement, 1953-1954,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1967.

[3] For a discussion of these debates and their outcome, see Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era,* Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, pp. 34-62.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peking concluded an Atomic Cooperation Treaty, under which the Russians agreed to supply a 10-megawatt experimental reactor and a cyclotron to the Chinese. From 1956 on, Chinese scientists and engineers took part in the work of the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna, in the Soviet Union.[4] And in mid-October 1957 the two governments concluded an agreement on new technology for national defense.[5]

Soviet help was in the first instance for peaceful purposes, but if one takes the period 1957–59 as a whole, it came to have clear military implications and even to include some air defense and surface-to-surface missiles. Until 1958, there also were Sino-Soviet discussions which seem to have concentrated on Soviet aid for the Chinese nuclear development program, the question of whether or how far China should abstain from developing her own nuclear weapons in exchange for Soviet support, and some Soviet proposals for joint defense arrangements.

The Soviet tests of an intercontinental-missile launcher in 1957 appear to have produced complex reactions in China. They temporarily bolstered Peking's confidence that the United States would be deterred from any unprovoked attack. The way was therefore thought to be open for a more positive exploitation of the position of the socialist camp in ways short of "provocation." At the same time, Peking may have realized that whereas an air defense system would require an enormous economic and technical investment and would take a long time to achieve, a missile program could give China an effective deterrent comparatively quickly and cheaply. In any event, China announced in May 1958 that she intended to build her own missiles.[6]

Then, during the second half of 1958, came the crisis in the Taiwan Strait over the PRC's attempt to assert its claim to the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Events made it plain that the United States might indeed be willing to use nuclear weapons if pressed too hard, but that the Soviet Union would not use hers to protect China. Here, once again, was a challenge both to Maoist assertions about atomic weapons being paper tigers and to the validity of Chinese reliance on a Soviet nuclear shield. These strategic and foreign-policy problems were further complicated by Peking's ideological differences with Moscow about such matters as the Chinese Great Leap Forward, as well as by the broader implications of the 1959 dispute between Mao and Marshal P'eng Teh-huai over military policy. Mao received little sympathy for his strategic concerns from a Khrushchev who was conscious not only of the growing Maoist ideological and political challenge to the USSR within the Communist world but also of the need for some arms control arrangements with the West. Shortly afterward, Moscow effectively abrogated the defense technology pact, and Soviet aid to China's nuclear weapons program, as well as a large part of the arrangements for economic cooperation, was phased out during 1959–60. The damage to China's progress, through unplanned interruptions and the withdrawal of key personnel, was substantial. Henceforth she would have to proceed by her own efforts.[7]

China on Her Own

Over the last decade, the Chinese nuclear weapons program has received very high priority.[8] PRC policies in this area appear to have rested on at least three assumptions: (1) nuclear weapons have a special value in creating or maintaining diplomatic, political and strategic freedom of maneuver for China; (2) an operational nuclear force must therefore be part of the broad scientific, technological, and economic base which China requires in order to achieve her place in the world;[9] (3) the transition from a vulnerable embryonic weapons program, with

[4] The Institute was intended as a joint venture for several Communist states, and the extent of the PRC's participation in it was second only to that of the Soviet Union. Not until mid-1965 did the last Chinese scientists leave Dubna. See New China News Agency (NCNA) report, June 23, 1965; and Arnold Kramish, "The Great Chinese Bomb Puzzle—and a Solution," *Fortune* (New York), June 1966, pp. 248, 250.

[5] A fact which the Chinese revealed in 1963. See the statement of the Chinese government on Aug. 15, 1963, *Peking Review*, Aug. 16, 1963, pp. 7-15.

[6] Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow*, New York, Putnam's, 1963, p. 436.

[7] The Chinese never forgave Khrushchev. See, for instance, a collective article by "proletarian revolutionaries in departments under the Scientific and Technical Commission for National Defense," *Peking Review*, Nov. 3, 1967.

[8] In December 1958, the Chinese government issued a draft 12-year plan for the development of science and technology. Atomic energy, electronics, and jet propulsion technology headed the list of 57 areas for development.

[9] To be sure, that broad base need not in every respect be constructed along Western lines. The Chinese leadership has tended to reject the Western pattern of large-scale industry—at least as a general principle and for the time being. Instead, it has concentrated on the creation of a network of small factories and simple techniques of a sort which China's technologically deficient work force can master.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A MEASURE OF SELF-DEFENSE

China develops nuclear weapons because she is compelled to do so under imperialist nuclear threats, and she does so entirely for the purpose of defense and for breaking the imperialist nuclear monopoly and finally eliminating nuclear weapons. China's nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage, and at present she is not yet a nuclear power, nor will she ever be a "nuclear superpower" practicing the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail. . . .

—Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on July 30, 1971, New China News Agency report, Aug. 7, 1971.

its standing invitation to preemption, to an operational force capable of minimum deterrence must be made as quickly as possible. These principles, it should be noted, can sometimes conflict. On at least two occasions in the past, for example, Mao has decided defense debates in favor of long-term development and in the interests of broad national capabilities at the expense of "quick fixes" to meet immediate dangers. He did so in 1955 and again ten years later in the debates between the Mao-Lin group and Lo Jui-ch'ing about the danger that American action against North Vietnam might lead to attacks on Chinese territory.[10]

China has adequate resources of natural uranium, and work on an enrichment process (achieving greater concentrations of U–235) began quite early. Production of weapons-grade U–235 seems to have been under way since about 1963.[11] The initial Chinese weapons tests used devices based on enriched uranium rather than plutonium, though in later years plutonium production followed.[12] Chinese thermonuclear tests from about the mid-1960's onward provided evidence of the production of enriched lithium as well as of heavy water. According to a statement by US Defense Secretary Melvin Laird at the beginning of 1970, China only had enough U–235 for a few dozen weapons of any type. He added that an expansion of the production of fissionable materials to provide for a significant weapons program might well entail the building of another U–235 plant, which could not come on stream for several years.[13] But the Institute for Strategic Studies in London has suggested that by mid-1971 China probably had enough material for 120 atomic and thermonuclear devices, although one reason for holding the number of thermonuclear tests down to one a year during the late 1960's may have been the shortage of highly-enriched uranium.[14]

More speculatively, China's development of nuclear weapons may face other constraints or costs. One problem may concern the number of top-flight scientists and engineers available for this work. Of 200 key Chinese scientists involved in nuclear and missile programs during the early 1960's, three-quarters were trained abroad—half of them in the United States. A great deal of effort has gone into training programs since then, and many scientists and engineers have graduated. One assessment estimates that by 1970–71 China had 65,000 highly-qualified scientists and engineers involved in research and development programs.[15] Nevertheless, even this total would give China only one-tenth as many researchers as the Soviet Union or the United States, while China's expenditure on research and development is estimated to be roughly half as much (as a percentage of GNP) as that of either of the superpowers. All this suggests two further possible limitations. The need for senior

[10] See Harry Harding and Melvin Gurtov, *The Purge of Lo Jui-ch'ing: The Politics of Chinese Strategic Planning*, Paper R-548-PR, Santa Monica, Calif., RAND Corporation, February 1971; and Uri Ra'anan, "Peking's Foreign Policy 'Debate,' 1965-66," in Tang Tsou, Ed., *China in Crisis, Vol. 2: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 23-71.

[11] The early stages of the enrichment process probably took place in the Lanchow plant, which had been built with some Soviet aid. Arnold Kramish (*op. cit.*) has suggested that the Chinese probably achieved the quantity and concentration of U-235 required for their first tests by a combination of gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic separation. On this point, see also Manfredo Macioti, "Scientists Go Barefoot," *Survival* (London), Vol. 13, No. 7, July 1971, pp. 232-38.

[12] In 1967, a big new plutonium reactor came on stream.

[13] Statement of Feb. 20, 1970, before a joint session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, *The FY 1971 Defense Program and Budget*, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 107. Hereafter this statement will be referred to as Posture Statement 1970.

[14] See Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1970-71*, London, 1970; *The Military Balance 1971-72; and Strategic Survey 1970*, London, 1971.

[15] Macioti, *op. cit.*, p. 233. Morton H. Halperin indicates that some 950 Chinese scientists had been enrolled in, or had graduated from, the Dubna Institute by 1965. See his *China and the Bomb*, New York, Praeger, 1965, p. 74. For a general background study, see *An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Studies Prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress*, Washington, D. C., US Government Printing Office, February 1967—especially the chapter by Chu-yuen Chen on "Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China," Vol. 2, pp. 519-47.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

men to train top-flight younger ones may, at least for a while, divert some time and energy from other purposes;[16] and though the central authorities can channel great efforts into one or two selected programs, China's overall resource limitations in these fields may mean that concentration on weapons or computers involves significant neglect in other areas of the economy.

At any rate, the PRC government has gone to some lengths not to allow the work of its scientists to be disrupted even by otherwise highly important political movements and decisions.[17] China has also devoted much energy to an efficient organization of the inflow of scientific information from abroad,[18] though the impossibility of exchange visits by Chinese and foreign scientists in the past may have caused certain lags.

Between October 1964 and October 1970, China conducted eleven nuclear test explosions. While the first and second tests were of fission devices with a yield of some 20 kilotons, the third (in May 1966) involved a device of ten times this yield and containing some thermonuclear material—lithium 6. For the fourth test, in October 1966, the Chinese used a device of something under 20 kilotons, but whereas the devices in the second and third tests had been dropped from aircraft, this one was delivered over approximately 500 miles by a missile of one of the early Soviet types, possibly the SS-4.[19] The sixth test, in June 1967, was China's first explosion of a full thermonuclear device. This device was dropped in the Lop Nor region of Sinkiang and produced a yield of about three megatons. Of the five tests which followed, that of September 1969 involved the underground explosion of a fission device, with a yield of some 25 kilotons. The other four involved thermonuclear devices dropped from aircraft. The one set off in December 1967 appears to have been a partial failure, but those exploded in December 1968, September 1969, and October 1970 were successful and produced yields of some three megatons each.

Delivery Systems

The first effective delivery vehicles in Chinese hands were probably a few TU–16 medium-range jet bombers (with a radius of some 1,600 miles) acquired from the Soviet Union. Aircraft, of course, were particularly important at this stage because they could deliver three-megaton devices well before developmental work on yield-to-weight ratios would make it possible to fit comparable warheads onto missiles. Recently, however, there has been evidence that the Chinese regard the TU–16s not merely as a transitional method of delivery pending the introduction of operational missiles, but as an important continuing element in a mixed force. According to Secretary Laird, the Chinese version of the TU–16 has entered series production, and a significant force is expected to be available by mid-1972.[20] The basic decisions on such production must have been made by 1965. It seems possible that this policy, as well as the emphasis on medium-range missile production during the later 1960's, may have had to do with Peking's growing perception of a Soviet threat and of the need for China to have some deterrent against it.

Notwithstanding the buildup of the TU–16 force, the PRC has placed chief emphasis on missiles. Work on these has been going on since the early 1960's. By the summer of 1967, a substantial number of test firings, some over distances of several hundred miles, were being observed on the chief Chinese testing range. Further proof of booster capabilities came in April 1970, when the Chinese, in a scientifically elegant operation, launched a 381-lb. satellite—apparently using a booster assembly comparable to that of the early American Thor intermediate-range missiles (IRBMs), which had a

[16] Other writers, however, stress the importance of the Chinese policy of relying on the masses for seminal discoveries and technical innovation instead of on highly select groups of scientists and engineers. See, for instance, Macioti, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[17] The CCP Central Committee in August 1966 directed that research workers were to be isolated from the Cultural Revolution. This policy, it is true, does not seem to have been entirely successful. On June 25, 1968, for example, Radio Moscow reported that Nieh Jung-chen, chairman of the Scientific and Technological Commission, had been denounced on Red Guard posters. Nonetheless, there is evidence that on April 20, 1968, Chou En-lai himself chaired a meeting in Peking at which representatives of various factions—including the military committees of various institutes, the congress of students, the Academy of Sciences, and others—were sharply told to wind up their disputes and get on with their jobs. The government has continued to emphasize the importance of scientific effort. See, for example, Lin Piao's speech of Oct. 1, 1970, in *Peking Review*, Oct. 9, 1970, p. 15.

[18] Observers in Hong Kong have noted that the contents of a wide variety of Western scientific publications appear to be available in China within a comparatively short time after their publication in the West.

[19] *The Washington Post*, April 26, 1970.

[20] The PRC is also reported to be building MIG-21-type fighter aircraft at Chengtu, in South Central China. See *International Herald-Tribune* (Paris), March 3, 1971, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

range of 1,500 miles. This satellite was followed, in March 1971, by a slightly larger one, put into a fairly similar orbit.[21]

The first missiles to be deployed were medium-range missiles (MRBMs), stationed primarily in Northeast and Northwest China, with a capability of hitting the Soviet Maritime Provinces and Japan on one hand and Soviet Central Asia on the other. Thus far, Peking seems to have deployed some 20 MRBMs and possibly several batteries of shorter-range, nuclear-tipped missiles capable of ranges of up to several hundred miles. There are indications that most of these are liquid-fueled, but that not all of them require permanent emplacements.[22] This deployment accords fairly well with previous Western expectations. US Defense Secretary Laird has said at various times that China would have a small MRBM force deployed by mid-1971; that the emphasis of China's research and development program had shifted during 1970 from MRBMs to IRBMs, with the likelihood that by mid-1972 she would have a small mixed operational force of MRBMs and IRBMs; and that China might have an operational force of 80–100 MRBMs by the mid-1970's.[23] Some Japanese estimates suggest that Peking will have 300–500 missiles up to IRBM range by 1975.

There remains the question of China's development of ICBMs. Most of the direct and indirect evidence about the Chinese missile program is consistent with the assumption that the construction of ICBMs with thermonuclear warheads constitutes one of the PRC's principal medium-term aims in the field of strategic weapons. US intelligence sources have persistently argued that China will develop ICBMs, and there has been no indication that she wishes to abstain from doing so. To the contrary, the fitting-out of at least one missile-tracking ship as well as some Chinese activities in Eastern Africa suggest that Peking regards ICBM testing arrangements as desirable.

Moreover, missile-testing facilities within China appear to have some ICBM capabilities. The Chinese have constructed a new experimental launch complex in the Manchurian mountains, from which test firings of about 2,000 miles into the Sinkiang desert are possible.[24] This is much farther than the ranges previously obtainable from the Inner Mongolian testing site. Boosters similar to the ones used to launch the satellites, but in a missile configuration, have been prepared for testing and may even have undergone some tests already at the Manchurian site. According to Secretary Laird, "a reduced-range test of an ICBM may have occurred in late 1970," [25] and this was probably a test westward from Manchuria into Sinkiang. Mr. Laird concluded that the PRC may well achieve an initial operating capability in 1973, or a year or two later. In sum, it seems plausible to assume that a full-scale Chinese ICBM test will actually be made before the middle of 1972.[26]

At the same time, the progress of Chinese weapons and space technology can provide the PRC with additional options. One might be the development of satellite surveillance and perhaps communications facilities.[27] Another might be the development—after further work on smaller warheads using a fission process employing plutonium—of tactical weapons for battlefield use. Chinese interest in constructing tactical weapons could be one explanation for the underground test of September 1969, which might have been intended to combine closer analysis of design information with a denial to outside powers of the airborne debris needed to study PRC weapons developments.[28]

There is also the possibility of developing missile-equipped submarines. China already has the world's third-largest submarine fleet, including at least one boat with facilities for launching cruise missiles. Most of these boats, it is true, are obsolescent, and the fleet has little experience in high-seas

[21] For the announcements of the launchings, see NCNA report, April 25, 1970, and *Peking Review*, March 19, 1971. The second satellite weighed about 487 lbs. See also *International Herald-Tribune*, March 5, 1971.

[22] See *The Military Balance 1971-72*, cited above; and a *Hsing-tao Jih-pao* report translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *Reports* (Washington), No. 52417, Feb. 18, 1971, especially pp. 17-21.

[23] Posture Statement 1970, p. 108, and statement of March 9, 1971, before the House Armed Services Committee, *The FY 1972-1976 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget*, Washington, D. C., US Government Printing Office, 1971, p. 48. The latter statement will hereafter be referred to as Posture Statement 1971.

[24] See *The Military Balance 1971-72* and *Strategic Survey 1970*, cited above.

[25] Posture Statement 1971, pp. 47-48.

[26] It is not impossible that the timing of such a test could relate to the date of President Nixon's proposed visit to Peking.

[27] This has been suggested by the US Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. See *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1971, Part VI: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation; Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2nd sess.*, Washington, D. C., US Government Printing Office, 1970, pp. 1-3.

[28] Such an interpretation of the 1969 underground test has been advanced by Alice L. Hsieh in *Communist China's Evolving Military Strategy and Doctrine*, Paper P-646, Arlington, Va., Institute for Defense Analyses, June 1970, pp. 49-52. See also her "China's Nuclear-Missile Programme: Regional or Intercontinental?, *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 45, January-March 1971, especially pp. 89-91.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

operations. But Chinese shipyards have begun to build advanced warships—among them at least one nuclear-powered submarine.[29] Present indications are that this boat will be an attack submarine. Its deployment promises not only to give China's naval defenses additional depth but also to provide experience on which the subsequent construction and deployment of a more complex missile/submarine system could be based. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that by 1980 or so China will have the option of deploying her ICBMs on land or at sea, or in some mix of both.

Another set of issues concerns probable Chinese policies on hardening of missile sites versus mobility of missiles, on the development of high accuracies of delivery, and on the development of penetration aids and multiple warheads. It seems unlikely that the dispersal and concealment of silos would present insuperable difficulties in a country which is so large, which possesses such an excellent internal security system, and where the opportunities for concealing earthworks on farms or mountainous terrain are so many. As for land mobility, some techniques already appear to be in use, and it may be possible for the Chinese to develop others. Hence one must expect some mix of both hardening and mobility for land-based missiles. As for accuracies, since China presumably can take advantage of material on guidance systems published in Western scientific literature, it seems reasonable to expect levels of accuracy which represent a considerable improvement on those of the first-generation missiles of the United States or the USSR. What policy China may adopt regarding development of penetration aids and multiple warheads was repeatedly but inconclusively discussed during the American antiballistic missile debates of 1969–70.[30] The public record contains no evidence as to Chinese intentions in these areas, nor has any Chinese testing or development work on systems of either sort been reported. It seems a plausible assumption that Peking's decisions will be governed not simply by its own developing capabilities in the relevant areas of technology, but also by its political and strategic predictions about the kinds of weapons systems that the United States and the Soviet Union (and perhaps Japan) will have deployed by the time Chinese weapons systems can become operational. In the meantime, China is reported to be spending some two percent of her GNP on missiles and warheads.[31]

Doctrines for Employment

There remains the question of China's general strategic and nuclear-weapons doctrines. The PLA planning staffs must have pondered problems of deployment, targeting, and tactics, but neither arguments nor conclusions have appeared in print.[32] As to the basic political decisions which underlie any

[29] *The Military Balance 1971-72*, cited above; *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1971. There have been other reports that Dairen shipyards have for some time been building a Soviet-type missile submarine propelled by conventional motors, as well as an unconfirmed French report that China some years ago launched a submarine with nuclear propulsion.

[30] Most of the views expressed regarding them during the US ABM debates were somewhat speculative. Among those who opposed ABM deployment, Dr. J. P. Ruina suggested that the PRC could develop crude and low-confidence penetration aids, or even untested ones, whose effect would be to undermine US confidence in the damage-denial capability of the ABM system. Dr. Hans A. Bethe argued that China could develop penetration-aid systems using its MRBMs, and do laboratory work on the radar cross-section of its devices, so that the penetration aids would be available even before the ICBMs themselves were ready. Dr. F. Hornig agreed that China would have little difficulty in developing simple penetration aids, but he considered it almost inconceivable in any case that the Chinese would launch a missile at the US. Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky thought that the Chinese would be able to devise means of confusing the American radar system. Drs. George W. Rathjens and Herbert F. York said that China would be able to develop high-quality penetration aids much more quickly than the US had managed to do. The Nixon administration's reply was, in effect, that technical limitations would prevent swift Chinese progress in these fields—that it would take China a long time to achieve even a crude penetration-aid capability and longer still to develop a system reliable enough to provide a basis for responsible strategic planning. See Ruina in *Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, Part 1; Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 91st Cong., 1st sess.*, Washington, D. C., US Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 33; Bethe in *ibid.*, p. 38, and in Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," *Scientific American* (New York), Vol. 218, No. 3, March 1968, pp. 21-31; Hornig in *Military Procurement for Fiscal Year 1971; Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 91st Cong., 2nd sess.*, Washington, D. C., US Government Printing Office, 1970, pp. 2399-400; Panofsky in *ibid.*, p. 2219; Rathjens and York in *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1971, Part IV: Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System* (see fn. 27), p. 934; Secretary of Defense Laird in *Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System; Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st sess.*, Washington, D. C.; US Government Printing Office, 1969, especially pp. 11-15, 24-32; Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1971, Part IV: Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System*, p. 28.

[31] See *Time* (New York), March 8, 1971, p. 18. The US strategic-forces budget amounts to about 0.8 percent of what is, of course, a very much larger GNP.

[32] The major exception, of course, is the material from the PLA's *Bulletin of Activities* which became available in 1961 and is translated in J. C. Cheng, Ed., *The Politics of the Chinese Red Army*, Stanford, Calif., The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strategy, we know of them only by inference. There has been no public discussion of nuclear strategy comparable to that in the United States or even the USSR. Still less has China taken part in any international debates on these matters. An analysis of Chinese strategic thinking must therefore be based on a variety of general political statements, on the apparent characteristics of those weapons systems which China has chosen to develop and test, and on the empirical evidence of China's past behavior. It must also be based in part on a variety of domestic factors which cannot be examined in detail within the limits of this article, such as the pressures of bureaucratic interests, the role of the PLA as an instrument of order, and the general precedence which Maoists, at least, have accorded to the domestic political role of the PLA as opposed to its technical military functions.

Nuclear weapons appear to fit into a strategic concept which remains Maoist in its insistence that politics remains in command whatever the tools (including weapons) by which the aims of the state may be pursued at any given time.[33] Under this concept, military doctrine cannot be separated from political doctrine, and the army serves as the military extension of the party. While nuclear weapons are a supreme symbol of national independence and self-reliance, too great an emphasis on technical military problems can easily lead to the sin of professionalism. It can even result in an undermining of the correct political line, as in the cases of P'eng Teh-huai in the late 1950's and Lo Jui-ch'ing in 1965.[34] By the same token, possession of nuclear weapons cannot itself determine correct tactics, especially in the face of a technically superior enemy. Undue respect for the enemy's nuclear weapons could lead to defeatism; yet undue emphasis on China's own nuclear arms could lead to an equally undesirable adventurism.

In terms of actual policy, there is no convincing evidence that Peking fails to realize what nuclear war could mean, or that the Chinese leaders plan to make the deployment of their nuclear weapons the springboard for embarking on new higher-risk strategic policies. China has as yet given no indication that she intends these new arms to serve as an umbrella beneath which she can more easily and confidently dispatch conventional forces beyond her own borders, or to enable her to act more aggressively abroad as distinct from protecting China as the "secure base area" for foreign revolutionaries.[35] Nor has Peking suggested that its nuclear weapons might be available for use on behalf of an ally.

On the other hand, there is little doubt that the very existence of a deployed Chinese nuclear force will remove some past constraints on China's freedom of action and impose fresh limitations upon her opponents. It is too early to suggest precisely how this changed structure of expectations and constraints will operate in practice, but it seems likely that—in however indirect a fashion—China will seek to exploit an increased freedom of action not only for defense against direct attack but in support of those revolutionary tendencies elsewhere whose success she regards as a precondition for her own ultimate security.[36] True, as Lin Piao explained in his 1965 treatise, "Long Live the Victory of People's War," China cannot initiate or create revolutions elsewhere. Yet the Chinese also believe that neither within nor between states can there be accommodation between oppressors and oppressed, and that Peking is fully entitled to support revolutions or wars of national liberation morally, politically, and with training and logistics.

In the context of global strategy, Peking appears to regard the possession of nuclear weapons as a practical advantage in several respects. First and foremost, they support China's claim to great-power

[33] I do not wish to suggest that this attitude is peculiar to Mao. He shares it with such diverse thinkers as Karl von Clausewitz and Julius Caesar. The opposite view tends to regard war as something separate from the political process which precedes it and resumes once victory is achieved. Representatives of this school of thought include Baron Henri Jomini, General Douglas MacArthur, and Genghis Khan.

[34] After P'eng's fall, he was accused as follows: "In a futile attempt to turn our army into an appendage of the Khrushchev revisionist clique, he depended entirely on that clique for the improvement of our army's equipment and the development of up-to-date military science and technology." See "Settle Accounts with P'eng Teh-huai for His Heinous Crimes of Usurping Army Leadership and Opposing the Party," *Peking Review*, Sept. 1, 1967. For a detailed discussion of the Lo Jui-ch'ing affair, see Harding and Gurtov, *op. cit.*

[35] See Mao's formulation of a "general rule" that Chinese troops will not be sent to fight outside Chinese territory, in a speech of May 21, 1970, quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

[36] Notions about the need for worldwide revolution remain strong. In March 1971, for example, a joint article by the editorial departments of *Jen-min Jih-pao*, *Hung-ch'i*, and *Chieh-fang-chun Pao* in commemoration of the Paris Commune declared: "The final victory of a socialist country not only requires the efforts of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people at home, but also involves the victory of the world revolution and the abolition of the system of exploitation of man by man over the whole globe. . . ." "Long Live the Victory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat!," in *Peking Review*, March 19, 1971, pp. 3-13. See also the joint editorial of May 1, 1971, "Long Live the Great Unity of the People of the World," in *Peking Review*, May 7, 1971, pp. 10-12.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

status and strengthen her political and diplomatic role in the world at large. Without them, China cannot expect to be treated as an equal.[37] The Chinese are well aware that Western comments on the China problem in 1970–71 have often stressed the importance of the nuclear component of China's strength, and that many of the arguments advanced by Western advocates of Peking's admission to the United Nations have made the same point. Beyond this, a Chinese nuclear force will, in Peking's view, tend to deter the Soviet Union and the United States from launching a major attack on China either by nuclear or conventional means.[38] Given the smallness and vulnerability of the initial Chinese force, this deterrence cannot be absolute, but the mere existence of the force will confront any would-be attacker with an unpleasant choice. He can accept some risk that China might use her nuclear weapons in retaliation against an attack; or he can accept the need—and the exceedingly heavy political costs—of preempting the Chinese force (even though a first strike might not guarantee the elimination of every Chinese bomber or missile); or else he must abstain from attacking. The desire to avoid such a choice will itself place major constraints upon an opponent. China's ability to force that choice must therefore be regarded as a major gain.

This is all the more important because fear of a sudden strike—either as part of or followed up by an invasion of China—has been one of Peking's chief strategic anxieties for 20 years. Both a strategic surprise attack and an attack on China's cities will seem—and be—less likely once China possesses some retaliatory capability; furthermore, landing operations on Chinese coasts would be a more doubtful proposition if the defenders were known to have tactical nuclear weapons. Peking may, indeed, already have some experience of the usefulness of a small deterrent force: the possibility of Chinese retaliation against cities in Siberia or the Maritime Provinces was probably one significant factor in persuading Moscow not to attack China in 1969–70 during their border confrontation.

Similarly, China may very well hope to strengthen her resistance to possible nuclear blackmail, and to deter other powers from introducing nuclear weapons into any local Asian conflict which might break out. For example, China's possession of medium-range weapons capable of hitting US bases in Asia would no doubt tend to discourage Washington from escalating any conflict in Southeast Asia, or a new clash in Korea, to the nuclear level. If all concerned in a local conflict refrained from employing nuclear weapons, moreover, one important result would be to upgrade China's conventional capabilities. (This would entail particular advantages for the Chinese in any fighting on their own soil.) Hence, Chinese deployment of nuclear weapons would widen the span of risks facing any potential opponent.

China can also calculate that a nuclear force will increase her leverage vis-a-vis smaller Asian states. It can do so directly by allowing China somewhat greater latitude to intervene in local conflicts or to encourage local dissident groups. More important, perhaps, it can do so indirectly: for example, by helping to weaken American alliance systems. In a period when the United States is in any case diminishing its presence in Asia, uncertainties among Asians about the value of ties with the United States may grow. So may their fears that, if a confrontation between China and the US should occur, such ties could lead to their involvement in nuclear conflict. These attitudes could, in turn, produce greater pressure from Asian capitals upon Washington to avoid or soft-pedal any disputes with the PRC.

Finally, acquisition of nuclear weapons has given China a special role in great-power discussions on arms control and disarmament. Peking has consistently been unimpressed by general arguments about the undesirability of nuclear weapons, as distinct from the undesirability of seeing weapons in the hands of particular states and governments. It defended its own weapons program for a time on the ground that since the policies of states are determined by their social systems and socialist states are inherently peace-loving, nuclear weapons in socialist hands would not increase the likelihood of war. China, to be sure, has said that she is willing to dispose of her nuclear arms as part of a global ban on such weapons and a dismantling of great-power nuclear arsenals,[39] but short of such an agreement, she reserves the right to acquire her own nuclear

[37] See, for example, Chou En-lai's remark to Lord Montgomery in 1961 "that other great nations had such weapons and smaller ones would have them in due course." "China on the Move," *Sunday Times* (London), Oct. 15, 1961.

[38] See Peking's comment on the first Chinese nuclear test: "China cannot remain idle and do nothing in the face of the ever-increasing nuclear threat posed by the United States . . . the development of nuclear weapons by China is for defense and for protecting the Chinese people from the danger of the United States launching a nuclear war," NCNA, Oct. 16, 1964.

[39] This has been the official view since 1963. See *Peking Review*, Aug. 2, 1963, pp. 7-8, and Oct. 23, 1964, p. 5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons, though she insists that she will never be the first to use them.[40] (This "no-first-use" posture has several practical advantages. It makes the first use of nuclear weapons by others against China still more difficult and politically costly. It is consistent with the image of a moderate and defensive China.[41] It encourages China's smaller neighbors to dissuade the great powers from nuclear action. And by downgrading nuclear weapons, it emphasizes forms of conflict in which the PRC's strength is greatest: conventional and revolutionary wars.)

In addition, China has indicated that she will not consider entering into partial arms-control arrangements which would tend to freeze her strategic disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States and the USSR. In fact, she has been consistently hostile to Soviet-American proposals on arms control. For example, Peking interpreted the partial nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963 as an attempt to consolidate a Soviet-American duopoly on nuclear arms and to blackmail China into abstaining from developing them. It has advanced similar arguments about almost all arms-control proposals since then. The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, too, have been viewed with skepticism—though Chinese attitudes toward these negotiations may be ambivalent since some kinds of outcome could be in China's interests.[42]

Peking has also come to regard past Soviet assertions that socialist countries could rely on Soviet nuclear protection as nothing but great-power chauvinism.[43] Indeed, it has at times seen Soviet nuclear weapons as specifically directed against the revolutionary peoples.[44] And proposals such as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, with its associated great-power guarantees to non-weapon states, have provoked Chinese charges of nuclear fraud, Soviet-American military collaboration, and an encirclement of China.[45] These arguments have involved not only political and security concerns but also the ideological differences between Moscow and Peking. The Russians have said that agreements such as the test-ban treaty were made possible, in part, by fundamental changes in the world situation. In Peking's view, however, the changes have not been fundamental, and there is consequently no possibility of reaching serious agreements with the capitalist world. Arms control arrangements short of general disarmament, the Chinese claim, are a sham or, worse, an outright betrayal of the revolutionary cause.

CONCERNING DISARMAMENT

The Chinese Government's stand on the question of nuclear weapons has always been clear. Firstly, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; secondly, the Chinese Government has declared on many occasions that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons; thirdly, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the convening of a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as the first step, to reach an agreement on the nonuse of nuclear weapons. . . .

The Chinese Government holds that in order to realize the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons, should issue statements, separately or jointly, to openly undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or in any circumstances, and to dismantle all nuclear bases set up on the territories of other countries and withdraw to their own countries the nuclear weapons stockpiled and nuclear armed forces stationed on those territories. Whether this is carried out or not will be a test as to whether they have the desire to realize nuclear disarmament.

—Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on July 30, 1971, New China News Agency report, Aug. 7, 1971.

[40] See, for example, Lin Piao's "no-first-use" statement in his speech of Oct. 1, 1969, *ibid.*, Oct. 3 1969, pp. 15-16. On Nov. 1, 1970, Peking called for a world conference on nuclear disarmament and reaffirmed that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Chinese made similar statements in July and August 1971, especially in rejecting the June 1971 Soviet proposal for a disarmament conference of the five nuclear powers. See *Strategic Survey 1970*, cited above, p. 85; *International Herald-Tribune*, July 21 and 26, 1971; *The Times* (London), July 21 and Aug. 9, 1971.

[41] As is the general formula, "we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked we will certainly counterattack." See, for instance, the statement of May 24, 1969, as reported by NCNA, May 24, 1969, and *Peking Review*, May 30, 1969.

[42] For example, a Soviet-American agreement to abandon ABMs entirely or an agreement limiting ABMs to some very low level would confirm the PRC's medium-range retaliatory capability against the USSR or against US bases and allies in the Far East. This would be good from the standpoint of the Chinese defense authorities. It would also be desirable from the perspective of some economic planners, in that it could limit the military's claim to a larger share of national resources. Such an agreement might even be useful in the eyes of Maoists if it bolstered their arguments for domestic discipline and unity in the face of Soviet-American collusion and for the need not to be misled by the visit to Peking of an American president.

[43] See, for instance, the Chinese government's statement of Aug. 15, 1963, in *Peking Review*, Aug. 16, 1963, pp. 12-13.

[44] See *ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1967, and *Jen-min Jih-pao*, July 8, 1968.

[45] *Peking Review*, June 21, 1968.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the same time, it should be noted that the Chinese nuclear program compels the Soviet Union and the United States to take China into account in their own strategic and arms-control discussions. It does so in two ways. The first is technical: the problem of whether either superpower needs ABM protection against China and, if so, when and of what kind, will have an important bearing on the character of any arms-control arrangements between them. The second is through the creation of a political situation in which the United States or the Soviet Union may be forced to pay a price for China's involvement in arms-control discussions. This, again, can come about in either of two ways. First, the progress of the Chinese nuclear program increases the pressures on the superpowers to draw China into tripartite arms-control talks, with all the diplomatic advantages which China may be able to derive from this.[46] Or, second, the superpowers might achieve an arms-control agreement between themselves—in which case, any subsequent attempt to secure Chinese accession to it would place Peking in a highly advantageous bargaining position. If the two powers were to seek to avoid such a consequence by making tacit or informal arrangements rather than a formal treaty, this outcome in itself would reflect an important degree of Chinese influence and would strengthen arguments for including China at the negotiating table in any subsequent talks.

Problems Ahead

It is important to note that none of these actual or potential advantages to China depends upon the creation of a large or very sophisticated force. The Chinese leaders must be aware that, in terms of numbers and sophistication of weapons, there will be a gap between China and the superpowers for a considerable period. But the achievement of many of their aims does not require a substantial second-strike force, let alone such things as damage limitation or first-strike capabilities. Nor would it be essential for China to have sophisticated penetration aids—or even, perhaps, a very high level of confidence in the survivability of the Chinese force. It would be enough to fashion a force capable of posing a general and unspecific threat to the Soviet Far East or to US bases or allies in the Western Pacific, and later to a few cities of European Russia or the continental United States. There seem, however, to be three general requirements. The first is the creation of a force large and varied enough to make it difficult for an enemy commander to guarantee its total destruction in a preemptive strike. The second is for both nuclear and industrial facilities to be dispersed so as to compel an enemy to commit large forces to any attempt to destroy them.[47] The third is for China to manage the triangular Soviet-American-Chinese relationship so that Soviet and American threats to China are diminished while the US and the USSR remain mutually hostile. The Soviet Union and the US can then be played off against each other not only in a political but in a strategic sense. A nuclear conflict involving either of them and China would bring (whatever its consequences for China herself) a considerable risk of loss or damage which would weaken that power's position vis-a-vis the other superpower. This consideration could be used by China to constrain decision-makers in Washington or Moscow before any such conflict began.

At the same time, the continuing development and deployment of nuclear weapons is likely to raise some acute problems for the PRC government. The first systems to be operationally deployed—medium-range bombers and missiles—have given Peking some desired capabilities, including a measure of deterrence against Soviet or American attack.[48] But

[46] In mid-1971, shortly after China's MRBM deployments had become significant, the Soviet government for the first time proposed an arms-control conference to be attended by all five nuclear powers. See TASS (Moscow), June 23, 1971. And President Nixon's planned visit to Peking has obvious potential arms-control implications.

[47] The Chinese population is much more dispersed than, say, the US population. While 63 percent of Americans live in the country's 1,000 largest cities, China's 1,000 largest cities contain only 11 percent of its people. Moreover, the Chinese peasantry is less vulnerable than American suburbanites and would therefore have a better chance of surviving a nuclear exchange. But the industrial capacity is about equally concentrated on both sides: some 50-60 percent in the 50 largest cities. For comparative figures on population and industry, see the testimony of Secretary Laird in *Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System; Hearings before the Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations,* p. 15. The Chinese have, however, undertaken programs to disperse their industrial facilities into the interior of the country. Since 1969, there have also been considerable civil defense measures and shelter programs not only for people but for aircraft and ships, as well as underground storage of gasoline supplies. See Lin Piao's comments on Oct. 1, 1969, *Peking Review,* Oct. 3, 1969, pp. 15-16, and his report of April 4, 1969, in *ibid.,* April 28, 1969, special issue; also, Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1969,* London, 1970, p. 70.

[48] We have already noted the contribution which the PRC's nuclear weapons are likely to have made to dissuading the USSR from attacking China in 1969-70. Other possibilities may also exist. For example, bombers can be rotated on airfields within China in ways which convey messages to foreign countries at times of tension.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the way ahead from there may be less clear. The creation of a long-range strike force will bring new problems of resource allocation and interservice rivalries whose outcome cannot be accurately predicted. Moreover, once such a force is deployed—especially if it is in the form of ICBMs—opponents may be able to detect and target the missile silos, and particular countries will regard themselves as threatened by particular forms of deployment. From some points of view, therefore, it could be almost as useful to have tested ICBMs and to have the known ability to produce a force as actually to deploy one. Yet, on balance, it seems probable that the PRC will choose to deploy.

The leadup to this deployment is likely to be regarded as threatening by both India and Japan. Full-scale ICBM tests cannot be conducted within China: they would have to extend either into the Indian Ocean or the Pacific Ocean. An Indian Ocean shot would require monitoring facilities in that area, and there are some signs that China may be creating options in this direction.[49] But facilities also signal intentions, and a shot might well alarm India enough to make her decide to develop nuclear weapons of her own. Not only would such an Indian move complicate the strategic and diplomatic situation on China's southwestern borders, but it might also help to propel Japan in a similar direction. Such an outcome would certainly create a serious problem for Peking.

China has already expressed concern about the consequences of the Nixon doctrine and the emergence of what she regards as a Japanese-American axis. She has shown particular alarm about the progress of Japanese rearmament.[50] A rearmed Japan could seriously limit China's freedom of maneuver in Asia, and the deployment of sophisticated Japanese weapons, especially nuclears, might diminish China's ability to derive even oblique political and psychological benefits from her own advanced weapons program. Peking will therefore probably try to strengthen Japan's nuclear inhibitions. Indeed, there are indications that this goal stands high on Peking's list of priorities.[51] If so, a Chinese ICBM test into the Pacific, carried out in a manner likely to alarm Japan, could entail heavy political costs—quite apart from the fact that the US could monitor a Chinese test into this region at least as well as China herself. As against this drawback, a shot into the Pacific would have logistic advantages over one into the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the precedents set by previous Soviet tests into the Pacific area would add to the political legitimacy of such a Chinese test, and Tokyo might not be much more alarmed by a Chinese Pacific test than it already has been by the PRC's medium-range ballistic missile deployments in Northeast China.

Nonetheless, the overall costs of acquiring a nuclear force are considerable and could grow. Altogether, China is likely to find—especially in view of the growing sophistication of the weaponry, including non-nuclear weaponry, of the US and the USSR—that the acquisition of a nuclear force will yield fewer and costlier political gains than she may have expected. The balance of advantage depends in part on factors beyond China's own control. If the Soviet-American standoff becomes too absolute; if electoral opinion in the West makes the use of all nuclear weapons so unthinkable that deterrence becomes seriously eroded; if the Soviet Union does not effectively counterbalance the increasing Chinese force; if Japan continues to abstain from establishing large military capabilities and thus increases Peking's freedom of action, then China's expectation concerning the political advantages she can derive from possession of her own nuclear force could be amply fulfilled. But if Japan reacts sharply to the creation of a Chinese threat capability; if the Soviet Union strengthens its defensive as well as retaliatory capabilities in the Far East, or achieves politico-military understandings with Japan as well as India; if above all, the US is prepared to continue to make the risks and costs of Chinese armed excursions very high, especially by retaining an effective theater deterrent in the Western Pacific,[52] then the PRC may find its road to great-power status longer and rougher than even Maoist realism may have led Peking to expect.

[49] Peking's policies in Tanzania suggest a desire for such options. The PRC's space-tracking ship could, of course, be used in this type of operation.

[50] See, for example, NCNA (Peking), Feb. 7 and 17, 1970; the joint editorial of *Jen-min Jih-pao* and *Chieh-fang-chun Pao*, Sept. 3, 1970; Chairman Mao's message to Kim Il-song on Sept. 8, 1970, in *Peking Review*, Sept. 11, 1970, p. 8; *ibid.*, Sept. 18, 1970, p. 27; the Oct. 9, 1970, message from the CCP Central Committee to the North Korean United Workers' Party, in *ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1970, p. 3; *ibid.*, March 19, 1971, p. 20, and May 7, 1971, pp. 15-16, 18.

[51] The language of many Chinese pronouncements on Japanese rearmament seems designed to encourage anti-nuclear opinion in Japan as much as to air real Chinese fears.

[52] A theater deterrent would carry quite different political and strategic implications from reliance upon land-based missiles stationed in North America or upon submarine-launched ballistic missiles whose stationing patterns could easily be changed.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Twenty Years After:
The Crisis of Soviet-Type Systems

By Zygmunt Bauman

There was a time when the problem of effecting the transfer of political power from one generation of leaders to the next in a peaceful and orderly fashion—the so-called succession problem—was rightly viewed as the Achilles' heel of Soviet-type political systems. That time, however, now appears to have passed. Even though some Western observers of socialism might disagree, evidence has been accumulating for some time that a new pattern of "peaceful" and legitimized succession is emerging in the Soviet-bloc countries and has even matured to the point where it is becoming solidly institutionalized. Its outward manifestations may still appear exotic and irregular to Western eyes in the dramatized form they take on when molded into news reports for Western readers, but the pattern has in fact—like the Apollo flights to the moon—already become routinely dull and almost commonplace.

In essence, what appears to have happened is this. As a consequence of the growing modernization and differentiation of the Soviet-type socialist societies, their political elites have tended to become increasingly heterogeneous ideologically and organizationally. That is to say, there has been a proliferation of conflicting interest groups advocating different approaches to the goals and problems of these societies. At the same time, however, the integrating unity that formerly centered in organization and ideology has now been replaced by a new consensus centering on the "rules of the game"—*i.e.*, on what is the fair, just and proper method of resolving conflicts between rival interest groups and, in particular, of deciding which of the various contenders for political power has earned the right to rule.[1]

Since, under the new game rules, losers in the contest for power are no longer "liquidated" in Stalinist fashion, this development has given the members of the Soviet-bloc political elites, as individuals, a greatly increased measure of personal security. Yet, paradoxically, these elites, being dependent in their struggle for power on the more routine political "energy inputs" such as support, have at the same time become much more exposed and susceptible, as entities, to extraneous pressures and influences both from within their own particular society and from the international environment—especially the "socialist" camp. Indeed, these pressures and influences have become regular and indispensable inputs into the socialist political systems, not only generating and defining pivotal issues in the competition between rival contenders for the mantle of succession but also serving—in the decisive stage—to legitimize the final outcome.

Such, then, is the general configuration of the emergent pattern of resolving the succession prob-

Mr. Bauman is currently on the faculty of the Department of Social Sciences at the University of Leeds (Great Britain). For some years, he occupied the Chair of General Sociology at the University of Warsaw, Poland. Among his works are Class, Movement, Elite, *Warsaw, Polish Scientific Editors, 1960, and* Culture and Society, *Warsaw, Polish Scientific Editors, Warsaw, 1966.*

[1] On the distinction between these two types of agreement, see James M. Buchanan, "An Individualistic Theory of Political Process," in David Easton, ed., *Varieties of Political Theory,* New York, Prentice Hall, 1966.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

iem in the Soviet-type socialist polities. The exact form the pattern takes in a given country, however, is shaped in large part by indigenous factors, often of a fortuitous historical nature, that are only distantly related to the more basic factors governing the long-term evolution of the system. This becomes clearer if we look at the case of Poland, where the sudden and violent workers' riots that erupted at Poznan in 1956 can now be seen, in retrospect, to have been the first link in the chain of events that determined the pattern of the Gomulka leadership's overthrow in December of last year.

The Polish Example

The Poznan uprising was a spontaneous event; nevertheless, it set in train an irreversible process whereby manifestations of worker discontent took on an institutionally patterned meaning in the context of the evolving Polish political culture. In short, they became a recognized signal in the code of political communication, signifying the presence in the body politic of serious tensions requiring drastic political change. Once established in the code, of course, the signal not only could be deciphered but could also be manipulated for political purposes. Thus, stirring up unrest in important industrial plants, for example, became as much a part of the political game for ambitious second-level Polish leaders as the delivery of impassioned harangues over television or the utilization of a paid publicity machine is for political aspirants in various other systems.

This was precisely the way in which the Polish succession crisis of last December, which saw the transfer of power from Wladislaw Gomulka to Edward Gierek, came about. The riots of dock and shipyard workers at the port cities of Gdansk and Szczecin were seized upon by second-level elements in the leadership, who utilized them as an ultimate lever for forcing Gomulka's ouster after other, less drastic methods had failed. These second-generation leaders, or new party elite, had already launched their bid for power with the staging of the alleged student-revisionist plot of March 1968 and had pursued it further in 1969 and 1970 through persistent, covert tactics of nibbling away at the remaining footholds of the old guard.[2] But while these maneuvers were indeed successful in winning key positions in the power structure for the plotters, they did not suffice to break the will of the thin stratum of diehards to cling to the apex of power; nor—what was more important—did they convince the Kremlin that Gomulka's effectiveness had vanished and that the time had come for Moscow—in the jargon used by the Soviets to express their support of a particular Communish leader involved in a domestic power struggle—to choose another "best friend of the Soviet Union." It thus became clear that nothing short of the code signal of workers' revolt would suffice.

Effective as the strategem proved in this instance, it must be noted that utilization of the code is subject to certain limitations. For, unlike its linguistic counterpart, the political code is fashioned of a stuff that is not reducible to purely communicative functions. Its signals are not as readily manipulated and controlled as the sounds of speech; nor can a particular signal be evoked in every situation. Thus, the forces seeking to oust Gomulka and his old guard could not have exploited the workers' discontent last December unless that discontent had already reached explosive proportions. To be sure, opposition leaders can attempt to create tinderbox situations; indeed, this was what the principal actors in the drama of December 1970 had previously tried to do in March 1968, when they actively encouraged the campaign against corrupt "Zionist" officials in the party and government in order to fan the smoldering embers of anti-Semitism into a politically dramatized fire. Still, the politician's freedom of maneuver in this sphere is necessarily restricted to a degree by the presence or absence of the materials of which the signals of the political code are molded.

Recourse to the code is also subject to certain risks. There is no way of knowing whether those who touched off the Polish workers' revolt fully realized that they were playing with fire, and that fires are often more easily kindled than extinguished. It appears likely, however, that in endorsing the political legitimacy of the December strikes, Gomulka's challengers took a calculated risk and were prepared to pay the price of the workers' getting out of hand for a time. It looks now as if the price was an acceptable one in the short run, but whether it will prove so over the longer term remains to be seen. The outcome is likely to depend on the degree to which the political changes of December prove harmonious with the strategic evolution of the sys-

[2] See A. Ross Johnson, "Poland: End of an Era?", *Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (January-February) 1970, pp. 28-40.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tem, which—as noted earlier—is governed by certain basic, permanent factors that are essentially unmanipulable and have an independent logic of their own.

The Second-Generation Crisis

Thus far, we have looked at the indigenous factors which conditioned the emerging pattern of leadership succession in the particular setting of Poland. In other words, we have provided an answer to the "how" aspect of the succession question in a specific case. But far more important is the "why"—*i.e.*, what sort of immanent processes in the system make changes of leadership desirable or necessary? Who reaches for the mechanisms available to facilitate such change, and for what purpose? In answering these questions, it must be noted, we shall be turning our attention to the more basic and permanent factors referred to above—factors which are by no means purely local phenomena but, on the contrary, apply to most if not all of the Soviet-type socialist systems.

These factors ineluctably become operative as a result of a cluster of social processes which can best be summed up as the birth pangs of "second-generation" socialism. For reasons that will become clearer in the course of the subsequent discussion, the cumulative impact of these processes begins to be felt approximately twenty years after the installation of Soviet-type socialism, this being the time span which appears to be required for all the major dissent-generating conflicts inherent in the system to mature and gather force to the point where they come to dominate the political scene. Whatever the reasons for this remarkable synchrony (doubtless biological in the main), the cumulative aggravation of explosive social problems brings the system to the verge of crisis, requiring a response of commensurate potency.

But while the social processes that produce the second-generation crisis are remarkably similar in all Soviet-type systems, the responses of the ruling elites to the crisis vary widely—as can readily be seen by comparing the differing responses chosen in the Soviet Union and various East European countries. To use Hegelian terminology, the social processes determine the *Dasein* but not the *Sosein* of the response—that is to say, they determine its necessity but not its precise shape. In each case, quite a number of options are open to the leaders, and it appears doubtful that their full potential range has yet been exhausted in actual practice. If, however—as appears to have been the case in most instances to date—the response boils down to little more than another round in a game of musical chairs at the top leadership level, it will likely prove a temporary, makeshift solution that does not satisfy the requirements of the social processes that generated the crisis.

What, then, are these processes? One can point to three which appear to have played major roles in bringing about the second-generation crisis in Soviet-type systems.

Promise *vs.* Reality

The first process is the emergence in these systems of a growing discrepancy between, on the one hand, the millenarian and egalitarian ideals embodied in the ideological complex on which they base their legitimacy and, on the other, the actual conditions that have developed in the socialist societies. For a time, the gap between promise and fulfillment can be justified by appealing to the reasonably equitable principle of rewarding the few "who made the revolution," or it can be explained away as a lingering "residue of class heritage." But having exhausted such temporizing devices, these systems inevitably come to face their first critical test some twenty years after birth, when dissatisfaction over continuing inequalities can no longer be appeased by invoking the privileges of revolutionary heroes and the vast majority of disgruntled citizens have experienced no other class system than the one they are living under.

Now, for the first time, the issue at stake is the very pith and marrow of the socialist promise: equality of opportunity. It has been brought to the fore by the natural proclivity of the older, hitherto privileged group to prevent the downward mobility of their children, now coming of age—to transform their own preferential status into a hereditary property and the existing pattern of social stratification into a permanent and rigid class structure. On the other hand, the underprivileged and their children have been finding the path of upward mobility—which was wide open immediately after the socialist takeover—increasingly barred by the requirement of superior educational achievement, while at the same time their ability to satisfy this requirement has been kept down by the reluctance

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the privileged class to permit adequate expansion of educational facilities and by the maintenance of preferential access to these facilities for children of that class.[3] The resultant stratification—flying directly in the face of the egalitarian foundations of the legitimizing ideology—generates a potential for conflict that is not present to the same degree in systems of a different type.

Another dimension of the same process is the continuous tendency of the Soviet-type systems to move away from the premises of a socialist "welfare state" toward the principle that the individual is responsible for his own well-being. Many goods and services that formerly were provided gratis—including health services, rest and convalescence facilities, and stipends for university students—have become marketable commodities that must be paid for. And since inequalities in income persist, the poor find themselves worse off with respect to the consumption of such goods and services than they were under the old non-pecuniary criterion of distributing necessities on the basis of need.

In addition, consumer goods output has tended to take on an unmistakable "class profile." Whereas commodities formerly were much the same for all classes of consumers, they now differ widely in quality and price. Thus, in 1967, citizens of Warsaw could find in the shops luxury shirts at 700 zlotys each for the well-to-do and shoddy ones at 70 zlotys for "the hewers of wood and drawers of water"; sausages ranging in price from 12 to 120 zlotys; alcoholic beverages, from 40 to 450 zlotys; and furniture suites, from 3,000 to 50,000 zlotys. (When Gomulka, replying to questions put to him by anxious workers at the Zeran factory in Warsaw in 1966, assured them that the government "would not raise the price of sausages consumed by the working class,"[4] he inadvertently acknowledged that there were sausages not intended for workers' consumption.) It is apparent at any rate that consumer commodities, having become conspicuously diversified and unevenly distributed, have again taken on the character of class symbols, laying bare the hardening class stratification of the supposedly egalitarian socialist societies.

One of the products of these trends is the painfully frustrating clash between the ideology-born expectations and the actual life experiences of young people. The clash has caused spiritual ferment among the more ideologically-minded segment of youth and has led many others to seek an escape in indifferentism and apathy or in money-grubbing. It has also led to a growing impatience and querulousness on the part of the underprivileged, who not only are weary of their leaders' broken promises to ameliorate living conditions but also are beginning to realize that even if they were to participate in the process of upward social mobility, the ceiling to their aspirations for personal advancement would still be relatively low.

The Changing Elite

Another process that has contributed greatly to the second-generation crisis is the change in the composition of what, for want of a better term, may be called the "new middle class" that came into being with the establishment of the system. I am referring here to the thousands of party *apparatchiki,* middle-level civil servants, directors of economic enterprises, police and military officials, etc., who function as the joints and sinews of the political, economic, security and cultural subsystems—in a word, all those who implement the will of the top-level leaders in the management of the masses and assure the survival of the system as a going concern. After twenty years, the original members of this group have become the "old guard," and they find themselves increasingly challenged by a "new guard" consisting of the middle or second generation of the ruling elite. But while twenty years is a sufficient period of time to underscore the erosion

[3] In Poland, as in most of the Soviet-type societies, the most rigorous screening of the upward flow of young people seeking higher social status through education occurs at two strategic points in the educational system: (1) between primary school and secondary comprehensive or vocational school; and (2) between secondary-level education and the universities. In 1965, of 661,000 children leaving primary school, only 117,000 were admitted to secondary comprehensive and 101,000 to secondary vocational schools, while 90,000 were relegated to elementary vocational schools (serving as a dead end for failures). Of roughly 80,000 leaving all types of secondary schools in the same year, plus an unknown number of older graduates who could afford to try again, only 45,300 gained admission to universities or formally equivalent higher-educational facilities (including evening courses, which are a manifestly inferior form of college education). These data are based on *Rocznik Statystyczny* (Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny, 1966. An unpublished research study made by this author in 1967 indicated that the actual probability of a working-class child in Poland attaining the university level of education was then 15-20 times less than that of children of the "new middle class" (*i.e.*, middle- and upper middle-level members of the ruling establishment).

[4] This revealing slip of the tongue was, of course, off the record but was widely circulated at the time on a "hearsay" basis.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the administrative skills of the old guard—which were meager from the outset—it is not long enough for them to have grown too old to cling to the positions awarded them in recognition of past revolutionary merit. Thus, the new-guard leaders are obliged to wage a major offensive against their antiquated predecessors reluctant to pass away or step aside.

The predicament of the new guard is rendered doubly awkward by the fact that it simultaneously finds itself under permanent challenge from still another group—*i.e.*, the young, technically-trained experts becoming ever more strongly entrenched in the system as a consequence of its commitment to an industrializing strategy. Under these circumstances, the new-guard leaders confront a difficult dilemma—namely, that in resorting to all-out measures to unseat the old guard, they are by that very action undermining the traditional legitimizing foundations on which the authority of rulers over experts has hitherto rested, thus rendering themselves vulnerable to the challenge of the latter.[5] Hence the ambiguity of their situation, which is mirrored in the endemic ambivalence of their ideological stance.

But in order to comprehend and disentangle the complex skein of strains and tensions generated by the division of the system's "new middle class" into these three generational groups, one must further take into account the coexistence of at least two interwoven structures of oppositions. First, there are the misgivings of the old guard over what its members view as the new guard's overall underestimation of the ideological dimension of the system—misgivings which take shape ever faster as the modernization process progresses. Unconditional loyalty to the system, it must be remembered, was both the actual operative factor in the old guard's ascendance to power and the crux of the system's ideological rationale. Its members looked upon the system as the embodiment of a central cluster of values which, even though later subjected to some rather eccentric reinterpretations, still constrains them to reject the more pragmatic and flexible approach advocated by the second-generation contenders for power, whom they consider guilty of ideological lukewarmness. From the other side of the barricade, the new-guard contenders view the same conflict primarily from the standpoint of the need to strike off the chains of dogmatic loyalty fettering the system's ability to adapt to changing conditions. They cannot compete with the old guard so long as the old rules of the game remain in force; so they wish to change the rules.

Interlocked with, and to some extent inhibiting, this conflict pattern is another one centering on the third group—the experts—whose presence threatens both the old guard and the new. Fortunately enough from their own standpoint, the position which the experts occupy in the social structure is one that enables them to identify their group interests with the seemingly suprapartisan values of technical rationality. The closer these values come to attaining a dominant position in the society—as, indeed, they are bound to do, however fitfully, under the aegis of the established modernizing strategy—the closer the experts come to acquiring a determining influence on the decision-making process. This places the new guard on the horns of still another dilemma, for it finds itself as effectively barred from exploiting the technical-rational-modernity paradigm to bolster its own position as it was from invoking the traditional formula of ideological loyalty. The fits and starts of recent East European political history have many of their deepest roots in this inherently ambiguous predicament of the new guard of middle- and upper-level leaders.

As a consequence of these divisions and patterns of conflict, the typical Soviet-type system faces its second-generation crisis with its "new middle class" split and ridden by mutual suspicions and anxieties, with each of the contending groups fearful for the security of its own position. What is more, since a moral collapse of this class is the one thing that the system cannot possibly survive, the situation is rendered much more precarious than it would otherwise be. For the lesser Soviet-type systems, the problem has been compounded by the fact that at the time they approached their own second-generation crises, they were not in a position to avail themselves of the Stalin-Mao method of untying the Gordian knot—that is, assuring the security of the ruling class as a whole at the cost of totally destroying the security of every one of its individual members. Hence the rather wide range of attempted solutions and the seeming breakup, at least on the surface, of the hitherto uniform patterns of historical

[5] For a sociological analysis of the distinction between the roles of rulers and experts, see this author's "Uses of Information: When Social Information Becomes Desired," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia), January 1971, pp. 20-31. The same matter is dealt with from the standpoint of its empirical applications in a further study by the author, "Social Dissent in the East European Political Systems," to be published in *European Archiv of Sociology* for 1971.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development in Eastern Europe. (Beneath the diversified surface, however, there is still a common, unifying factor—the new guard in each country in quest of an institutional-ideological vessel maneuverable enough to navigate safely between the Scylla of traditional dogmatic loyalism and the Charybdis of expert technicism.)

The usual lack of a clearcut guiding line in the political history of each separate Soviet-type state is due in part to the shifting alliances among the three components of the conflict-ridden "middle class" as a whole. The interests of any two of these components seem unified when they are seriously threatened by the third, but an excessive weakening of the third, in turn, may leave both momentary allies at each other's mercy. Provided all three component groups behave in a relatively rational manner, the logic of the game produces a precarious but sometimes quite prolonged state of equilibrium. Indeed, what would seem to be the system's self-destructive lack of consistency on the political plane because of the shifting intergroup alliances may actually be its only means of achieving a degree of political homeostasis.

The New Proletariat

This brings us to the last of the three processes chiefly responsible for the second-generation crisis in socialist systems—namely, the shaping of the new industrial working class, which comes to fruition at roughly the same critical time as the processes already described.

It is common knowledge (though seldom given adequate attention) that most of the countries involved in this analysis embarked on the socialist adventure with next to nothing in the way of an industrial working class. This class had never been particularly numerous in the countries concerned, and the small remnants that emerged unscathed from the holocausts of international and/or civil war were almost immediately and completely drained of their most active, politically conscious, and ambitious elements through recruitment into the new postwar elite. What was left after this second sweep was consequently but an amorphous rump that was unlikely to regain anything like its former shape and characteristics. Most important of all, the truncated class, along with the loss of its own elite, also lost its "collective memory" of the institutions and values of workers' democracy and self-government, and it was subsequently unable to regain its old profile in the face of a massive influx of rural elements innocent of any of the traditions of organized labor. The result was that an entirely new class of industrial workers took shape virtually from scratch.

During the periods of postwar reconstruction and subsequent extensive industrialization, the flood of peasants into the burgeoning towns and cities reached overwhelming proportions, reducing the residuum of traditional, pre-socialist workers to an insignificant fraction of the industrial population.[6] Moreover, the numerical growth of this population proceeded at such giant strides that it for a time prevented, by itself, the creation of anything approaching a stable social structure, and the total absence in the cities of an already established industry-based social-cultural framework capable of assimilating the rural newcomers intensified, in turn, the obstacles to the development among the new industrial population of any sense of working-class identity. Thus, even at the time of the post-Stalin political crisis in Poland, ten years after the socialist takeover, the rioters in Poznan were still on the level of a "pre-industrial crowd."[7]

In the bloated workers' housing developments and hostels, it was yesterday's peasants who called the tune. They were too fascinated by the novel experiences of decking themselves out in city clothes, furnishing a city apartment, and discovering the excitement of the market place to be bothered with the complexities of politics—still too deeply imbued with peasant individualism to be willing to join in the sort of risky collective endeavor necessary for the workers to secure a better bargaining position. As a result, the ruling elite could count, at least for the time being, on the political quiescence of this segment of the nation. The only conceivable situation in which the new industrial proletariat might pose a

[6] In Poland, a 1965 sampling of industrial and construction workers showed that no less than 56.2 percent had spent at least the first 14 years of their lives in rural villages, and that only 14.6 percent had already begun working in industry before World War II and could therefore be considered fully integrated into the traditional working-class culture. [S. Widerspzil, *Sklad polskiej klasy robotniczej* (Composition of the Polish Working Class), Warsaw, 1965, pp. 220, 223.] Between 1950 and 1960 alone, the number of people employed in the non-agricultural branches of the national economy increased by 145 percent in Albania, 120 percent in Bulgaria, 53 percent in Romania, 49 percent in Hungary, and 46 percent in Poland—with Czechoslovakia alone showing no increase [see compilation by Antoni Rajkiewicz in Adam Sarapata, ed., *Przemiany spoleczne w Polsce Ludowej* (Social Change in People's Poland), Warsaw, 1965, p. 259].

[7] Term coined by George Rudé. See his *The Crowd in History*, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1964, pp. 214 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political problem was one of fomented mob hysteria, and such a situation, the rulers calculated, could probably be dealt with, if not prevented, by means of *ad hoc,* extrapolitical measures.

After twenty years, however, these conditions no longer obtain. The youth brought up in the cities and daily passing through the factory gates have only the dimmest memory of the rural background of their fathers. They are urban through and through, trained to handle the implements of urban industrial living, conditioned to strive after urban values. They are far better educated than their fathers; they read newspapers, listen to the radio, watch TV; they go to the cinema and attend evening lectures. And whatever their social position, it is much more secure than that of any other social stratum (except, in Poland and *only* Poland, that of the farmers).

Not only more secure but also more politically aware, the new urban industrial worker of "twenty years after" is ready and able to give more than passing thought to what he has repeatedly been told about his right to rule the country. And if he and his fellows were asked how *they* would run their factory, local community, or country, they—unlike most of their fathers—would certainly have something to say.

Once they have thus intruded on the political scene, moreover, they can no longer be easily manipulated simply by administering a bigger dose of carrot or stick. Even if it is rather unlikely that they will lead off with an attempt to assert their influence at the state level (since this would require a greater degree of political self-consciousness and self-mobilization at the grassroots level than they yet can boast), it is fairly certain that they will not miss whatever opportunities present themselves to place their bargaining power on a more constant and secure footing.

In trying to cope with this new challenge, the ruling elite sooner or later becomes conscious of the fact that its room for maneuver is uncomfortably narrow. For the challengers in this case are the very class in whose name the elite claims to rule, and it is therefore, once again, nothing less than the legitimacy of the system that is placed in jeopardy. In spite of all the "adjustments" to which the legitimizing formula has already been subjected and probably will be subjected in the future, the one thing that the rulers of the system can under no circumstances afford to abandon—if only because of the division of the world into opposed ideological camps—is the system's identification with the power of the proletariat. The key importance of this element overrules its abandonment, whatever difficulties it imposes on the rulers in dealing with the workers' challenge.

The Options

Having examined the three basic social processes that have been most instrumental in generating the second-generation crisis, let us now turn to the options that are open to the rulers of the systems facing such crises. For while the rulers have been and still remain obliged to keep within the unyielding framework of the system's basic legitimizing premises, they nevertheless can still move in various directions. The one thing that is absolutely certain is that they must move in some direction—and that mere recourse to the safety valves of shifting responsibility to scapegoats or reshuffling the palace guard, while it may temporarily cool the atmosphere, will not suffice to resolve the deepseated social problems that rack the system. What direction the rulers will finally choose to move in is not determined directly by the situation itself; theoretically, they appear to be faced with a choice between three alternative strategies.

The first may be called the democratic alternative. This strategy—which finds its genuine focus in the political sphere though it may encompass, and often start from, the economic subsystem—consists, to begin with, in allowing the already existing interest groups to organize and govern themselves, to appoint their own spokesmen, and to adapt their game tactics to the best defense of whatever they define as their respective group interests. The obvious advantage to be gained by such an institutional change would be that it would bring the resolution of conflicts more into line with actual power relations, with the result that the explosive resentments fostered by the incongruities of the existing situation would be defused before they reach the point of ignition, thus making the system less vulnerable to major political crises. Another clear gain would be that the government would no longer have to shoulder sole blame for inability to resolve urgent problems and could eschew staking the regime's popular support on every momentary success or failure of its policies.

On the other hand, the main drawback inherent in the democratic alternative from the standpoint of those in power is that it is an "either-or" strategy. That is to say, if it is to achieve its purpose, the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

institutional reform outlined above cannot be partial, nor be stopped partway. In order that the diverse interest groups may be able to assert their interests in a truly effective way, they have to be accorded the full panoply of democratic rights. But if that is done, there is no way of knowing how many different groups will emerge or where the exercise of their rights will lead. One reform that the ruling elite would probably be least willing to accept is the introduction of a system of workers' control sufficiently broad in scope to ensure industrial self-government as part, eventually, of a genuine overall social-political pluralism—and the reluctance of the rulers would most likely be shared wholeheartedly by the managerial elite of technical "specialists."

The second alternative is a decentralization of power limited to the economic sphere. This would necessarily entail relinquishment by the state of its monopolistic control over the means of production to the managerial class, which would thereby assume the role of "private collective owners of the means of production" and thus fulfill at last its dream of turning from a privileged class into a class of privileged.[8]

The complementary side of this strategy would be the retention by the state of monopolistic political power. While being freed from noxious state control of the economy, the managerial class would still have to depend on the political power of the state to keep at bay those elements in the society dissatisfied with the growing inequalities in income distribution and the widening gap in the economy between the powerful managers and their powerless subordinates.

The latter conjecture perhaps requires some substantiation in view of the tendency of some Western observers to assume an affinity between managers of state- or public-owned enterprises in a socialist society and owner-managers in a capitalist socio-economic system, and to conclude from this assumed affinity that the former entertain the same inherent, rationally-based sympathy towards political democracy as the latter.[9] Both the assumption and the conclusion are false. In capitalist societies, as long as the state power remains relatively unobtrusive and does not challenge the central value-cluster on which the socio-economic equilibrium of the system is founded, the owner-managers neither owe their basic rights to the group holding political power at the moment, nor can they hold it responsible for any predicament they may be in. Precisely because their position is securely based on a solid foundation of well-entrenched economic, social and cultural institutions, they can afford the free interplay of political forces. Indeed, to the extent that this free interplay tends to moderate political cleavages and reduce the likelihood that political conflict will degenerate into deadlock, they are inclined to welcome it.

The situation of the managers in a state-ownership system is diametrically opposite. In contrast to that of capitalist owner-managers whose security is anchored outside the political sphere, their position is inherently political in nature, being founded solely and exclusively on a political equilibrium. What power they have is politically granted, politically guaranteed, and politically oriented. And since they are generally aware of the strings attached to their position, they are unlikely to cavil at the existence of a strong central power, even though advocating an institutional separation of "economy" and "state" whereby they would take the distribution and execution of economic roles into their own hands while continuing to enjoy the benefits of the state's overall political guardianship. In sum, they are oriented toward continued political monopoly rather than political democracy.

On the other hand, the rulers can hardly look with favor on a strategy which would strip them of a large part of their power, even if only in the economic sphere, and transfer it into the hands of the managerial class. Even where they have, in fact, been forced by economic pressures to make partial concessions to the principle of managerial autonomy under programs of economic reform, they have usually tried to the best of their ability to sabotage the implementation of these concessions, and it appears likely that they will continue this resistance.

What is frequently overlooked in this connection is that the rulers, in striving to keep the fetters

[8] The existing system endows managers, particularly those of higher rank, with a whole range of attractive privileges, but only in their capacity as incumbents of specific positions. As appointments are politically decided, however, every single manager remains insecure in his enjoyment of these privileges because he does not know how long he will be allowed to keep his position. On the contrary, decentralization would mean, first and foremost, depoliticization of managerial appointments, and the privileges formerly attached to the managerial class as a whole would therefore become the secure, personal privileges of individual managers.

[9] Hence the numerous theories of "convergence" between capitalist and socialist societies under the impact of modernization—e.g., those of Ptirim Sorokin, John K. Galbraith, and Daniel Bell.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on managerial power, can count on the support of the mass of workers. To the latter, nothing seems more threatening than untrammeled economic liberty for the managers without countervailing institutions for workers' self-defense, leaving them to become helpless victims of economic decisions in which they have no part and which they can expect to be based on coldly rational economic calculations without regard to the impact of such decisions on those workers whose value to the economy is only marginal. Better than this or any other alternative solution short of outright political democracy, from the workers' viewpoint, would be a continuation of the omnipotent wardship of the state, since the political power is at least susceptible of being persuaded to tolerate certain economic irrationalities when these are deemed to be a politically rational means of appeasing worker discontent. For example, a sociological investigation carried out in Poland around 1965 revealed that at the Cegielski works, a fairly representative large industrial enterprise, no less than about 20 percent of the workers on the payroll were actually not working, mostly because of chronic illness, disability, or old age. Under the existing system, these workers are permitted to go on collecting their weekly paychecks, but in the event of a managerial takeover of the economy, they could expect to find themselves unemployed.

This, then, leaves us with the third alternative, which is the continuation without essential change of the present system of total, undivided, and highly centralized control of all political, economic and social subsystems. For the reasons just explained above, this solution can claim a much broader base of political support than it is commonly thought to have. For some powerful forces in the Soviet-type societies, it is the only acceptable solution; for some others it is a lesser evil; and for still others it represents a distasteful but not altogether unacceptable way out of the dilemma, preferable at least to the risks that would be involved in its destruction. Under these circumstances, it would hardly be surprising if—in spite of all arguments, however reasonable, to the contrary—the socialist societies entangled in the second-generation crisis were to emerge from it with the system unchanged except for rather minor modifications. The perpetuation of the system cannot be ascribed simply to the vested interest of a single group, however powerful; rather it appears to represent the solution most likely to be accepted by, and acceptable to, the most significant elements in the body politic.

To recapitulate briefly the main points of this discussion, we have suggested that the "how" aspect of the leadership succession problem in Soviet-type societies begins to be resolved institutionally when the "why" factors are brought to the fore by the maturation of the new socio-economic conditions generated by the system. We have pointed out that this seems to occur roughly two decades after the installation of the system, for it is then that what outwardly appears to be a more or less "routine" change of leadership becomes in actuality a necessary prerequisite for the system's survival and the "institutionalization" of the pattern of change therefore becomes a matter of the highest priority. We have also examined the particular modalities of the "second-generation" crisis as it manifested itself in Poland during the years 1968-70, and we have tried to outline the basic social processes and conflicts that operate to bring about the like phenomenon in most if not all of the Soviet-type systems. Finally, we have examined the three main long-term strategies which every system seized by the second-generation crisis has to choose from in attempting to resolve it, and we have seen that each of these theoretical alternatives is subject to the push and pull of powerful contradictory interests.

Precisely because of the plurality of conflicting forces, it is exceedingly difficult to predict which alternative is likely to be chosen in each particular case. Nor is the task of forecasting the outcome made any easier by the presence of other, extraneous but nonetheless influential factors, such as unsatisfied national aspirations, East-West cultural divisions, the apprehensive vigilance of foreign power-centers, ideological lags, uncorrected miscalculations, etc. Thus, what seems rationally to be the least likely outcome may turn out to be the most feasible realistically.

Available evidence indicates that thus far attempts to resolve the crisis of the socialist systems have been erratic, timorous, and tentative, resulting in halfway solutions unlikely to satisfy any of the various groups involved and therefore bound to intensify rather than alleviate the existing tensions. In the case of Poland, it would appear that the ruling elite has chosen to evade even this modest an attempt to address the root problems, resorting instead to the familiar scapegoat expedient.

This can only mean that genuine action by the Soviet-type systems to come to grips with the second-generation crisis still lies largely in the future.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Romanian Foreign Policy: A Case of Partial Alignment

By Robert L. Farlow

One of the most important developments within the complex of party-state commitments and structures which constitutes the Soviet-East European alignment system has been the evolution of a deviant Romanian foreign policy. Romania is the only country that has managed to stake out a relatively autonomous position while at the same time remaining within the system.

The Romanian posture involves a rather complex mixture of adherence to and deviation from various policies established by the Soviet Union. This pattern of cooperation and conflict was graphically illustrated by two recent events. In early June 1971, Nicolae Ceausescu, Romanian President and General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP), traveled to Peking, where he received a warm welcome from Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. The trip was a direct repudiation of Soviet policy toward China and, coming as it did shortly before President Nixon's announcement of his own intended visit to China, could only enmesh the Romanian leadership more deeply in what Moscow perceives as anti-Soviet maneuvering. The following month, the Romanian regime played host to the 25th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and signed the session's lengthy Program, which outlined new efforts aimed at the economic integration of Eastern Europe. Although the document rejected supranational mechanisms to guide integration and the RCP quickly defined integration in such a way as to preclude its use to undermine Romanian independence,[1] the mere fact that the Romanians signed a document calling for integration was a limited concession to the Soviet Union.

The Romanian pattern of limited cooperation and significant deviation is hardly new. Its major elements were set during 1958–64 by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who at the time of his death in March 1965 combined the roles of First Secretary and President. Under Dej's leadership, Romania registered impressive achievements. It successfully thwarted Khrushchev's plans for the economic integration of Eastern Europe under the suggested supranational authority of Comecon; it began an extensive campaign to improve relations with the West and to seek new trade with the advanced Western states; and at the same time it limited the share of Comecon states, especially the Soviet Union, in its expanding trade. During this period, the nation recorded the highest industrial growth rate of any country in the Communist world. In addition, Romania effected rapprochements with Communist China, Albania, and Yugoslavia—all of whom were in some degree of disfavor with the other members of the Soviet/East European alignment system. Internally, Dej initiated a process of cultural de-Russification and Romanianization which mobilized the masses behind the regime and its new foreign policy. Moreover, he legitimized and explicated the new Romanian stance by placing all these particular policies within a coherent ideological framework.

Mr. Farlow is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Muskingum College (Ohio). A contributor of articles on Romanian foreign policy to the Journal of Asian and African Studies *(Leiden) and* East European Quarterly *(Denver), he is currently writing a book on the subject.*

[1] For the Romanian conception of economic integration, see Emilian Dobrescu, "Bazele Principiale ale Dezvoltarii Colaborarii se Integrarii Economice Socialiste a Trailor Membre ale C.A.E.R.," *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Aug. 9, 1971.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In broad terms, Ceausescu has pursued the basic foreign-policy strategy laid down by his predecessor. Remaining faithful to the ideological principles that Dej espoused, Ceausecscu has continued gradually to disengage Romania from heavy dependence on and linkage with the economic and military substructures of the alignment system. Furthermore, while limiting the degree of Romanian participation in Comecon and the Warsaw Pact and while opposing coordination of foreign policy with the Soviet Union in several areas, Ceausescu has carefully maintained and expanded the nation's economic and political contacts with the West, non-Comecon Communist states, and various developing countries. This approach has given Romania political and economic support vital for independence.

Ceausescu's most notable contribution to the strategy of Romanian foreign policy has been in the realm of personal diplomacy. Beginning in 1969, he initiated a series of personal visits to heads of state in both the Communist and non-Communist worlds, and the number of world leaders visiting Bucharest also increased. In addition, the diplomatic undertakings of the Romanian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister became quite extensive. The object of all this activity is obviously to gain further economic benefits from trade and scientific exchange, to build up international backing for Romania's foreign policy, and to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that Romania is indeed not a subservient ally.

Thus, it can be seen that since 1958 the RCP has made a concerted effort to move Romania into what may be called a position of partial alignment within the Soviet/East European system. Partial alignment may be defined as a sub-type of foreign-policy behavior whose general characteristics are, on the one hand, frequent statements by a nation of its desire to remain within a given alignment system and to cooperate with the other members thereof and, on the other hand, only limited cooperation with those members and frequent opposition to the policies upon which they have agreed.

This article will examine the various facets of recent Romanian foreign policy, with emphasis on developments since 1965.[2] Moreover, it will attempt to delineate briefly the major determinants of Romanian behavior—to point out those factors which have conditioned the content of the new foreign policy and made the Romanian state unique within the Soviet/East European alignment system.

Ideological Independence

The Romanian Communist rulers have established a general ideological framework of principles and concepts for Romania's external behavior which have increasingly become the standard against which particular foreign-policy options are evaluated. For this reason, a grasp of the ideological framework is crucial to an understanding of Romanian foreign policy. As Romanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu has said, "an explanation of Romania's foreign policy today means first, an exposition of the principles upon which it is based, and second, an illustration of how these principles are given practical effect." [3]

A close reading of speeches by the RCP leadership and articles by leading Romanian theoreticians would indicate that there are at least five major aspects of the ideological framework. These have to do with Romanian concepts of: (1) the nation; (2) socialist internationalism; (3) the laws of socialist development; (4) national *vs.* international communism; and (5) proletarian internationalism.[4]

The Nation. From the Romanian perspective, the nation-state is the primary actor within the international system. Moreover, the Romanians see the nation as the only setting in which socialism can be fully constructed. To them, the nation is the natural outgrowth of the objective processes of social development and thus, for a long time to come, will be "the form of human community which is historically necessary." [5] (The emergence of new states in Asia and Africa and the continuing adherence to the nation-state by the masses and many leaders in the West reinforce this perception.[6]) Therefore, they maintain, socialist construction must place primary reliance on national forms; and, conversely, the nation, by entering a qualitatively superior stage,

[2] A more extensive analysis may be found in Robert L. Farlow, *Alignment and Conflict: Romanian Foreign Policy, 1958-1969*, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University, 1971. In addition, see Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The New Rumania*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1967.

[3] Corneliu Manescu, "Romania in the Concert of Nations," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1969, pp. 2-3.

[4] For a more detailed analysis of the Romanian ideology, see Robert L. Farlow, "The Ideological Foundations of Romanian Foreign Policy," *East European Quarterly*, forthcoming.

[5] "Natiunea in Lumea Contemporana," (Prima Parte), *Lupta de Clasa* (Bucharest), Vol. 47, No. 10, October 1967, p. 101.

[6] Nicolae Ceausescu, *Report [of Aug. 6, 1969] at the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party*, Bucharest, Agerpres, 1969, pp. 73-74.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reaches its full socio-economic potential under socialism.

Romanian theorists buttress their position that socialism must unfold in a national context, relying more on internal than external factors, with two basic arguments.[7] First, history has demonstrated that socialist revolution springs out of the contradictions within a nation and is successful because it is led by the people of that nation. Second, each nation is culturally and economically distinct, with special traditions and problems; therefore, Communist decision-making must take into consideration these national peculiarities. To ignore or misinterpret them would hinder socialism. But only the people of a nation and, more particularly, the national Communist party are capable of evaluating these traditions accurately.

Such a stance is a challenge to Soviet contentions that national institutional forms are now insufficient for socialist development, and that it is only through a fusion of the national/international aspects of the socialist world—with stress on the latter—that socialism can be completely realized. However, it does not mean that the Romanians are advocating isolationism. The central point is that they believe internal, national factors govern the success of socialism much more than do external, international factors.

Socialist Internationalism. According to the RCP, each nation-state has certain rights and duties which collectively constitute the principles or norms that are to govern interstate relations. These emerged with the formation of centralized states, and their content is the same for all states. In the terminology of the socialist party-states, they are known as socialist internationalism. Socialist interstate relations are based on "the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, mutual advantage, comradely assistance, non-interference in internal affairs, observance of territorial integrity. . . ." [8]

On a rhetorical level, there is little difference between this pronouncement and Soviet statements dealing with socialist internationalism, but the Romanian and Soviet interpretations of the character of these principles differ vastly. For the RCP, the principles are not restricted to socialist states *per se*. Rather, they apply to any nation-state.[9] The only difference is that capitalist states of necessity violate the principles, while socialist states inherently enjoy greater possibilities for respecting them. (This view, it should be noted, represents a considerable departure from the traditional Leninist tenet that the triumph of socialist forces in specific countries *ipso facto* resolves the problems of state-to-state relations between them.) However, the socialist states at times also violate the injunctions of socialist internationalism, Ceausescu has said, and "mistakes and unjust practices" have resulted.[10]

The conflict over the nature of these principles clearly stems from the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies interpret the rights and duties in a "class" context, while Romania interprets them in a traditional, legalistic manner more in accord with Western international law. For example, the Romanians regard sovereignty as an absolute, inalienable attribute of any nation-state, whether socialist or capitalist. One Romanian theorist has defined it as "independence of the state, the right to freely decide the problems of its internal and international life, in conformity with the limits of international law." [11] From this perspective, the sovereignty of a socialist state cannot be subordinated to "class" considerations—that is, to considerations of whether or not a state is pursuing a "correct" socialist policy. Hence, while Soviet leaders argue that assistance or intervention of any kind to protect orthodox socialist development is an act contributing to the real sovereignty of a state, the Romanians reject such a view. Indeed, Ceausescu has declared that the Soviet doctrine of "limited sovereignty" within the alignment system is a violation of socialist internationalism and will not be accepted by the RCP.[12]

Laws of Socialism. The Romanian position regarding the role and relevance of the nation-state and its legal rights is intended to protect the independence of states. Therefore, Bucharest has found it necessary to reject the traditional Soviet line that Soviet socialist development has demonstrated the validity

[7] "Natiunea in Lumea Contemporana," (Doua Parte), *Lupta de Clasa*, Vol. 47, No. 11, November 1967, p. 58.

[8] *Statement [of April 1964] on the Stand of the Romanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working-Class Movement*, Bucharest, Agerpres, 1964, p. 31.

[9] Constantin Flitan, "Coordonatele Dreptului International Contemporan," *Lupta de Clasa*, Vol. 45, No. 10, October 1964, p. 112.

[10] Nicolae Ceausescu, "Speech Made at the General Military Academy," Aug. 14, 1968, in *Documents, Articles and Information on Romania, Supplement* (Bucharest), No. 8, Aug. 15, 1963, p. 6. Hereafter cited as *DAIR Supplement.*

[11] Quoted in Flitan, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

[12] Nicolae Ceausescu, *Exposé Made [Nov. 29, 1968] at the Jubilee Meeting of the Grand National Assembly Dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of the Union of Transylvania with Romania*, Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1968, p. 52.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the general, objective laws of socialism, and that, within limits, Soviet experience has relevance for other socialist states. Acceptance of this thesis would amount to recognition of the superiority of the Soviet Union in the area of socialist theory and practice, and such a recognition would negate national independence. Consequently, the RCP has revised the doctrine on the laws of socialism so as to ensure state autonomy.

The essence of the Romanian view is that (1) the general laws of socialism unfold in diverse socio-economic contexts and can manifest themselves "only *in* and *through* the particular," [13] and (2) the general laws themselves are not immutable and change as society progresses.[14] The general and particular aspects of socialism tend to vary from nation to nation and to merge within each nation in such a way as to form a "dialectical unity." From this analysis, the Romanians deduce that there is no single model or example of socialist construction which can be universally applied, and thus that no one is entitled to make judgments regarding the orthodoxy of any policy pursued in a particular socialist state. This reinterpretation of the laws of socialism effectively deposes Soviet experience as the standard against which all other socialist development must be evaluated.

National/International Communism. As a corollary to the notion of the fusion of the general in the particular, the RCP asserts that it is false to distinguish between national and international communism, for the building and strengthening of communism within each state has, simultaneously, both national and international ramifications. In the words of Ceausescu,

There is no national communism and international communism; communism is national and international at the same time. . . . By building socialism, every people fulfills a national task and at the same time an international one, contributing to the general advance of mankind toward socialism.[15]

In this light, there are no higher interests to which national policies must be accommodated.

Proletarian Internationalism. The final major element in the new ideology has to do with proletarian internationalism—*i.e.*, those principles which are to govern interparty relations. From the Romanian perspective, just as each nation-state has absolute rights, so each party has absolute rights. Within the socialist alignment system, there must be

. . . strict observance of the principle that all Marxist-Leninist parties enjoy equal rights, of the principle of non-interference in other parties' domestic affairs, of each party's exclusive right to solve its own political and organizational problems of appointing its leaders [and] orienting its members in problems of internal and international politics.[16]

From these general principles, the RCP has derived a number of specific guidelines with respect to interparty relations. First, the internal and external policies of a party should not be open to criticism or evaluation by other parties. Second, international gatherings of Communist parties are not entitled to issue policies or programs binding on members of the movement; nor are they entitled to "excommunicate" parties. Third, participation or non-participation in international Communist meetings should

ON FRATERNAL RELATIONS

Proletarian internationalism includes solidarity with all socialist countries and a struggle for their unity and for surmounting differences. Our party has acted and will continue to act most firmly for surmounting the existing divergencies between socialist countries, for their unity and cooperation, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, on full equality among all socialist nations.

Our party's internationalism is reflected in the continuous development of relations with all Communist and Workers' parties, in the active support for the fight waged by those parties, and in the fact that we understand that only by strengthening the cooperation and unity with the Communist parties based on Marxism-Leninism, on respect for the right of each party to independently work out its own political line, do we contribute to the unity and development of the progressive and revolutionary movement.

—Speech of Nicolae Ceausescu, Secretary General of the RCP, in Turnu-Severin on Sept. 16, 1971, *Scinteia* (Bucharest), Sept. 17, 1971.

[13] Ion Serbanescu, "General si Particular in Dezvoltarea Sociala," *Lupta de Clasa*, Vol. 48, No. 2, February 1968, p. 83.

[14] Nicolae Ceausescu, "Speech Delivered at the Festive Meeting Dedicated to the 100th Anniversary of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's Birth," April 17, 1970, in *DAIR Supplement*, No. 7, April 20, 1970, p. 37.

[15] Nicolae Ceausescu, speech of May 7, 1966, *The Romanian Communist Party—Continuer of the Romanian People's Revolutionary and Democratic Struggle, of the Traditions of the Working-Class and Socialist Movement in Romania*, Bucharest, Agerpres, 1966, p. 86.

[16] April 1964 *Statement of the Romanian Workers' Party*, pp. 45-46.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not be a measure of a party's devotion to communism. Fourth, one party may not bypass the leadership of another in any interparty dealings.[17]

For the Romanians, the unity of Communist parties springs neither from the existence of an international center nor from a monolithic identity of policies. Rather, it derives from respect by all parties for the independence of any other party as it shapes policies to meet internal conditions and needs. In short, respect for pluralism is the basis of interparty unity. All parties must recognize that "diversity constitutes the inevitable and irreversible historical framework of the activities of the Communist and Workers' parties." [18]

Thus, the Romanian conception of proletarian internationalism emerges as a declaration of independence for all Communist parties. It makes no concessions to the traditional Soviet claim to preeminence, or to arguments pointing to the overriding bonds of the alignment system. However, it does not exclude cooperation with the members of the system so long as this is based on mutual advantage.

Political Independence

The foregoing ideological tenets serve as the theoretical framework and legitimization of Romania's policy of partial alignment. Bucharest's major purpose in elaborating them has been to undermine the traditional conceptual premises regulating the behavior of members of the Soviet/East European alignment system. It has used these tenets to negate all theoretical justifications of hierarchy and stratification within that system—though not to reject the system itself—and thereby to justify Romania's pursuit of policies deemed necessary for the achievement of goals established by the RCP.

But Romanian deviancy has not been entirely on an abstract level. The RCP has sought to ensure, often at considerable risk, that all particular external policies are congruent with the ideological principles. It is the concerted application of the ideological framework by the Romanians that has given rise to tension and conflict between their country and its formal allies, especially the Soviet Union.

While it is possible to trace the evolution of a deviant Romanian foreign policy back to 1958, the most dramatic manifestations of it have occurred since Ceausescu succeeded Dej in 1965. Increasingly, the country has come to dissociate itself from cooperation with its formal allies on matters of both an interstate and an interparty nature. The ensuing section will explore the more salient features of this growing political independence.

Interstate Issues. On the interstate plane, Romanian deviancy has been most evident in three general areas: Romanian-Soviet relations, Romanian-Warsaw Pact relations, and Romanian-Western relations. Let us look at each of these areas.

There has been a clear-cut relationship between the evolution of Romanian foreign policy and Romanian-Soviet relations. As Bucharest has restructured its foreign policy, tension and conflict have come to dominate Romanian-Soviet interactions. For example, in 1966 Ceausescu documented, in the most daring anti-Soviet commentary ever issued by an East European Communist leader within the alignment system, the harm caused to the RCP by the Comintern and Cominform;[19] moreover, the RCP has frequently complained that the malpractices associated with these bodies have not been abandoned.

The sources of Romanian-Soviet tension are many. They include Romania's establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1967, the Romanian refusal to sever diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, and Romania's unwillingness to sign a 1968 Warsaw Pact communique which declared that all Pact members intended to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In addition, the Romanians have continued to reduce their economic dependence on the USSR. For instance, the Soviet share in total Romanian trade fell from 42 percent in 1964 to 27 percent in 1969.[20] This reduction of economic dependence on Soviet markets, combined with an increase in trade with the non-Communist world, has had the effect of limiting Soviet political leverage over Romania. As one Romanian official has asserted, "we support our political independence by economic independence." [21]

Another source of tension has been Romanian policy toward the Warsaw Pact. Just as Dej opposed

[17] The Romanian position on interparty relations is set forth by Paul Niculescu-Mizil in his "Speech at Budapest Consultative Meeting," in *DAIR Supplement*, No. 4, Feb. 29, 1968.

[18] Serbanescu, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

[19] Ceausescu, *The Romanian Communist Party*, pp. 28, 33-38, 49-53, and 90-92.

[20] *Anuarul Statistic—1970*, Bucharest, Directia Centrala de Statistica, 1970, p. 565.

[21] Alexandru Birladeanu, "Speech at the Ninth Congress of the RCP," in *DAIR Supplement*, No. 13, Aug. 10, 1965, p. 31.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet plans for the economic integration of Eastern Europe under Comecon, Ceausescu has opposed recent Soviet plans and policies aimed at greater military integration of Eastern Europe under the Pact. Bucharest sees any integration, whether of an economic or military nature, as undermining the role of the nation, negating the principles of sovereignty and independence, and ensuring Soviet control over Eastern Europe.

The basic position of the RCP concerning military alliances was articulated by Ceausescu in his famous speech of May 7, 1966, in which he asserted:

One of the barriers in the path of cooperation among peoples is military blocs and the existence of military bases and troops of some states on the territories of other states. The existence of these blocs, as well as the dispatching of troops to other countries, represents an anachronism which is incompatible with the national independence and sovereignty of the peoples and with normal interstate relations.[22]

This blunt critique has set the tone of Romania's approach toward the Warsaw Pact.

Bucharest's fundamental strategy vis-a-vis the Pact has been one of criticism and non-cooperation followed by periods of limited cooperation. Thus, shortly after the May 7 speech, Ceausescu adopted the standard Soviet formula that as long as NATO exists, the Pact will be necessary. Despite this concession, the RCP let it be known that the Pact would have to operate in accord with the principles of state equality and sovereignty.[23]

As a major component of its negative policy toward the military alliance, the Ceausescu regime has curtailed Romania's involvement in Pact activities. This has been most noticeable in the drastic reduction of Romania's participation in joint military maneuvers. Furthermore, Romania has steadfastly resisted Soviet pressure to hold such maneuvers on its soil—fearing that once Soviet troops entered, they might not leave.

The Romanian-Soviet and Romanian-Warsaw Pact conflicts coalesced dramatically with the emergence of Czechoslovakia as a major source of controversy in 1968. Prior to the invasion of the country by Pact members, the RCP made known its general support for the Dubcek regime and vigorously attempted to ward off any allied military intervention through the instrumentality of the Pact. The failure of these efforts and the ultimate invasion represented, in one sense, a setback for Romanian foreign policy. In another sense, though, the invasion proved a watershed in the development of Bucharest's policy of partial alignment. Romania's refusal to participate in the invasion, Ceausescu's unqualified condemnation of the undertaking, and his vow to resist militarily any armed intervention in Romania were blatant and successful acts of independence.[24] Indeed, the failure of the Soviet Union to put a forcible stop to the Romanian challenge tended to indicate that the policy of partial alignment would be permitted to endure. Having survived the events of 1968, the RCP now seems to believe that only the most flagrant acts of deviancy would prompt Soviet military intervention.

As a result, Romania has continued to develop autonomous policies while not entirely eschewing cooperation with the Soviet Union when this does not violate its interests or principles; and the pattern of conflict and cooperation has persisted. For example, Ceausescu's vocal criticism of Soviet policy toward China at the 1969 Budapest conference of Communist parties[25] and his historic reception of President Nixon in Bucharest the same year were balanced by Romanian renewal, even if belated, of the Soviet-Romanian Friendship Treaty and by more active (but still limited) Romanian participation in Comecon and the Warsaw Pact.

While Romanian-Soviet relations have deteriorated, Romanian-Western relations have undergone rapid improvement. The RCP has marshaled two basic justifications for enhancing its contacts with the West. First, the normalization and expansion of contacts with states outside the alignment system has an objective rationale in that socio-economic development is dependent upon keeping up with world scientific and economic activities and engaging in international exchanges.[26] Second, there are political forces at work in Western Europe that seek to liquidate the remnants of the cold war, to assert the independence of their nations, and to create an atmosphere of East-West détente that would ensure

[22] Ceausescu, *The Romanian Communist Party*, pp. 97-98.

[23] Nicolae Ceausescu, "Speech at the Meeting of the Basic Active of the Armed Forces," May 31, 1967, in *DAIR Supplement*, June 1, 1967, p. 9.

[24] For Ceausescu's condemnation of the invasion, see his "Speech at the Rally in Front of the Headquarters of the RCP," Aug. 21, 1968, in *ibid.*, No. 18, Aug. 21, 1968.

[25] "Speech at the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties," June, 1969, in *ibid.*, No. 8, June 10, 1969, p. 21

[26] Nicolae Ceausescu, "Speech at the Meeting Held in Resita," in *ibid.*, No. 23, Sept. 2, 1968, pp. 3-4.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European security; and promoting relations with Western Europe supports these progressive European forces.[27]

Bucharest's revamped policy toward the West has been wide-ranging, embracing economic, political, and cultural relations. In the economic realm, it has brought considerable dividends to Romania—in terms of both trade and cooperation between Romanian state and private Western industries. Thus, the Western share in total Romanian trade rose from 24 percent in 1964 to 35 percent in 1969.[28] Most of this trade was with advanced West European countries—particularly West Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy. The exchange has been vital in facilitating Romania's industrialization and the diversification of its markets, although these gains have been achieved at the expense of a large trade deficit vis-a-vis the West. According to one informed Western observer, Romania has signed about a dozen industrial cooperation agreements with private Western firms.[29]

In addition to economic benefits, the rapprochement with the West has created a reservoir of Western political support for Romania's foreign policy. Charles de Gaulle's visit to Romania in May 1968 and President Nixon's visit the following year symbolized Western endorsement of Romania's independent stance. Ceausescu, in turn, has recognized the importance of this support and has continued the policy of détente by visiting France and the United States (in 1970).

The revitalization of relations with the United States has progressed somewhat differently than that of relations with Western Europe. Trade between the two states has continued to be minimal, for it has been limited not only by the economic gap between them but also by US legal restrictions. Moreover, the normalization of relations, which began in the early 1960's, halted from 1965 to 1968 as American involvement in South Vietnam mounted. It was not until mid-1968, after the Paris peace talks began, that Romania decided once again to step up its contacts.

The process of normalization was accelerated by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in late August 1968. Bucharest's reaction to this event demonstrated to American officials the extent to which Romania was willing to assert an autonomous position. At the same time, Romanian officials were impressed with US attempts to forestall further aggressive activity by the Soviet Union. The outcome of these developments was a rapid expansion of scientific and cultural exchange between the two nations. While trade still remains low, the US government has lifted some restrictions on commerce with Romania and is encouraging private American investment in the country. (Moreover, several US senators are actively supporting most-favored-nation status for Romania.) In general, Romanian-American relations are positive and cordial at present. In the absence of more concrete American assistance to Romania's economic objectives, however, the favorable political interaction will likely remain somewhat tenuous.

By the end of the 1960's, then, it was clear that Bucharest's interstate policy was no longer determined by the policies of the USSR or the Soviet/East European alignment system. Although there are limits beyond which the Romanian leadership will not go for fear of provoking an extreme Soviet reaction, it can nevertheless articulate and execute an independent position on numerous issues, and prospects are that, as long as it does not formally reject the institutions of the alignment system and engages in limited cooperation with the other members, it will manage to continue to pursue its policy of partial alignment in interstate affairs.

Interparty Issues. In Romanian eyes, partial alignment covers interparty as well as interstate relations. Its application at the interparty level has presented a particular challenge to Bucharest, for here Soviet claims to political and ideological primacy have been very strong.

We have already discussed the ideological principles of Communist party independence and equality that the Romanians have formulated. There have been dramatic demonstrations of the RCP's willingness to uphold the principles in practice. These may be categorized as follows: (1) neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute; (2) friendly relations with the Yugoslav and Albanian parties; (3) support for Alexander Dubcek's policies of socialist democracy in Czechoslovakia; and (4) non-participation in or criticism of international Communist party meetings.

As an outgrowth of their rejection of Soviet claims to primacy, the Romanians have declined to take sides on the issues involved in the Sino-Soviet controversy. Although Romanian views on these matters are closer to those of the Soviets, the RCP's official position has been one of neutrality, of

[27] Alexandru Campeanu, "Imperativul Colaborarii Intereuropene," *Lupta de Clasa*, Vol. 48, No. 6, June 1968, p. 53.

[28] *Anuarul Statistic—1970*, pp. 563-67.

[29] See Michael Gamarnikow, "Industrial Cooperation: East Europe Looks West," *Problems of Communism*, May-June, 1971, p. 44.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

refusing to recognize either the Chinese or Soviet stance as *the* legitimate one. Indeed, the Romanians have attempted to counter Soviet moves to expel the Chinese party from the international Communist movement. There seem to have been two fundamental considerations behind Bucharest's policy. First, to join a particular side in the dispute would vitiate the RCP's claim that a party's policies are not open to evaluation by others. Second, the Sino-Soviet dispute has been *one* of the major factors behind Romania's ability to revise its own foreign policy without suffering Soviet sanctions.[30]

Romania's friendship with China has become a matter of increasing concern to the Soviet Union. The Romanian-Chinese relationship is warmer now than at any prior juncture—a fact underscored by China's recent extension of a loan of more than $200 million to Romania and by Ceausescu's trip to Peking. These manifestations of strong Sino-Romanian ties have come, moreover, at a time when the Chinese have been taking much more of an activist role in world affairs than they had since the onset of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and have been seeking to restore some normalcy to their relations with countries such as Yugoslavia and the United States. The Soviets seem especially worried that Peking may promote anti-Soviet cooperation in Eastern Europe. No doubt at Moscow's behest, the Hungarians in August 1971 warned that "an extremely dangerous situation" would be created by the emergence of an anti-Soviet "Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest axis." [31] And the Soviet newspaper *Literaturnaia gazeta* has told the Romanians that they "cannot hold a neutral or, even more, a conciliatory position in regard to China." [32]

This pressure seems to have induced Ceausescu to eschew further dramatic moves toward China at least for the present. But it is quite unlikely that the Romanians will abandon their current position on China, for to do so would be to recognize Soviet primacy after more than ten years of rejecting it.

In line with the contention that each individual party must be free to chart its own path to socialism-communism, the RCP has ignored the Soviet conflict with Albania and Yugoslavia and has renewed its relations with both on the party as well as the state level. Indeed, the Romanians maintain that the policies of the Albanian and Yugoslav parties are valid manifestations (within the socio-economic contexts and traditions of the two countries) of socialism. Although the RCP and the Yugoslav League of Communists have opted for quite different internal political orders, their foreign policies have become increasingly congruous. In 1968, for example, Ceausescu and Josip Tito met three times to discuss the Czechoslovak crisis and related problems. The Romanian relationship with Albania has not been as close as that with Yugoslavia; nevertheless, it has been very correct, and the Romanians have approached the matter with a desire to further mutual interests and normalize contacts. For instance, in 1965 Bucharest concluded a cultural agreement with Tirana—the first such agreement between Albania and an East European party-state since 1960.

The RCP also supported the right of Alexander Dubcek and the Czechoslovak party to carry out a policy of socialist democracy. Not only did the Romanian leadership refuse to join with the Soviet Union and its allies in condemnation of Prague's

A BALKAN GOOD-NEIGHBOR POLICY

By promoting a realistic foreign policy, with a profoundly scientific character, socialist Romania acts consistently for the Balkan area to become a region of peace and cooperation among peoples, of good neighborliness, a nuclear-free zone. . . .

In elaborating and translating into life this main line of her foreign policy, Romania sets out from the concrete situation in the Balkan region: the fact that four countries—Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania—are socialist countries and that the geographical closeness has created objective conditions for and mutual interests in economic, political and cultural cooperation with a regional character. . . .

The other countries in this zone, too, contribute to the assertion of the idea of understanding and cooperation. . . . In the context of the revolution of inter-Balkan relations, of the assertion of their wish to live in peace, good neighborhood and cooperation, the statement made nearly 40 years ago by the famous Romanian diplomatist Nicolae Titules is fully valid: It is precisely here, in the Balkan region, that, thanks to our strivings, a renewing trend is being felt, whose aim is to erect the edifice of peace upon the only possible sound basis, since it is a moral one: to help each other without harming anybody.

—"Romania and Balkan Cooperation," Agerpres, Sept. 14, 1971.

[30] For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on Romanian policy, see Jacques Lévesque, *Le Conflit Sino-soviétique et l'Europe de L'Est,* Montreal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1970, pp. 99-281.

[31] *Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest), Aug. 13, 1971.

[32] *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 11, 1971.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new course, but Ceasescu openly endorsed the Dubcek program.[33] Bucharest felt that among the most important issues involved in the situation was whether Moscow would allow individual parties greater freedom to shape their own socialist policies. That is, the Romanians saw Czechoslovakia as a test of Soviet willingness to respect the Romanian interpretation of party independence within the alignment system; and by supporting Dubcek, the RCP sought to protect and promote its own ideological commitments.

When, as was to be expected, the RCP was not invited to the party-state meetings convened to discuss Czechoslovak developments and related problems of the alignment system, it vehemently denounced this exclusion as further evidence of the violation of the norms of party and state relations.[34] However, the Romanians have deliberately absented themselves from other interparty meetings which appeared designed as propaganda forums for the Soviet Union. For example, there were no Romanian representatives at the March 1965 consultative meeting in Moscow for the preparation of a world conference of Communist parties or at the April 1967 meeting of European parties in Karlovy Vary. And in 1968 the Romanian delegation at the Budapest consultative meeting for the preparation of a world conference walked out after the participants declined to condemn an attack on Romanian foreign policy by the Syrian delegate.[35] The RCP also displayed its leeriness of multilateral Communist party meetings by its unenthusiastic response to the 1969 decision to convoke a world conference of Communist parties,[36] though it did attend the final gathering in 1970.

Collectively, the party and state policies outlined above have projected Romania into a position of partial alignment. There is every indication that, as the 1970's unfold, the RCP will continue to pursue this course and will persist in arguing that

by the world socialist system we understand not a bloc in which the states are fused into a whole, giving up their national sovereignty, but the assertion of socialism as an international force by its victory in several independent states, which develop independently. . . .[37]

Having surveyed the content of Romania's posture of partial alignment, let us now turn to some key questions which this posture raises. Why has Romania charted an independent course for itself, and how has it been able to avoid Soviet military intervention or some other form of major sanctions? The answers to both these questions really lie in the fortuitous conjunction of several internal and external circumstances.

Determinants of Policy

The first set has to do with the personal characteristics of the top-level leadership of the RCP. Ever since Dej consolidated his power in 1957, the RCP has been under the control of an elite which is relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnic background, education, political experiences, and political values.[38] This statement applies both to Dej's associates, of whom Ceausescu was one, and to the new men that Ceausescu has brought into power. For the most part, the group has consisted of ethnic Romanians who were born and reared in Romania and have never resided elsewhere for any significant time; consequently, its members—particularly Ceausescu and his advisers—have possessed a strong sense of national identity. In this regard, they have differed from their former party opponents and predecessors in the leadership, who had non-Romanian backgrounds, had lived for a long while in the Soviet Union, and had thus come to perceive themselves as representatives of Soviet interests in Romania. For example, in the period after 1945 the RCP was controlled by Ana Pauker, who was of Jewish origin, and Vasile Luca, who was of Hungarian background. Both had spent the war years in the Soviet Union and had returned to Romania along with the Soviet army.

Because of its national identification, the RCP elite has been particularly sensitive to Soviet policies which violate Romanian interests and hence work to undermine the internal strength of the party and the elite's personal legitimacy. Moreover, it has tended to see such violations not as a relatively new

[33] Nicolae Ceausescu, "Speech at Galati Iron and Steel Combine," July 15, 1968, in *DAIR Supplement*, No. 14, July 17, 1968, p. 11.

[34] "Every Effort for Strengthening the Unity of the Socialist Countries," *Scinteia*, Aug. 7, 1968, in *ibid.*, No. 15, Aug. 8, 1968, p. 5.

[35] "Communique of the Special Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP," March 1, 1968, in *ibid.*, No. 6, March 2, 1968.

[36] Niculescu-Mizil, *op. cit., passim.*

[37] Ceausescu, *Report at the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party*, pp. 107-08.

[38] See D. A. Tomasic, "The Romanian Communist Party Leadership," *Slavic Review* (New York), Vol. 20, October 1961, pp. 477-94.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phenomenon but as a major element of continuity in Soviet policy between Romania's pre-Communist and post-Communist periods. The list of its grievances includes first Comintern and then Cominform interference with RCP policies, Soviet annexation of Romanian territory during World War II, and Soviet exploitation of the Romanian economy through joint Romanian-Soviet companies in the years up to 1956. It regards the last as having been disastrous for Romanian economic development and politically injurious to the RCP, just as later Soviet proposals for economic and military integration would have been if they had been implemented. All these things together have produced a very negative image of the Soviet Union among the RCP leaders—an image which both the Dej regime and Ceausescu have articulated publicly.[39]

A second set of circumstances is the alterations that have taken place in the international environment since the late 1950's. At the very time Dej was consolidating his control over the RCP, the international environment was undergoing changes conducive to the expression of the independent proclivities that the elite's value-system called for. Two of the most important were the lessening of tension between the more or less bipolar Communist and non-Communist worlds and the rapid fragmentation of international communism. Soviet articulation of "peaceful coexistence" and the increased willingness of the Western powers, especially those in Western Europe, to engage in economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges with Communist states provided the Romanians with not only a justification for but also a concrete means of disengagement from excessive dependence on Comecon countries. Simultaneously, the emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the successful deviation of Yugoslavia and Albania, and the independent tendencies in non-ruling Communist parties helped both to divert Soviet attention from Eastern Europe and to limit Soviet leverage over that area.

These developments have given the Romanians the option of turning to the West, to deviant socialist countries, or to both at the same time. The rise of Bucharest's trade with the West and its position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute indicate a willingness to avail itself of all opportunities.

A third set of circumstances involves economic and political conditions within Romania at large. The primary one of these has been the rapid growth of the economy. At the very point in time when the Soviet Union began to press for integration of the East European economies, Romania's industrialization program had reached the takeoff point for self-sustaining development, and the visible successes of Bucharest's previous economic policies reinforced, and still continue to reinforce, its will to resist Soviet proposals which would threaten that program. In part, then, foreign policy has been devised to protect and aid economic development.

Of major significance, too, has been the traditional anti-Russian bias of the Romanian population. In challenging Moscow's control of the Soviet/East European alignment system, the Romanian leadership has consciously endeavored to exploit this popular feeling for its own purposes, and it has been notably successful in doing so.

The final set of circumstances concerns features of Romania's party-state *apparat.* Since 1957, internal cohesion and centralization of authority have prevailed within that *apparat.* Under Dej and Ceausescu, moreover, the bureaucracy has been streamlined, and all persons whose loyalty to the leadership was open to question have been removed. Thus, possible centers of opposition have been eliminated at all echelons.

This structural unity has been important in facilitating the implementation of the new foreign policy, for it has made the *apparat* relatively immune to Soviet manipulation. Today, indeed, Soviet leaders must reckon with the fact that there would be no section of the Romanian *apparat* upon which they could rely to carry out their directives if they risked a military intervention.

While the Romanian policy of partial alignment is at the moment unique within the Soviet/East European alignment system, this circumstance may not prevail permanently. The Romanian leadership has been arguing, in effect, for a restructuring of the system to turn it into a voluntary grouping of party-states free to operate as autonomous actors in the international arena in pursuit of their diverse goals, yet collaborating with each other on issues of mutual concern. Although the elites of other East European countries have thus far failed to emulate the RCP's course, socio-political conditions in Eastern Europe are fluid, and it may be only a matter of time before the internal-external situations of other party-states alter in ways which will result in new manifestations of partial alignment.

[39] April 1964 *Statement of the Romanian Workers' Party,* pp. 44-45; and Ceausescu, *The Romanian Communist Party,* pp. 28, 33-38, 49-53.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lumumba University: An Assessment

By Alvin Z. Rubinstein

Under Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union embarked on an ambitious and active policy of penetrating the Third World. One of the long-range ventures undertaken to implement this policy was the creation of the University for Friendship of Peoples. Its purpose was to provide higher education for students from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The Soviet Premier announced its establishment on February 24, 1960, during a visit to Indonesia; a year later, on February 22, 1961, it became the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University, in honor of the Congolese leader slain a few weeks before. During a recent trip to Moscow, the writer discussed current operations and problems with University officials and gained some insights into the University's activities during the 10 years since he had last visited it in 1960. Changes in the University, and Soviet views regarding the institution's achievements and shortcomings, shed additional light on the USSR's past and present efforts to build up its influence in the Third World.

Structure and Recruitment Practices

The basic organization of the University has altered little over the years. There are seven faculties: the Faculty of Engineering, which specializes in mechanical, civil, and mining engineering; the Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics; the Faculty of Agriculture; the Faculty of Medicine; the Faculty of History and Philology, which concentrates on contemporary history and Russian language and literature; the Faculty of Economics and Law, which stresses economic theory and development, particularly as they relate to developing countries; and the Preparatory Faculty, which prepares entering students in the Russian language, provides remedial work (especially in mathematics and sciences) for those who require it, and helps to acculturate them to Soviet society.

The Preparatory Faculty was originally conceived as an interim device to deal with the first batch of students, most of whom either lacked complete formal secondary education or came from poor schools and had been recruited more because of their political views than because of their educational abilities. It was hoped that as the quality of students improved, the faculty's role would be minor. But Soviet officials now admit that the level of student preparation is not always as high as they would like; indeed, the need for a year of intensive study of the Russian language more than justifies the continuation of the faculty's separate status. After the first year in the Preparatory Faculty, students are tested. If they pass the examination, they go on to the first year of actual university-level work. Those who fail either receive additional remedial work or have to enter a polytechnical (trade) school.

In recent years, the Soviet authorities have tried to professionalize recruitment. Formerly, students had applied directly to the Friendship University or through Soviet embassies abroad. Two major modifications have since been made. First, the University administrators now rely heavily upon the recommendation of national societies for promoting

Mr. Rubinstein is Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. His works include The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953-1963, *Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964, and* Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, *Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cultural relations with the Soviet Union—*e.g.*, the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society (ISCUS) in India or the Chilean Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union in Chile. No longer are promising applicants invited to Moscow for examinations and interviews. This revision in procedure clearly stems in part from the great expense involved, but it may likewise reflect a deemphasis on the recruitment of "politically promising" applicants, at least in the initial stage of the educational process. Second, an increasing number of University students now come as a result of intergovernmental agreements. Several factors have rendered this development possible. Many observers in the Third World have become convinced that the intent of the University is to provide straightforward education and not political training; Third World nations have acquired a measure of confidence in their diplomatic relationship with the USSR; and Lumumba graduates have drifted back to their native countries with little evidence of subversive behavior. Consequently, governments such as those of India and the Sudan have been willing to negotiate official arrangements and thus relieve University officials of the responsibility for actual recruitment.

(As an aside here, the writer wishes to note that there is no real indication Moscow is deliberately training revolutionaries at Friendship University. While some competent Western observers believe that Soviet intelligence has sought to identify and approach potentially useful contacts among students at the University, such activities do not mean that the institution functions as a school for rebels. At the time of the abortive uprising in Ceylon by the Ceylon Liberation Front in April 1971, attention was drawn to the fact that one of the leaders, Rohana Wijiwera, had attended Lumumba University in the mid-1960's. However, from all reports, Wijiwera was too radical to suit the Soviets, and he was dropped from the program at an early stage. In general terms, the training of revolutionaries at Lumumba University to overthrow nonaligned governments which Moscow strongly supports would seem to make little political sense; such an endeavor, if substantiated, could undermine not only the University's future but also the Soviet position in the nonaligned world.)

University officials described the recruitment procedures for Chile and India as follows: About 25 scholarships are allotted for Chile. In late fall, announcements and applications are distributed by local branches of the Chilean Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union. After the applications have been culled by a committee, finalists are brought to Santiago for an interview conducted by members of the Institute, several of whom are educators. A representative from the Soviet embassy attends the interviews as an observer. The final list of candidates is then submitted to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs for approval and issuance of the necessary exit permits. The procedure is simpler in the case of India. There, most of the 30-40 candidates accepted each year are proposed by the Ministry of Education, which processes the applications. Finalists are selected with the foreknowledge of ISCUS or the Soviet embassy. In addition, ISCUS recommends a number of candidates, who must also be endorsed by the Ministry of Education before they are accepted.

Variants of these two methods are used in most countries with which the Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations. While some Ministries of Education of Third World countries, according to Western sources, have complained that they do not in fact have sufficient control over the students selected and approved by the Soviet embassy, the selection committees do generally send qualified candidates. Rarely do the University authorities send anyone home as unsuitable.

In keeping with the increased stress on professionalization of recruitment, few students are now admitted by personal application to the University. This change in policy, of course, has other causes as well. The Soviets want to dispel any notion abroad that they are surreptitiously recruiting candidates to be trained as Communist activists; moreover, they discovered during the early 1960's that few applicants from "off the street" had even minimal qualifications. Indeed, as a group, such applicants fell well below those chosen through institutionalized processes.

The Student Body

Soviet officials say that they process 8,000-9,000 applications annually. Western diplomats in Moscow are skeptical and place the number closer to 2,000-3,000 a year; some say, "Lumumba University [as it is generally known] will accept almost anyone who applies."

The enrollment figures shown to the writer indicated a student body of about 3,500. Of this total, 850 were Soviet students. The regional breakdown

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the rest was: Africa—700, of whom 150 were Nigerians, 68 were Sierra Leonians, and 57 were Kenyans; the Middle East—660, of whom 110 were Syrians, 83 were Sudanese, and 82 were Jordanians (an additional 27 were identified as Palestinians); Southeast Asia—460, of whom 185 were Indians, 91 were Nepalese, and 70 were Ceylonese; Latin America—802, of whom the majority came from five countries: Chile (157), Colombia (89), Mexico (86), Bolivia (67), and Ecuador (63). There were none, incidentally, from Cuba. This fact can be explained by the University's policy from the very outset not to admit students from other Communist nations on the ground that ample educational facilities exist there. No doubt this policy was also designed to give the institution more of a non-political coloration.

That 25 percent of the students are Soviet citizens indicates an important departure from early thinking, which anticipated accepting no more than 10 percent. During the planning of the University, officials probably reasoned that admitting a small number of Soviet students would, on the one hand, facilitate the acculturation of foreign students and, on the other, afford the Soviet students useful exposure to representatives from various areas of the Third World and enable them to learn to speak the languages—particularly those of Africa, India, and Indonesia—in which the Soviet Union then had fairly few experts. A desire to monitor the activities of foreign students may also have figured in the calculations. (A number of foreign students have expressed the feeling that this is one of the roles of their Soviet counterparts.) The increased percentage of Soviet students is likely related to the difficult and time-consuming tasks of helping the foreign student to learn Russian, to adjust to Soviet society, and to acquire proper study habits and an understanding of Soviet mores.

Socialization, it ought to be underscored, is not Sovietization. Crass proselytizing, while not unknown in the early years, is now apparently out; relatively little propagandizing and conversion go on. The Soviets do recruit a few disciples, who turn up as representatives of Lumumba University at various international Communist and Communist-front gatherings—*e.g.*, the Youth Congress held in Sofia in 1968—but the number is small. These days, Moscow aims at winning and maintaining respectability abroad. The Soviet government, it is true, does seem to hope that Lumumba graduates will in time come to occupy positions of importance in their societies and presumably favor closer ties with the USSR; yet, judging by the Western experience, one might hazard the opinion that Moscow may be overly optimistic in its expectations.

The Educational Program

During the 1970-71 academic year, enrollment in the University's seven faculties was distributed in the following manner: about 1,000 students in the Preparatory Faculty; 655 in the Engineering Faculty; 501 in the Medical Faculty; 360 in the Natural Sciences and Mathematics Faculty; 342 in the Faculty of Economics and Law; 336 in the Faculty of Agriculture; and 268 in the Faculty of History and Philology. From the very beginning, the University has emphasized education in skills relating to the functional needs of developing countries. The low priority attached to the humanities and social sciences also reflects the philosophy of the Soviet educational establishment, which frowns on liberal arts in general.

The Preparatory Faculty stresses language training. In the first year, all students spend four hours daily in class and three hours in linguaphone labs. There are no more than five students in a class, and ten-person groups are organized to work on phonetics. To ensure maximum exposure to the language, two foreign students (each from a different country) are housed with a Soviet student. In this way, students are encouraged to use Russian and avoid lapsing into their native tongues, and they have a Soviet student friend to acquaint them with the do's and don'ts of Soviet culture. There are frequent tours and films. After three months of intensive preliminary work in the Russian language, students are gradually introduced to subjects in which they lack academic background. University officials said that the preparation of entering students is much better than it was in the early 1960's, but few foreign students have knowledge of the sciences and mathematics even roughly equivalent to that of their Soviet counterparts and therefore require considerable remedial work.

In the six full-fledged academic faculties, a new development consistent with Soviet educational theory has taken place. Students now get work experience in factories, institutes, and agricultural research stations consonant with their particular field of specialization. According to Soviet officials, more than 200 enterprises in 30 cities participate

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the program. A student spends 15-30 percent of his time, depending on his specialty, in practical work. In this way, the Soviets hope to combat the aversion to "blue-collar" activity still deeply rooted in the mental outlook of students from many Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American countries.

One could detect in the comments of University officials a high-level policy to upgrade the quality of education at Lumumba. They indicated that the requirement of compulsory attendance at all classes was strictly enforced. Laggards are reprimanded and subjected to moral pressures; constant offenders are dismissed. About one-fourth of entering students drop out—20 percent because of poor academic performance and 5 percent because of irregular attendance and other forms of non-conformity with University and Soviet standards. Students are expected to work for their scholarships, and academic demands on them have been increased lately.

A desire for self-improvement also stands at the heart of several recent reforms. The University has extended the preparatory period for students to two and, in some cases, three years. Furthermore, the courses of study in the professional faculties were to be lengthened by one year beginning in September 1971 in order to allow students to take fewer courses during each academic year and do better work, and to permit more time for independent research. Thus, the degree in medicine will now take seven years to complete, while the other degrees will require five.

This general revision of programs, of course, means that students will have to spend at least one additional year away from home. University officials are somewhat concerned over the students' reaction to this, but they clearly realize that only by graduating students whose professional competence is recognized in their native countries can the University be a potent force in Soviet cultural relations with developing countries. As one of them put it, "quality is the best propaganda for the school."

It is important in this connection to keep in mind that the problem of accreditation for Lumumba University degrees has plagued Soviet authorities since 1965, when the first students were graduated. In an interview in *Pravda* on February 6, 1970, Professor Sergei V. Rumiantsev, Rector of the University from 1960 until 1970, registered a strong complaint on the subject, citing the case of a girl from Ecuador who had to fight for two years and undergo repeated examinations before her degree from Lumumba's Engineering Faculty was recognized. Some countries—for example, Ghana—have even insisted that doctors trained in the Soviet Union must pass certification examinations to demonstrate their competence before they can practice. While there are no data on how many of the roughly 3,000 foreign graduates of the University have returned home and how many of these returnees have found positions commensurate with their education, the entire Soviet input of effort and expense will be vitiated unless Lumumba degrees are accepted in students' home countries.

Yet Moscow still has a long way to go before Lumumba University (in contrast to Moscow State University) obtains widespread acceptance by the countries that the University is intended to assist. At the request of the Soviet government, a UNESCO conference on the equivalence and comparative value of diplomas and academic degrees convened in the Soviet capital in June 1968, but nothing was settled there. Currently, therefore, the USSR is trying to negotiate separate agreements concerning equivalence of degrees with each Third World nation. The People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) signed such an agreement in 1970, and India in the same year became the first Asian nation to recognize Lumumba degrees—one of the tangible Soviet dividends from the USSR's heavy investment in India under Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Nonetheless, the overall results of Soviet labors have been relatively meager thus far.

A good deal of the University's difficulties, of course, lie in the general caliber of students that it manages to attract. The ablest students from the Third World still prefer to matriculate in the West; the poorer ones go to the Soviet Union. Of those who actually do their work in the USSR, Lumumba gets only a small portion. During the 1960-70 period, for example, there were between 10,000 and 12,000 students a year from non-Communist developing countries studying at Soviet insti-

NOTICE OF ERRATA

TO OUR READERS: Certain press runs of the last issue of *Problems of Communism* contained the following errors that warrant correction:

Page 38, headline: "Appendix: Agricultural Projects" should read "Appendix: Agricultural Projections."

Page 40, col. 1, lines 14-15: "output of 123 million tons" should read "output of 213 million tons."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tutions—more than 50 percent from sub-Saharan Africa, 32 percent from the Middle East and South Asia, 11 percent from Latin America, and 6 percent from East Asia. Of the total, Lumumba University enrolled only an average of 2,300 a year. Moreover, they did not constitute the cream of the crop. Among the foreign students themselves, in fact, there is a tendency to belittle the Lumumba product. Those who attend Moscow State University regard themselves as infinitely superior and refer deprecatingly to Lumumba as a "colonial establishment."

Lumumba officials report that their best students are Indians and Nigerians and that the least successful are Latin Americans. The Indians come with good high-school foundations and sometimes even with college training, and the Nigerians are serious, able, and hardworking. By and large, the Latin Americans, according to officials, lack self-discipline and the ability to concentrate for long.

Problems of Students

Along with the University's new dedication to raising the general level of proficiency of its graduates has gone a decrease in its financial generosity toward its students. In former years, when recruitment of politically congenial students had much higher priority and when the University wanted to acquire an instant attractiveness for foreign students, every student received a round-trip ticket home each year. This inducement has been abolished. Students are entitled to two months' vacation in the summer and two weeks in the winter, but they do not get additional funds to visit home. In theory, they can save from their scholarships, but few are able to do so. As a result, homesickness has become another of the major psychological problems besetting foreign students.

The three main problems, however, are those of climate, color, and culture. Adapting to Moscow's cold weather and to six months of winter and darkness is often difficult for Lumumba students, most of whom come from tropical habitats. Simple matters, such as dressing properly, take long to master—with the result that health is affected. University officials said that in attempting to cope with the broad problem, they are taking steps to improve health facilities and provide more comfortable living quarters.

One can usually bear the inconvenience of unfamiliar climate, of course, if the ambience is congenial. Unfortunately for foreign students, especially those from Black Africa, Soviet society is far from the unprejudiced socialist haven depicted in Soviet propaganda abroad. Soviet citizens are color-conscious, and blacks still encounter open abuse and disdain, though apparently far less now—at least in Moscow—than in the early 1960's. When Friendship University was established, students at Moscow State University cynically dubbed it "Apartheid University," a convenient way of separating the Africans—with their freer ways—from the Soviet students. But there is a greater maturity of late—especially in the capital, where citizens have become used to thousands of tourists and delegations from all countries. It is not unusual in Moscow these days to see young girls dating Africans; nor does this mixed dating occasion the social tension and trouble it once did. Moscow is not the cosmopolitan center that London or Paris or New York is; nevertheless, it is somewhat more than "a village of eight million peasants." The situation, however, is less serene in Kiev or Odessa, and ugly incidents still occur there.

Perhaps the nub of the problem lies in the nature of Soviet society itself. The decision not to provide annual trips home for students at Lumumba University led the authorities to encourage all foreign students to found their own national organizations so that they could meet socially and forget their loneliness. But the facilities provided are meager, the social gatherings are contrived, and the occasions for letting go are few and far between. Not infrequently, the creation of these national organizations has led to student feuds along traditional tribal or ethnic dividing lines—*e.g.*, the Luos versus the Kikuyus—or along political lines—*e.g.*, East versus West Pakistanis. Political animosities are not left at the border. The practice of inviting foreign students into local homes during holidays or of developing friendships outside the context of the University is virtually unknown in Soviet society, where families tend to be insular and wary. There are no stores in Moscow which sell exotic foods; no restaurants cater to the regional and national palates of African, Asian, or Latin American students. (Middle East students are exceptionally fortunate in that there are excellent Armenian and Georgian restaurants in Moscow serving familiar foods). And for all its museums, Moscow has few jazz joints, cabarets, or coffee houses. It is not a city where Bohemian impulses can readily be indulged.

Foreign students who complain that they do not receive enough money for an adequate wardrobe

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

find little sympathy among their Soviet counterparts, who resent the higher scholarships given to non-Soviet Lumumba students. During their year in the Preparatory Faculty, foreign students get 80 rubles a month; after that, they get 90 rubles a month. These stipends, which are in addition to room, books, tuition, medical facilities, and an initial outlay for clothing, amount to twice as much money as Soviet scholarship students receive. Hence the resentment among the latter, who gripe that the foreign students have more money to spend on wine and women. Yet prices in Moscow being what they are and the students having no families and few friends to whom to turn for supplementary support and entertainment, the wonder—to this writer at least—is that some 60-75 percent strive and survive and eventually graduate.

According to Western residents in Moscow, most students at Lumumba University come away from their experience with an anti-Soviet bias—notwithstanding the improvements in the University in recent years. Not only is the personal experience there less than enriching, but the professional training is regarded as of limited utility in tackling specific problems at home. Still appropriate is the adage, "If you want to produce a Communist, send him to Paris;—if a capitalist, send him to Moscow."

Summary

That Moscow believes in the value of the University is evident from the decision to construct new and more impressive quarters for it on the outskirts of the city, on the road to Vnukovo Airport. Part of the buildings are already in operation, and the transfer from the present site is to be completed sometime in 1973 or 1974. According to University officials, the new campus will be equipped with more than 200 research labs, the most modern equipment (including computers), and improved housing and recreational facilities.

The intent is to make Lumumba University a first-class institution which is universally recognized and respected, a showpiece of Soviet goodwill toward the Third World. Soviet determination to upgrade the University is reflected in a number of specific ways. The recruitment of students is now being handled through official rather than unofficial channels. The degree program has been lengthened in order to produce better qualified graduates. The curriculum has become relatively free of political propagandizing. (Soviet officials emphasized that foreign students are not required to take courses in military training, Communist Party history, or Marxism-Leninism, and that only those specializing in the social sciences and the humanities are required to take courses in Soviet history and socialist political economy.) The teacher-student ratio is high. (With a staff of 900, there is one faculty member for every four students.) Open exploitation of students for political purposes is now avoided. (For example, there has been no repetition of the 1961 incident when Guinean students were mobilized to protest Sekou Touré's crackdown on a Communist-led union. Moreover, when Ethiopian students protested against Emperor Haile Selassie in March 1969, the Soviet government quickly apologized.) The University's budget has been increased. (Ten million rubles a year is the figure at present, the writer was told.) And impressive plans for future expansion have been formulated. The Soviet government clearly considers the University an asset in its courtship of developing countries and an integral part of its international cultural offensive.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books

Sino-American Relations

By William P. Bundy

JOHN K. FAIRBANK: *The United States and China.* Rev. 3rd ed., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.

A NEW EDITION of Professor Fairbank's classic, *The United States and China,* is bound to be a major event. Those who have used the older editions for teaching the history of China will ask whether the virtues thereof have been maintained. Others will look more to the new material incorporated since the last edition of 1958, wondering whether the addenda are satisfying and up to the quality of the first two editions.

In the reviewer's opinion, the answer on the first point is clear: the book remains the best single introduction to China and to the history of American efforts and relations there up to 1950. Slightly revised and tightened, with a few summaries of recent scholarship added, the first 325 pages stand the test of time and new perspective admirably. They remain a *tour de force* of clear exposition and wise selection, well worth rereading for all but the most expert.

On the new material, however, the reviewer would have to return a mixed verdict. China's internal developments of the 1950's, the Great Leap and its aftermath, the growing Sino-Soviet split, and the Cultural Revolution are all dealt with in summary but cogent fashion. The treatment of the Cultural Revolution is especially excellent. Throughout the sections on internal developments in the Communist period, the author makes judicious use of the outpouring of scholarship in the past decade, much of it by men trained or influenced by Professor Fairbank himself.

By contrast, the discussion of China's external policies and actions—and above all the treatment of the interplay between the United States and China from 1949 onward—is disappointing. The 1958 edition devoted itself to showing how the United States had never "lost China" because it had never had it; perhaps understandably, because too little time had elapsed for a proper perspective, Professor Fairbank eschewed discussion of American policy in the Korea and post-Korea periods, although there was a sentence in a favorable vein about American assistance to South Korea and even to South Vietnam. Now the 1971 edition bemoans the Vietnam war and questions whether the United States has ever understood China—but tells almost nothing of what went on, or why, in the whole intervening period. In short, brilliant as the book is on the cultural elements of the Sino-American relationship, it fails to come to grips with the impact of one nation on the other since a united and massive China for the first time became a major factor in the international world.

Thus, Professor Fairbank still ends his detailed treatment of American responses to Chinese developments with the reactions to the Communist takeover in 1949. There is almost nothing about the events that brought on large-scale fighting between Americans and Chinese in Korea from 1951 to 1953, or about the impact of that tragic miscalculation on feelings in America and on the whole course of American policy in East Asia in the 1950's. Professor Fairbank at one point calls the United States "the most expansive power of recent times" (p. 418), a startling description that needs more development than the glancing suggestion in other passages that America "expanded defensively" and that its impact was vastly magnified by technology. Why *did* America become so concerned in the 1950's about Chinese ambitions? Why did a level-headed liberal Democrat like President Kennedy, as late as 1963, raise constantly in private conversation, and at least once publicly, the specter of a billion Chinese under Stalinist rulers and armed with nuclear weapons?[1] Why, for that matter, did a self-styled "unconscionable realist" like Professor Fairbank himself, as late as 1966, testify

[1] *Public Papers of the President of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963,* Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1964, p. 616.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

before a committee of the US Congress that the American effort in Vietnam was broadly justified as part of a policy to contain China?

It seems to me there is a vast story here which has not been told (at least by Professor Fairbank) on how the United States and China became for a time opposite poles of attraction and repulsion in East Asia as a whole. Originally fueled on the American side by belief in the monolithic nature of communism, this polar rivalry nonetheless continued even after the end of what Fairbank has called a decade of Soviet "paramountcy" in China's foreign affairs. Surely, this phenomenon was caused by the US' belief that China was a serious threat in its own right. At one point Professor Fairbank says: "Circumstance imposed upon Peking the traditional aim of strong dynasties: to dominate contiguous areas in defense of the Middle Kingdom" (p. 366). He adds that this aim became fused with the revolutionary goals of a universalist ideology, which China for a time shared with the Soviet Union. If this was the case, was it not the same kind of "circumstance" (rather than caprice) that drew the US more fully into support for countries around China's periphery? If China came to believe itself encircled (as it surely must have done), what of the fears of China's neighbors toward China herself, and the sense —particularly in Southeast Asia— that China represented the threatening power and the US the assisting friend, by the end of the 1950's?

The simple fact is that, since 1949, American relations with China have been understandable only in the wider context of developments in postwar East Asia. The sense of confrontation felt on both sides affected everything, including issues that might superficially have been regarded as bilateral, such as the American commitment in Taiwan.

Parenthetically, even on the issues that might be considered bilateral—the Warsaw talks, efforts at contact, or Taiwan—the book is almost totally silent. It particularly fails to note, as Professor Fairbank has done forcefully in his occasional writings elsewhere, the constructive change over the years in Taiwan, which makes so many feel with him today—as he and others might hardly have felt in the 1950's—that the United States cannot lightly abandon its commitment there, even for the sake of formal diplomatic relations with Peking.

As for Chinese foreign policy in the 1960's, the book makes only the briefest of references to the Indian conflict of 1962, and then a terse summary of the Lin Piao pronouncement of 1965. Doubtless both were overinterpreted by Americans, but this is just the point that deserves discussion. Then, for the climactic year 1965, there is only a single paragraph (pp. 387–88) to describe China's reaction to the bombing of North Vietnam, the debacle in Indonesia, and the failure of Chinese efforts to organize Afro-Asian countries, with no mention whatever of the most humiliating episode of all, China's virtual ultimatum and abject withdrawal on the Indian border during the India-Pakistan war. The ensuing period of China's self-imposed isolation during the Cultural Revolution began to show signs of change in 1968. Yet in a book completed in October of 1970 we find nothing about the reopening of communication with the United States, the crucial issue of Taiwan's future, the Chinese reaction to America's relations with Japan, or the significance of what were clearly by this time drastic changes in the American climate of opinion both toward China and toward a military role around China's periphery.

To be sure, the last seven pages of the book address the future and attempt to frame a perspective. In what are largely snippets from his own longer writings and speeches, Professor Fairbank argues the historical case that China will be preoccupied with domestic affairs for a long time to come, claims that the domestic political impact of the "loss of China" and the contrasting popular acceptance of the Korean intervention strongly influenced American actions in the

Reviewers in This Issue

WILLIAM P. BUNDY—Formerly Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; currently in residence at the Center for International Studies at MIT.

DONALD W. KLEIN—Research Associate at the East Asian Institute, Columbia University; co-author, with Anne B. Clarke, of *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.

ROGER E. KANET—Associate Professor of Political Science and Slavic and Soviet Area Studies at the University of Kansas; recently editor of *The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies,* New York, The Free Press, 1971.

WILLIAM TAUBMAN—Assistant Professor of Political Science at Amherst College; his publications include *View from Lenin Hills: An American Student's Report on Soviet Youth in Ferment,* New York, Coward-McCann, 1967.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1960's in Vietnam (an exaggerated thesis in my judgment), and notes the truism that containment in Asia could not be the same as in Europe. All this is disappointingly shallow and inadequate from a man of the author's stature, touching events that have, after all, formed the core of dealings between the United States and China for the past twenty years—and that constitute the prelude to what all responsible Americans hope is a change for the better.

Perhaps the reviewer is being a shade unfair in asking that the book treat carefully and fully what what Professor Fairbank obviously wished to include at most peripherally and tangentially. Yet certainly the last chapters and the title could suggest to the reader a scope that simply is not there. In sum, this remains a superior work on all aspects of Sino-American relations through 1949, and on internal events to the present, but it contains little that is substantial or truly useful on the post-1949 interplay between the United States and China as nation-states with major interests in the area of East Asia and the Pacific.

Keys to Peking's Foreign Policy

By Donald W. Klein

ARTHUR HUCK: *The Security of China: Chinese Approaches to Problems of War and Strategy.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.
J. D. SIMMONDS: *China's World: The Foreign Policy of a Developing State.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.

CURRENT INTEREST in Chinese foreign policy makes the recent publication of these books especially timely. Arthur Huck's estimable study is a model of brevity, clarity, and excellent prose. He opens with a chapter on "Chinese outlooks," a subtly written analysis of the Chinese view of the world, which skillfully weaves together patterns found in traditional and contemporary China. He holds that while the Maoist and traditional views of the world are in some ways antithetical, both have a "determined interest in removing alien (distant, foreign, 'imperialist') influence from the periphery of China."

Then comes an excellent account of the "threats to China," which emphasizes that a "highly realistic judgment of China's multiple weaknesses would appear to be the most consistently held view of her policy-makers," and that a "low-risk strategy has been consistently adopted, whenever the danger of imperialist intervention has been high." Huck's ability to puncture clichés, a trait common to all fine synthesizers, is much in evidence here. In examining China's border policy, for example, he writes that this is "often discussed in terms of Chinese 'expansionism,' as if China had some such innate tendency. (Do states ever suffer 'contractionism'?)"

That same talent is also brought to bear in his next chapter, which might be described as a corrective for the mindless *Mein Kampf* interpretation of Lin Piao's celebrated 1965 article, "Long Live the Victory of People's War." The author does not discount China's wish to spread its influence abroad, but he rightly points to Peking's essential commitment to "revolutionary self-sufficiency": if groups in other lands wish to overthrow their established governments, they must, in the final analysis, do it themselves. He then passes to an intelligent discussion of Chinese attitudes on nuclear weaponry and strategy and concludes with some cautious speculations about the future.

There are virtually no unfamiliar facts in Huck's book, but it may well be the best work available in terms of clarity, excellence of interpretation, and brevity (less than 100 pages). In his concise preface, he notes that whereas many China specialists agree on Chinese politics and strategy, "their conclusions . . . are often remote from the bulk of journalistic or official comment on such matters." His observation might well be modified to emphasize the "remoteness" of the senior echelons of governments and influential periodicals. As for gov-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ernments, this "remoteness" is perhaps nowhere more pronounced than in the United States, which probably has the world's best group of middle-echelon China experts and the least penetration of that group's views upward to top leaders. Huck's book, therefore, would be especially recommendable for those highly placed men who—for real, imagined, or bureaucratic reasons—cannot find time to wade through lengthy, detailed, and often dully-written studies of Chinese foreign policy.

J. D. SIMMONDS' volume is a more conventional book, and many of his basic themes and ideas parallel those of Huck. But it has an importance of a different kind because of Simmonds' approach. Thus, while I regard this work as less satisfactory than Huck's book, it merits a more elaborate discussion. Simmonds has set out to write a book on Chinese foreign policy which would link foreign and domestic policy. Few others have seriously attempted this linkage; hence, he has broken ground on an approach that will probably influence future writings on Chinese foreign affairs. One is tempted to say three cheers for the effort and for suggesting a fresh approach—but back to the drawing board for further and important refinements.

The first third of the book consists of a chronological treatment of the period from 1949 to 1968, when, it is generally believed, the Cultural Revolution had run its course. A "chronology" (his term) might suggest dullness, but this is not the case. The discussion is heavily sprinkled with interpretation which is usually provocative even though not always convincing. The scene shifts back and forth from domestic to international affairs, with the author fastidiously searching out the linkage of foreign and domestic events. But, to be persuasive, such an attempt at linkage demands an equal fastidiousness concerning the use of factual data, especially in interpretative sections. Unfortunately, some sections here—a minority to be sure—are marred by errors that weaken the argumentation. For example, on p. 28 we are incorrectly told that Georgi Malenkov visited China in 1953, and on the next page is the mistaken statement that 1953 was a US presidential election year. China's State Planning Commission was not created in August 1952 (p. 25), and the new post of Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs was not established in the spring (but in the fall) of 1954 (p. 33).

The chronology is followed by a section on "policy themes." Perhaps the most arresting of these (and an implicit basis for his discussion throughout the entire work) is that connected with the agrarian nature of China. We all know, of course, that China is an agrarian nation, but I believe Simmonds is the first to link this fact specifically to foreign policy. For example, he asserts that foreign policy initiatives (or the lack of them) are intimately tied to the harvests in a country always close to the margin of available food. This observation is useful if only because most "China-watchers" live and work in industrially-oriented societies where the harvest is equated with the nearest supermarket. Simmonds offers a number of other stimulating discourses that similarly sensitize us to elements of Chinese thinking. We can argue with him on several counts—such as the meaning of the "East Wind" in Mao's famous statement that the "East Wind" will prevail over the "West Wind"—but it is seldom possible to dismiss his argumentation out of hand. The same can be said for his interpretation of China's conceptions of the "intermediate zone" and the "united front," the subjects of two of the most interesting chapters in the book. His volume concludes with a view of Chinese foreign policy strengths and weaknesses, which he attempts to tie in with the earlier sections of the book.

But the ultimate value of this study rests heavily upon the validity of Simmonds' methodology for establishing linkage between internal factors and foreign policy. He endeavors to show that domestic considerations (such as the quality of harvests) had a decisive impact on such institutional developments as changes within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To be more specific, he analyzes three things: the dating of the appointments of 17 men who have served as vice-ministers (it should be 18; he omitted Yuan Chung-hsien); the structure of and alterations in the Ministry's geographical departments; and the appointments and removals of ambassadors. The first two are explicitly mentioned in his introduction; the third is never far from his attention.

Detailed study of domestic institutions involved with foreign affairs is certainly a defensible technique. Yet it raises more problems than it solves if the wrong institutions are scrutinized, or if an insufficient number of them are examined. What was wrong with Simmonds' selection of institutions? The Foreign Affairs Ministry clearly must be included, but distorted results are inevitable if one neglects China's

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

elaborate network of "mass" or "people's" organizations. The proof, in my judgment, lies in the rather remarkable fact that China's relations with Japan, of all nations, are almost totally overlooked in Simmond's otherwise detailed study. Not having official diplomatic links with Tokyo, the Chinese punctiliously deal with Japan through their "mass" organizations; hence, one finds virtually no reflection of critical events in Sino-Japanese relations in an investigation focused almost exclusively on the Foreign Ministry. It would be grossly unfair to Simmonds to state that he has ignored all nations without formal diplomatic ties with China. However—to repeat—his neglect of Japan was probably an unfortunate by-product of his otherwise innovative research method.

Turning to the three broad types of changes that Simmonds analyzes in connection with the Foreign Ministry, we encounter other problems. Some readers may not realize that we already have precise "official" dates for the appointments of the vice-ministers—as we do for *all* vice-ministers in *all* ministries from 1949 until the Cultural Revolution began in 1966. Why, then, is Simmonds preoccupied with the "question of dating"? It is because he contends that "official" dates often shield from view more critical but unannounced "decisions" to appoint this or that vice-minister. Such an approach may have merit, but it provides a temptation to mold data to fit a hypothesis. Thus, on numerous occasions when the author is attempting to link a new vice-minister to some new course in Chinese foreign policy, he argues that the "decision" to appoint the man was "probably" taken at a date which fits his argument. In my opinion, there are too many instances of this throughout the book, and the reader finally becomes mesmerized with dating and suspects the judgments so derived.

Simmonds also attaches great weight to what he calls the "three major phases of reorganization" of the Foreign Ministry, which he places in the years 1950, 1956, and 1962. (This listing is on p. 134. Yet, for some reason, 1956 changes to 1957 on p. 236; and from the context, this new date is not a typographical error.) We then read that "in all cases the start of these phases of change can be traced to the late autumn or beginning of winter"—*i.e.*, there is a "connection between the assessment of national harvest prospects and the initiation of new foreign policy lines." On the very next page, however—in a perplexing switch—the autumn-winter formula alters to become the summer or the "beginning of the autumn." Such flexibility allows the author to "relate" changes in foreign policy to three of the four seasons!

Equally troublesome is the assertion that the Foreign Ministry has in fact been reorganized. This proposition assumes that the splitting of the Ministry's Asian Affairs Department into First and Second Asian Affairs Departments or the addition of one or two new vice-ministers, for example, amounted to a "reorganization." I cannot agree. China had an extremely small Foreign Ministry in 1949. Not surprisingly, as Peking's relations with foreign countries expanded from a handful of nations to 50-odd by the 1960's, there was a natural *bureaucratic* growth in the number of vice-ministers, and there were equally natural adjustments in responsibilities for geographic areas in order to handle this growth. Such bureaucratic growth and adjustment took place in *all* Chinese ministries after 1949. To support this statement, I will merely note that China's cabinet increased from 76 ministers and vice-ministers in 1949 to 366 in 1966 (on the eve of the Cultural Revolution). Hence, expansion and subdivision of the Foreign Ministry afford poor proof of shifts in Chinese foreign policy.

There is also the matter of ambassadorial appointments. Simmonds conveys the impression that they fell into a pattern shaped by harvest estimates, which in turn related to policy initiatives. But has there been a pattern? And has it been related to the harvest season—*i.e.*, in rough terms, to the second half of the year? Is such a notion, in short, a reliable research tool? A check by this reviewer of the dates of *all* 134 ambassadorial-level appointments from 1949 to 1966 reveals 77 from January to June and 67 from July to December. If a quarterly breakdown is fairer to Simmonds, then the figures are 41, 36, 41, and 16. Even by thirds of a year, they come out to 51, 49, and 34. On the face of things, these facts seem to disprove more than to support Simmonds' arguments; nevertheless, I would still think that bureaucratic processes and mere statistical chance probably constitute the chief factors behind the distribution.

None of these sharp criticisms of Simmonds' study should cloud the fact that it is path-breaking and stimulating. In my judgment, Huck's wide-ranging book is the superior work, but Simmonds may well have done a greater service by probing new ways of studying Chinese foreign policy. Both efforts should be welcomed.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moscow's Approach to Aid

By Roger E. Kanet

REINHOLD BISKUP:
Sowjetpolitik und Entwicklungslaender (Soviet Policy and Developing Countries). Preface by Ludwig Erhard. Freiburg i. B., Verlag Rombach, 1970.
KURT MUELLER:
Die Entwicklungshilfe Osteuropas. Konzeptionen und Schwerpunkte. (East Europe's Development Aid: Conceptions and Emphases), Hannover, Verlag fuer Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1970.

DURING THE PAST decade, both Soviet atittudes and Soviet policy with respect to developing countries have changed significantly. The unbridled optimism entertained by Moscow in the late 1950's concerning developments in Asia and Africa has been replaced by a much more realistic assessment of the prospects for economic development and for the implantation of "scientific socialism." Soviet writers are displaying a new awareness not only of the inapplicability of the Soviet model of development, with its emphasis on heavy industry, in many of the countries of the developing world, but also of the problems of economic planning in societies that lack trained personnel. They are likewise beginning to recognize the positive role of some form of capitalism in Asian and African economic development, the need for Western capital and loans, the necessity of focusing on agricultural development, and a number of other problems that they virtually ignored ten years ago. At the policy level, the Soviet leadership no longer focuses primarily on a small group of "revolutionary" countries but seeks to develop contacts with any country of potential importance to the Soviet Union, whether for strategic, economic or other reasons. Soviet involvement in the Nigerian war and the ensuing improvement in Soviet-Nigerian relations provide an excellent example of the Soviet leaders' readiness to exploit situations to Moscow's advantage—even though they ended up supporting what, by their own prior assessments, were the most conservative elements of Nigerian society.

The two volumes under review both deal with Soviet policy toward the developing countries, though from very different perspectives. While Mr. Mueller is more concerned with the factual portrayal of actual Soviet attitudes and policy and how they have changed, Dr. Biskup tries to prove that Soviet policy in the developing areas follows the centuries-old tradition of expansionism in Tsarist Russian and Soviet foreign policy.

In spite of the claim on the dust jacket that Dr. Biskup's book analyzes the role of development assistance in the long-term conception of Soviet foreign policy, *Sowjetpolitik und Entwicklungslaender* is in fact more of an ideological polemic than a careful, empirical study of Soviet policy toward developing countries. The book is based primarily on secondary sources and consists mainly of interpretations of Soviet ideological statements or summaries of other Western writers' analyses of such statements. For example, in a section supposedly dealing with "The Developing Countries in The Focus of Communist Rivalry," Biskup discusses the conflicting Chinese and Soviet views concerning world revolution, peaceful coexistence, and military doctrine, but he does not refer to the practical impact of these ideological differences on Soviet policy toward the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, on Soviet economic assistance to Asia and Africa, or on any other concrete aspect of Soviet policy.

As indicated above, Dr. Biskup's central thesis is that Soviet policy toward the developing countries is no less expansionist than was Tsarist Russian policy. In order to support this thesis, the author cites the Marxist classics and contemporary Soviet ideologists but scarcely bothers to examine the empirical evidence. For example, in his section dealing

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with Soviet economic aid (which incidentally is based only on figures through 1966, although data for 1967 and 1968 were available before the book went to press), Biskup looks only at the presumed political motivations behind the Soviet aid program and ignores such practical economic considerations as the benefits the Soviet Union stands to reap from aiding, for example, in the development of natural gas resources in northern Iran. Moreover, in his singleminded preoccupation with ideological statements, he disregards factors in the developing countries themselves that have made Soviet aid attractive to them. He also seems unaware of the debate that has been going on within the Soviet Union concerning the proper policy to follow toward the developing countries and completely ignores the significant changes that have taken place in Moscow's attitudes with respect to nationalist leaders, the prospects for successful economic development, and related topics.

Indeed, Dr. Biskup has not even presented as strong a case in support of his thesis as he might have. Had he analyzed the actual operations of the Soviet government in its dealings with the developing countries, he could have produced at least some more tangible evidence to back up his contention that Soviet policy continues to be based on a desire to expand the areas under Soviet control. His decision to focus on ideology, however, prevented him from examining the ways in which the Soviets actually operate and the methods they are employing to expand their influence. In so doing, he has added virtually nothing to our knowledge and understanding of Soviet policy.

KURT MUELLER, on the other hand, addresses himself to the actual role of development assistance in Soviet relations with the developing countries. His discussion of the relationship of Soviet assistance programs to the competing strategies of coexistence and revolution shows an awareness of most of the factors ignored in Biskup's analysis. Especially important is his survey of changing Soviet attitudes on a variety of important questions such as the applicability of the Soviet model, the role of capitalism, and the speed with which any real development can occur. The author indicates that the Soviets have become much more sanguine about the prospects for development activities as a result of more than a decade of direct experience and contacts with Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Mueller's book is largely an extension and updating of his earlier study of Communist relations with the developing states. He devotes the major portion of his present study to a careful, well-documented survey of the assistance programs undertaken by the Soviet Union and its East European allies, concentrating on eight countries which have become major recipients of Communist assistance during the past decade. He divides these countries into three groups and attempts to analyze the differing factors that motivate the Soviets and their allies in their relations with each group. The groups examined are: the "neutrals"—Afghanistan and India—which have committed themselves to a policy of non-alignment with the West; the CENTO group—Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey—which have recently become targets of Communist policy; and the major Arab states—Algeria, Egypt, and Syria—which are engaged in the struggle with Israel.

Aid and trade figures, lists of production projects, an analysis of relations between the Communist countries and the individual developing countries, and a discussion of Soviet assessments of developments in each country comprise the bulk of the study. Unfortunately, the author does not examine the role of Soviet military aid to these countries, nor does he attempt to provide an assessment of the impact of Soviet and East European aid on the development of the recipient countries.

To some degree Mueller's conclusions support Biskup's contentions concerning the expansionist character of Soviet policy. Both view economic assistance as an essential part of an effort to substitute Soviet for Western influence in the developing countries. However, Mueller also notes aspects of Soviet policy that Biskup either subsumes or completely ignores, such as Moscow's shift from a doctrinaire to a more flexible position on development, the recent Soviet focus on "capitalist" countries like Iran and Turkey, and the launching of a new type of economic assistance—production cooperation—that brings economic benefits to the USSR.

Soviet foreign policy has indeed been expansionist, as Biskup argues, but one cannot understand its expansionist nature unless one understands not merely the ideology and the ways in which it has been interpreted, but also the opportunities for expansion of Soviet influence that have arisen (in this case, in the developing countries) and the concrete ways in which the Soviet leadership has responded to those opportunities.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Building Communism

By William Taubman

ANATOLE KOPP: *Town and Revolution—Soviet Architecture and City Planning, 1917-1935.* Translated by Thomas E. Burton. New York, George Braziller, 1970.
EL LISSITZKY: *Russia—An Architecture for World Revolution.* Translated by Eric Dluhosch. Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1970.

THE YOUNG MARX has become in recent years the focus of new attention among Marxists and non-Marxists alike. One reason is that his early works reveal a concern for socio-psychological patterns—chief among them alienation—which became submerged beneath economic and political analysis in his later writings, and which have been ignored or condemned as heretical by his more dogmatic Soviet and other followers. Less noted, but remarkable for similar reasons, is the Old Lenin, whose last articles show increasing alarm about bureaucratic behavior characterized as "deplorable, not to say disgusting," and about "defects" in "our culture, our social life, our habits"—defects so fundamental that they required, or so Lenin wrote, changes in economic and political tactics.[1]

[1] V. I. Lenin, "Better Fewer, But Better" (March 1923) in Robert V. Daniels, ed., *A Documentary History of Communism*, Vol. I, New York, Vintage Books, 1962, p. 230.

Marxism-Leninism's fatal flaw has been its inattention to what the Young Marx knew and the Old Lenin seemed to have learned. Two new books on Soviet architecture remind one of this because in the 1920's and early 1930's Soviet architects and city planners hoped to transform man by providing him with a new physical environment, and because their decline and fall were due in no small measure to their failure to understand the human nature of the beast they were trying to change.

Anatole Kopp has a private architectural practice in Paris and is a planner with the Bureau d'Etudes et de Réalisations Urbaines. Recipient of an architecture degree from MIT, he has published articles in a variety of American and European journals as well as in the Soviet publication *Arkhitektura SSSR.* His book, first published in Paris in 1967, and now available in English, has enough rare and wonderful plates to qualify as a unique publication on that score alone; however, it aspires to be much more—and is, notwithstanding certain important weaknesses. Its self-proclaimed emphasis is on "the history of ideas in architecture, rather than on architectural history"; its subject, writes Kopp, is "a clue to the understanding of a passionate epoch when the world was 'turned upside down.'" It moves both chronologically ("1920-1925: The Pursuit of Formal Expression"; "1925-1932: An Architecture for the New Times") and topically ("Town and Revolution"; "Dream and Reality") and concludes with an overview—"From the Twenties to the Year 2000."

El (Eleazar Markovich) Lissitzky was, in Kopp's words, "more of a painter, illustrator or make-up man than working architect." His work and acquaintances ranged widely both in the Soviet Union and in Western Europe, where he spent a great deal of time between 1919 and his permanent return to the USSR in 1929. *Russia: An Architecture for Revolution* takes up less than 44 pages of this 239-page volume; the rest consists of plates, four short essays and work commentaries by Lissitzky, plus a series of reports on Soviet architecture and urbanism in the years 1928-33 by contemporary Russian and German observers, including Ernst May, the planner who helped design the Soviet mining city Magnitogorsk. If the selection from Lissitzky himself is brief, it is also varied, moving from the programmatic ("By virtue of the exact division of time and work rhythm, and by making each individual share in a larger common responsibility, the factory has become the place of education—the uni-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

versity for a new Socialist man") to the epigrammatic ("Space: That which is not looked at through a keyhole, nor through an open door. Space does not exist for the eye only: it is not a picture; one wants to live in it").

The story of architecture in postrevolutionary Russia touches on many themes that are paralleled in the spheres of art and literature; the utopian enthusiasm of the first years, the proliferation of schools, from the Proletcult, at one extreme, to the formalist at the other; the time of troubles —backbiting within and attacks from without; the Stalinist ice age; and after his death, attempts at renewal and retrospection. The history of Soviet architecture is less well known than that of art and literature; for many Westerners it may consist of three images—Tatlin's unrealized tower, the Stalinist wedding cake of Moscow University, and most recently the new and modernistic Palace of Congresses. Yet Soviet architecture was and is strategically placed at the point where art meets not only politics but industry and technology as well. Whereas painters and writers had to lure audiences to come to them, architects and planners built, or at least planned to build, all around the new Soviet man. And whereas artists and poets required a relatively limited subsidy (needing freedom more than anything else), architects and planners were competing for truly massive resources and matching plans with the highest-priority effort of all—industrialization.

IN KOPP'S WORDS, the new architects believed that "although architecture is (or rather ought to be) a reflection of society, it is equally its mold and a tool for social transformation; that by the very act of living in a new environment man would shake off all associations with the old." The projects designed in service of this aim were numerous and wondrous. There were communal apartment houses, most of which were more realistic than one project which would have placed orchestras in large dormitories to muffle the collective snoring and induce collective sleep. There were workers' clubs (Lissitzky called them "social power plants"), not all of which were too expensive or technically impossible to build. There were Constructivist symbols inspired by the machine and intended to be intelligible to the masses, like the planned (though never erected) *Leningradskaia pravda* building, on whose facade the Brothers Vesnin would have tacked as many moving parts as possible, among them the elevators.

In city planning there were the "urbanists" who proposed new cities built around communal housing, with a maximum population of 40 to 50 thousand, and the "de-urbanists," who dreamed of linear cities—small homes spread evenly with industry along highways, and power lines criss-crossing the entire land. By today's standards, both the urbanists and de-urbanists were anti-urban.

Kopp's judgment of the new architects is positive:

. . . they formulated all the important problems of architecture and modern urban and regional planning. They devised new forms, which in many cases were much later in reaching the West; they anticipated techniques in use today, and others that are still in the future; and thus proved that a new architecture is formed not only of the experimental and inventive spirit of its creators, not only of technical advances but, above all, of the problems with which history suddenly confronts society.

They were, one might add, ahead of their time in other areas as well. Lissitzky's injunction to developers of the Black Sea coast resorts (to seek to reconcile "two contradictory elements—the free and organic growth of nature, seen as an entity of stone, vegetation and water, as opposed to the unity created by man") shows a sensitivity which a later generation would recognize as ecological. Lissitzky's work for the futurist opera *Victory Over the Sun* was based on a multi-media approach: he planned "objects which slide, roll and hover on, in and above the scaffolding . . . ; [and] at the flick of a switch . . . the din of a railroad station, or the roar of Niagara Falls, or the pounding of a steel-rolling mill." And behind the push for communal kitchens, which both Soviet leaders and masses came to reject as premature, was, among other things, an early striving for women's liberation.

IT SEEMS ALL TOO clear, in retrospect, that the new architecture was doomed to an early demise under Stalin. Yet the question "Why?" presents problems which are not discussed satisfactorily either by Kopp or in the German essays reprinted in the appendix to the Lissitzky volume. Kopp's answer is based on two main factors: Russia's economic and technological backwardness, and the architects' and planners' utopianism.

His stress on the first is to

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the point. Postwar reconstruction and then industrialization made demands which the regime would not deny, and even inflated; working with what was left, architects built projects which, in the absence of funds and technological means, mocked their promises—for example, communal houses which were in fact overcrowded barracks.

In support of his second line of explanation, Kopp cites the contemporary reactions of Western masters. *E.g.,* he quotes Frank Lloyd Wright on the proletarians' taste in architecture: "Nothing pleases them so much as the gleam of marble columns under high ceilings, glittering chandeliers, unmistakable luxury as they had to look up to it when it decided their fate, when they ate out of luxury's hand if at all."

Kopp's two-part answer leaves him free to hail what he calls "objective conditions" favoring good architecture and rational city planning—that is, state ownership of land and national economic planning. Such conditions, he argues, "made it possible to avoid the worst and begin again on solid footing in 1955." Presumably, the "worst" is what exists in capitalist, "consumer societies," which the Soviet Union, given these "objective conditions," is certain to outshine. But it is precisely this sort of logic which, when applied to general Soviet evolution, has received devastating and justified criticism. The official party line on Stalinism has been that the "cult of the personality" was an accident due to a combination of Russian backwardness and Stalin's own warped personality; since the political-economic system is "objectively" sound, progress has, of course, resumed and can be expected to continue, and there is no need for agonizing reappraisals —the sort so many revisionist and other writers have tried to offer— of the system's fundamentals.

The fact that the line on Stalin is so obviously self-serving does not mean that a variation of it necessarily misappraises the situation in architecture and city planning. In fact, it is a fascinating question whether the state Socialist system, with all its faults, is not better suited than free enterprise systems to attack post-industrial problems like pollution and urban decay. Yet, contrary to Kopp's confident assumptions, this is not a question that is easily decided. Answering it requires examination of other questions: Why has it taken so long to reorder the Soviet system of priorities, which puts heavy industry first and shortchanges housing and, in particular, municipal services? Hasn't Soviet bureaucratic behavior — supercentralization in some areas, chaotic interagency conflict in others—done its part to prevent planned and balanced urban growth? Granted that the Soviet Union has pushed far past the United States in the industrialized technology of low-cost housing, hasn't standardization combined with bad taste to produce town planning, which architecture critic Ada Louise Huxtable once described as "the sterile neoclassicism of endless straight avenues, vacuous squares and conventionally ruled-off residential quarters"?[2] W riting in 1931, Ernst May can be excused for drawing a contrast between Western cities, with their growth distorted by private ownership of the land, and Soviet cities influenced "solely by the laws of social hygiene and economy." But in 1971, such a comparison, to which Mr. Kopp comes perilously close, is far less defensible.

MR. KOPP'S American publisher informs us that he "traveled and researched extensively in the Soviet Union." Kopp himself adds that he decided "to use essentially only Soviet documents of the period and studies recently published in the Soviet Union." Perhaps this explains why he devoted a great deal of space to debunking Stalinist interpretations so patently false (for example, the charge that Lissitzky was a formalist pure and simple, with no political and social concerns) as to be dismissed by the briefest glance at the primary sources. It may also explain why his prose rings, at least in translation, with Soviet-style rhetoric— *e.g.,* his opening paragraph's melodramatic announcement that October 1917 "marked the collapse not merely of a decrepit and corrupt political system but of an entire society, its customs, its rites, and way of life"; or his assertion that West European "ruling circles" have shown a "violent opposition" to modern architecture; or his reference to "objective conditions" which allegedly guarantee the long-run success of Soviet city planning.

The trouble with designating some conditions objective and others subjective is that the distinction implies the former are prior and determinative, while the latter are derivative and subject to change. The fact that certain subjective factors—among them some which have plagued and continue to plague Soviet architecture and city planning—are important and enduring is what the Young Marx and the Old Lenin were talking about.

[2] *The New York Times,* Oct. 19, 1967, p. 26.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notes & Views

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

ON THE CC-CPSU

TO THE EDITORS: In an otherwise excellent article ("Keynote—Compromise") in your July-August issue, Professor Leonard Schapiro drew some faulty conclusions about the new Central Committee elected at the recent Soviet Party Congress.

Professor Schapiro directed "special attention" to the appearance of 12 regional party first secretaries of "a new and markedly different type" among the new full members of the CC. All, he said, were appointed to their posts "within a few months preceding the Congress, replacing men in their early sixties who have apparently been retired." All 12 were said to be under 50, with "long and extensive technical experience" and "slight, or even, in some cases, non-existent" prior service in the party apparatus. This development was seen as indicative of the party's intent to step up its interference in state affairs, relying on the technical rather than party-professional background of its new appointees to make such interference more acceptable to the state apparatus.

Having just completed an analysis of the new Central Committee, I was chagrined at not having noticed this phenomenon myself, and sought to determine to which of the new full members Professor Schapiro was referring. I must admit perplexity at the results of my investigation. My conclusions were: (1) one must include appointments made over two years prior to the Congress to compile a list of the twelve; (2) for the most part, the predecessors of these men were neither in their 60's nor retired; (3) these new regional first secretaries have, almost without exception, (a) a lengthy record of service in party or government offices and (b) no significantly longer record of technical experience than their predecessors in these offices.

In the six to eight months preceding the Congress, only three regional first secretaries subsequently elected to full CC membership were appointed. Relaxing the definition of "a few months" somewhat, one discovers only 13 who received their positions at any time since the start of 1969. One of these (G. V. Romanov) had been on the 1966 CC; one must assume that the remaining dozen are the ones Shapiro has in mind.

Of these 12, however, four (M. G. Voropaev, A. K. Cherny, M. Z. Shakirov, and P. P. Kozyr) are known to be over 50 years of age, and the last is further disqualified from Schapiro's list by lack of technical work experience. (I lack biographical data on one of the remaining eight—Ya. P. Riabov—and shall merely assume that he fits Schapiro's age and career specifications.)

Examining the careers of the remaining group, we find only *one* (V. I. Dolgikh, appointed in April 1969 as first secretary in Krasnoyarsk Krai) who can be said to have only "slight" or "non-existent" apparatus experience. His predecessor (A. A. Kokarev, *not* retired but holding another CC-level job) is, indeed, over 60. But Kokarev had compiled an impressive amount of technical experience during his own career. The six remaining secretaries under age 50 for whom biographies are available average *fourteen* years of full-time political work.

Indeed, if Schapiro's point is to draw a contrast between the eight new secretaries under age 50 and their predecessors (only three of whom, incidentally, were over 60, and only four of whom are apparently "retired"), he should have examined more thoroughly the careers of these latter men. In only one case other than that in Krasnoyarsk did the new incumbent possess significantly more technical experience than the man he replaced. And in two of these cases (M. S. Gorbachev and V. M. Tsybulko), the new younger men had *no* technical experience at all.

It appears that Mr. Schapiro's resulting generalization —which asserts a sudden pre-Congress flurry of appointments of men of a "markedly different type," resulting from a Brezhnev-Kosygin compromise and presaging a new relationship between party and state—is in fact without support. Though the newer regional party secretaries in the CC are, expectably, younger, they are not in fact significantly different in background from their predecessors.

One other comment on Schapiro's analysis is in order. He refers to the fact that 3.7 percent of the Central Auditing Commission members had served as full members of the previous CC, and that these were "mostly persons whose careers have associated them with Shelepin—a fact which provides further evidence that he has fallen from grace." There are indeed signs of Shelepin's decline, but this one appears to be "stretched." The number of CAC members constituting 3.7 percent is *three*. Of these, it can indeed be said that S. P. Pavlov's career is associated with Shelepin's, but certainly not L. N. Yefremov's. And while V. M. Churaev briefly served on the RSFSR Party-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

State Control Committee while Shelepin was heading the all-Union committee, this man's ties with Khrushchev (and even Podgorny) seem stronger than his association with Shelepin.

ROBERT H. DONALDSON
Dept. of Political Science
Vanderbilt University
Nashville, Tennessee

ON SOVIET SOCIOLOGY

TO THE EDITORS: Having just returned from a year at Moscow State University, where I was an exchange student in sociology, I should like to correct some inaccuracies in Mr. Zev Katz' rather cold-war-style report on sociology in the Soviet Union (May-June 1971). Contrary to Mr. Katz' statement, the first university chair of sociology in the USSR, held by Professor G. M. Andreeva, established a new Kafedra (Department) of Methods of Concrete Social Research which does indeed provide a course of study for undergraduates. The first group of students will have completed the course in two years' time, and many of them will presumably go on to graduate study in sociology. While the number of undergraduates receiving such training is small, this group and those after them will in fact have had formal training in the discipline. Attempts to establish similar courses in Leningrad State University and other institutions of higher education seem unable to get off the ground, but the Herzen Leningrad State Pedagogical Institute recently formed a Faculty of Social Psychology under Professor B. D. Parygin.

Mr. Katz consistently translates *konkretnye sotsialnye issledovaniia* as "applied social research" rather than "concrete social research." Neither Soviet sociologists themselves nor previous Western commentators have thus mistranslated the term. In Soviet usage, "concrete" is employed to distinguish sociological research, which studies the specific laws of society by empirical methods, from more general Marxist-Leninist sociology (historical materialism, scientific communism), which concentrates on the general laws of societal development. Such concrete research is supposed to link up with Marxist-Leninist "grand theory." The word "concrete" is used to distinguish such research from "mere bourgeois empiricism," which usually does not have such pretensions to connections with grand theory. The Soviet distinction is thus not the same as that generally made in this country between "theoretical" or "pure" and "applied" sociology. While Mr. Katz' mistranslation supports his conception of sociology in the USSR as the party's servant that may yet corrupt its master, it creates the illusion—as does much in the article—that sociological research is more practical, more tied to decision-making, and in general more common in the Soviet Union than may in fact be the case. (There is no doubt that Soviet sociologists and many Soviet decision-makers would like to feel that sociology is in fact being put to use, but my guess is that the situation is not unlike that prevailing in the United States, where decision-makers often adopt those conclusions of social research that agree with their preconceived notions and reject those that do not.) Sociology in the Soviet Union is not all Machiavellian politics; it has its intellectual side.

I suggest that as important a reason for the rebirth of sociology in the USSR as those Mr. Katz gives—the need for new instruments of control, considerations of national prestige, erosion of the ideology, careerism—is simple intellectual curiosity about Soviet society. To quote Isaac Deutscher, after more than half a century ". . . Soviet society does not know itself and is intensely conscious of this."

WESLEY A. FISHER
Department of Sociology
and Russian Institute
Columbia University
New York

MR. KATZ REPLIES: I was glad to learn from Wesley A. Fisher's letter that sociology is indeed being taught to undergraduates at Moscow University. I have recently heard from Professor A. Belitsky, of the University of Kiev, that sociology is one of the three major units of specialization for undergraduates within the Department of Philosophy at Kiev University. When I wrote the article I did not have this information and described the situation accordingly. It is to be hoped that the difficulties at other universities will be overcome and that sociology will become a widely taught subject in Soviet higher educational institutions.

In my project papers on Soviet sociology (at Glasgow and Harvard), I have often translated the Soviet term *konkretnye sotsialnye issledovaniia* with the word "concrete." However, in adapting my material for the article in your journal I was advised by both professional sociologists and translators from the Russian that the word "applied" would be more suitable for the English reader. Having spent an academic year in the USSR learning about sociology there, Mr. Fisher understands perhaps better than others the sensitivity of Soviet sociologists in these matters. It may, therefore, be right to accept his remark and use "concrete," especially since this would be more acceptable to our Soviet colleagues.

Mr. Fisher is obviously correct in pointing out that Soviet sociologists may be motivated, among other reasons, by "intellectual curiosity about Soviet society," and I have said so in my article.

As for his remark about the "cold-war style" of my article, doesn't Mr. Fisher's letter lend itself to such a description? It seems to me that a general study of the interrelation between the development of sociology and the Soviet system could be carried out basically in two ways: (a) one could try to avoid injuring political sensibilities by dealing with the subject in a manner abstract enough to prevent any coming to grips with realities; or (b) one could discuss in practical terms the mutual impact of sociology and the Soviet system on each other, without regard to possible rejoinders such as the "cold-war style" remark. Both ways have their advantages and disadvantages, and I have preferred the second.

Mr. Fisher suggests that "the situation [in the Soviet Union] is not unlike that prevailing in the United States, where decision-makers often adopt those conclusions of social research that agree with their preconceived notions and reject those that do not." This may indeed be so. But couldn't a Soviet critic regard this as a detrimental cold-war statement on Soviet decision-makers and sociologists, written in the spirit of the famous "convergence theory"? And isn't it somewhat in the Machievellian style to suggest that this is the case? Remembering the saying about people who live in glass houses, etc., shouldn't we all be rather careful about pinning the "cold-war" label on each other?

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Index to Volume XX

Annual indices for Volumes IV-XIX appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954). Numbers appearing to the right of the columns below refer to bimonthly issues.

THE SOVIET UNION

Conflict on the Ussuri: A Clash of Nationalisms
by Harold C. Hinton 1-2
Sociology in the Soviet Union
by Zev Katz 3
The 24th CPSU Congress
Keynote—Compromise
by Leonard Shapiro 4
Brezhnev and the Succession Issue
by Myron Rush 4
The Dilemma of Party Growth
by Darrell P. Hammer 4
Interparty Relations: The Limits of "Normalization"
by Kevin Devlin 4
Soviet Economic Reform at an Impasse
by Gertrude E. Schroeder 4
Women in the USSR
by Lotta Lennon 4
Prospects for Soviet Agriculture
by Roy D. Laird 5
Lumumba University: An Assessment
by Alvin Z. Rubinstein 6
Documents on Political Dissent 4

EASTERN EUROPE

Prague's Spring: Roots and Reasons
The Economic Impact of Stalinism
by Ota Sik 3
The Road to Reform
by Galia Golan 3
Industrial Cooperation: East Europe Looks West
by Michael Gamarnikow 3
Polish Perspectives, Past and Present
by A. Ross Johnson 4
Romanian Foreign Policy: A Case of Partial Alignment
by Robert L. Farlow 6

ASIA

Focus on Asia
Patterns of Asian Communism
by Robert A. Scalapino 1-2
The New Posture of the CPJ
by Paul F. Langer 1-2
PKI Fortunes at Low Tide
by Ruth T. McVey 1-2
Pyongyang's Search for Legitimacy
by Joungwon A. Kim 1-2
Conflict on the Ussuri: A Clash of Nationalisms
by Harold C. Hinton 1-2
Is China Expansionist?
A Design for Aggression
by Franz Michael 1-2
Mao Tse-tung and Revolutionary "Self-Reliance"
by Peter Van Ness 1-2
The New Face of Maoist China
by Tillman Durdin 5
China's New Diplomacy: A Symposium (I)
Commentaries:
Allen S. Whiting 6
G. F. Hudson 6
Robert A. Scalapino 6
Roderick MacFarquhar 6
Robert W. Barnett 6
C. P. FitzGerald 6
Zbigniew Brzezinski 6
Juergen Domes 6
Morton H. Halperin 6
Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy
by Harry G. Gelber 6

LATIN AMERICA

Whither Chile?
The Allende Regime: Actions and Reactions
by Leon Gouré and Jaime Suchlicki 3
Political Tradition and Perspectives
by Luis Aguilar 3
Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay
by Robert Moss 5

COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

What Makes "Socialist Law" Socialist?
by Harold J. Berman 5
Twenty Years After: The Crisis of Soviet-Type Systems
by Zygmunt Bauman 6

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MARXISM-LENINISM

An Inconclusive Dialogue
by Edmund Demaitre 5

BOOK REVIEWS

China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1945, by Harold C. Hinton; *Revolution and China's Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*, by Peter Van Ness—G. F. Hudson 1-2
The Communist Revolution in Asia (2nd ed.), Robert A. Scalapino, Ed.; *Issues in the Future of Asia: Communist and Non-Communist Alternatives*, Richard Lowenthal, Ed.—J. Bandyopadhyaya 1-2
Banner of People's War, The Party's Military Line, by General Vo Nguyen Giap; *Visions of Victory: Selected Vietnamese Communist Military Writings, 1964-1968*, Patrick J. McGarvey, Ed.; *General Giap: Politician and Strategist*, by Robert J. O'Neill—Melvin Gurtov 1-2
Kim Il Sung: Biography (3 vols.), by Baik Bong; *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948*, by Dae-Sook Suh—B. C. Koh 1-2
The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, by Robert L. Sansom—Alexander Woodside 1-2
Marxism and Asia, An Introduction with Readings, by Helene Carrere D'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram—A. Doak Barnett 1-2
Politics Versus Economics: The Foreign Trade and Aid Policies of China, by Sidney Klein—Chi-ming Hou . . . 1-2
The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China, by Yuan-Li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks—Genevieve Dean 1-2
Education in Communist China, by R. F. Price—Leo A. Orleans 1-2
Education and Communism in China, An Anthology of Commentary and Documents, Stewart E. Fraser, Ed.—C. T. Hu 1-2
The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928-1931, by Richard C. Thornton—John E. Rue 1-2
Canton Under Communism: Progress and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968, by Ezra Vogel—Robert F. Dernberger 1-2
As Peking Sees Us, by Yuan-Li Wu—William J. Parente . . 1-2
Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad, by Klaus Mehnert—Richard M. Pfeffer 1-2
The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920-1966, by Robert A. Scalapino—Rodger Swearingen 1-2
Guerrilla Movements in Latin America, by Richard Gott—Paul E. Sigmund 3
The Soviet Union and Latin America, J. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, Eds.; *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1918-1968: A Documentary Survey*, Stephen Clissold, Ed.; *Soviet Image of Contemporary Latin America: A Documentary History, 1960-1968*, Robert G. Carlton, Ed.; *Communist China and Latin America, 1959-1967*, by Cecil Johnson—Yale H. Ferguson 3
The Soviet Prefects, by Jerry Hough—Philip D. Stewart . . 3
In Quest of Justice: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union Today, Abraham Brumberg, Ed.—Paul A. Smith, Jr. 3
Delovaia Amerika: Zapiski inzhenera (Efficient America: An Engineer's Notes), 2nd ed., by Nikolai N. Smeliakov; *Politicheskaia organizatsiia SShA: Obshchestvennye instituty i ikh vzaimodeistvie s gosudarstvom* (The Political Organization of the USA: Social Institutions and Their Interaction with the State), by Galina G. Boichenko; *Nauchno-tekhnicheskii progress i rabochii klass SShA* (Scientific and Technical Progress and the Working Class of the USA), by Nikolai D. Gauzner—Richard M. Mills 3
Polish Society, by Jan Szczepanski—Adam Bromke 4
Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Eds.—Jan F. Triska 4
Involuntary Journey to Siberia, by Andrei Amalrik (Trans. by Manya Harari and Max Hayward)—Abraham Brumberg 4
The Secret Road to World War Two: Soviet Versus Western Intelligence, 1921-1939, by Paul W. Blackstock—Lothar Metzl 4
Mysli i vospominaniia o Lenine (Thoughts and Reminiscences About Lenin), by Anastas I. Mikoyan—Sidney I. Ploss 4
The Other Side of Coexistence, by Albert L. Weeks—Kempton B. Jenkins 4
Coexistence and Commerce—Guidelines for Transactions Between East and West, by Samuel Pisar—James Ramsey 4
For the Good of the Cause, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn (Trans. and ed. by David Floyd and Max Hayward)—Stafford Smiley 4
Khrushchev Remembers (Trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbot)—Carl A. Linden 5
Fragen, Antworten, Fragen. Aus der Biographie eines deutschen Marxisten (Questions, Answers, Questions. From the Biography of a German Marxist), by Robert Havemann; *Ostblock intern. 13 Jahre Dolmetscher fuer die polnische Partei und Staatsfuehrung* (The East Bloc from the Inside. Thirteen Years As a Translator for the Polish Party and State Leadership) by Erwin Weit—Melvin Croan 5
Cuba, or the Pursuit of Freedom, by Hugh Thomas; *Guerrillas in Power*, by K. S. Karol—Boris Goldenberg 5
Change in Communist Systems, Chalmers Johnson, Ed.; *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, Eds.—John W. Burton 5
The Role and Status of Women in the Soviet Union, by Donald R. Brown; *Women in the Soviet Union* (Author unspecified)—Ellen Mickiewicz 5
Between Two Ages—America's Role in the Technetronic Era, by Zbigniew Brzezinski—Stanislaw Wasowski 5
Czechoslovakia Since World War II, by Tad Szulc; *The Czechoslovak Experiment*, by Ivan Svitak; *Czechoslovakia—Intervention and Impact*, I. William Zartman, Ed.—Blanca Jicinski 5
Kronstadt 1921, by Paul Avrich—Harold Shukman 5
Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1957-1967, by William Zimmerman—Robert G. Wesson 5
The Battle Stalin Lost: Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-1953, by Vladimir Dedijer—Vladimir Petrov 5

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba, by Richard R. Fagen—Victor Alba 5
The United States and China (rev., 3rd ed.), by John K. Fairbank—William P. Bundy 6
The Security of China: Chinese Approaches to Problems of War and Strategy, by Arthur Huck; *China's World: The Foreign Policy of A Developing State*, by J. D. Simmonds—Donald W. Klein 6
Sowjetpolitik und Entwicklungslaender (Soviet Policy and Developing Countries) by Reinhold Biskup; *Die Entwicklungshilfe Osteuropas: Konzeptionen und Schwerpunkte* (East Europe's Development Aid: Conceptions and Emphases), by Kurt Mueller—Roger E. Kanet 6
Town and Revolution: Soviet Architecture and City Planning, 1917-1935, by Anatole Kopp; *Russia; An Architecture for World Revolution*, by El Lissitzky—William Taubman 6

CONTRIBUTORS' INDEX

Aguilar, Luis—Political Tradition and Perspectives 3
Alba, Victor—review 5
Bandyopadhyaya, J.—review 1-2
Barnett, A. Doak—review 1-2
Barnett, Robert W.—China's New Diplomacy 6
Bauman, Zygmunt—Twenty Years After: The Crisis of Soviet-Type Systems 6
Berman, Harold J.—What Makes "Socialist Law" Socialist? 5
Bromke, Adam—review 4
Brumberg, Abraham—review 4
Bundy, William P.—review 6
Burton, John W.—review 5
Brzezinski, Zbigniew—China's New Diplomacy 6
Croan, Melvin—review 5
Dean, Genevieve—review 1-2
Demaitre, Edmund—An Inconclusive Dialogue 5
Dernberger, Robert F.—review 1-2
Devlin, Kevin—Interparty Relations: The Limits of "Normalization" 4
Domes, Juergen—China's New Diplomacy 6
Durdin, Tillman—The New Face of Maoist China 5
Farlow, Robert L.—Romanian Foreign Policy: A Case of Partial Alignment 6
Ferguson, Yale H.—review 3
FitzGerald, C. P.—China's New Diplomacy 6
Gamarnikow, Michael—Industrial Cooperation: East Europe Looks West 3
Gelber, Harry G.—Nuclear Weapons in Chinese Strategy 6
Golan, Galia—The Road to Reform 3
Goldenberg, Boris—review 5
Gouré, Leon—The Allende Regime: Actions and Reactions 3
Gurtov, Melvin—review 1-2
Halperin, Morton H.—China's New Diplomacy 6
Hammer, Darrell P.—The Dilemma of Party Growth 4
Hinton, Harold C.—Conflict on the Ussuri: A Clash of Nationalisms 1-2
Hou, Chi-ming—review 1-2
Hu, C. T.—review 1-2
Hudson, G. F.—China's New Diplomacy 6
review 1-2
Jenkins, Kempton B.—review 4
Jicinski, Blanca—review 5
Johnson, A. Ross—Polish Perspectives, Past and Present 4
Kanet, Roger E.—review 6
Katz, Zev—Sociology in the Soviet Union 3
Kim, Joungwon A.—Pyongyang's Search for Legitimacy . 1-2
Klein, Donald W.—review 6
Koh, B. C.—review 1-2
Laird, Roy D.—Prospects for Soviet Agriculture 5
Langer, Paul F.—The New Posture of the CPJ 1-2
Lennon, Lotta—Women in the USSR 4
Linden, Carl A.—review 5
MacFarquhar, Roderick—China's New Diplomacy 6
McVey, Ruth T.—PKI Fortunes at Low Tide 1-2
Metzl, Lothar—review 4
Michael, Franz—A Design for Aggression 1-2
Mickiewicz, Ellen—review 5
Mills, Richard M.—review 3
Moss, Robert—Urban Guerrillas in Uruguay 5
Orleans, Leo A.—review 1-2
Parente, William J.—review 1-2
Petrov, Vladimir—review 5
Pfeffer, Richard M.—review 1-2
Ploss, Sidney I.—review 4
Ramsey, James—review 4
Rubinstein, Alvin Z.—Lumumba University: An Assessment 6
Rue, John E.—review 1-2
Rush, Myron—Brezhnev and the Succession Issue 4
Scalapino, Robert A.—Patterns of Asian Communism . . 1-2
China's New Diplomacy 6
Schapiro, Leonard—Keynote—Compromise 4
Schroeder, Gertrude E.—Soviet Economic Reform at an Impasse 4
Shukman, Harold—review 5
Sigmund, Paul E.—review 3
Sik, Ota—The Economic Impact of Stalinism 3
Smiley, Stafford—review 4
Smith, Paul A., Jr.—review 3
Stewart, Philip D.—review 3
Suchlicki, Jaime—The Allende Regime: Actions and Reactions 3
Swearinghen, Rodger—review 1-2
Taubman, William—review 6
Triska, Jan F.—review 4
Van Ness, Peter—Mao Tse-tung and Revolutionary "Self-Reliance" 1-2
Wasowski, Stanislaw—review 5
Wesson, Robert G.—review 5
Whiting, Allen S.—China's New Diplomacy 6
Woodside, Alexander—review 1-2

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED